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ABSTRACT
This thesis considers the role of the mainstream South African print media in perpetuating
discrimination during the years of legalised racial discrimination – commonly known as
apartheid – from when the Herenigde Nationale Party took power in May 1948 with an
unprecedented 28-seat swing under the leadership of 74-year-old Dr Daniel F. Malan until it
was replaced by the African National Congress, black-dominated unity government in April,
1994. Against an historical background, it focuses on the agenda and efforts of the
mainstream metropolitan print media during the apartheid era, the build-up to the first nonracial elections, and the media’s role in the immediate post-apartheid era.
Race and class-based inequalities have always been a feature of South African life
since settlement when the Dutch arrived at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652. The era of racial
segregation can broadly be categorised as starting from 1910 to 1948, the Immigrant
Regulation Act of 1913 that prevented the free movement of Indians across the provincial
borders of Natal, which also placed restrictions on Indians owning land outside Natal
province. Black land ownership was subjected to similar regulations with the Scheduled
Areas of the Native Lands Act of 1913 and later the Native (Urban Areas) Act.
But it was from 1948 that the era of apartheid started under the National Party leader
Dr Malan, known as the father of apartheid, a racially discriminatory and evil practice based
entirely on racial superiority and aimed at keeping the minority white tribe of Africa in
control over the indigenous people. This “separate development” policy was already
entrenched in South African society by the time the National Party took control after the 1948
elections, but Malan legislated oppression by introducing various Acts of Parliament and in
1953 disenfranchised the “Coloured” people by removing them from the voters’ role.
Instead of opposing this blatant racism and discrimination that lasted nearly half a
century, the South African mainstream print media – both the English and Afrikaans language
press – embraced the new direction in the early years with an enthusiasm that reflected
poorly on the role of the press. During the early reign of the National Party, from 1949 to the
mid-50s, the English-language newspapers were weak and fearful, lacked integrity and
honesty, and failed in their duty as public watchdog. While the Afrikaans-language
newspapers were developing to support government policies, the English press shared similar
views. Both the English and Afrikaans press failed in their duties as the Fourth Estate in
keeping a watchful eye on government. They never opposed the status quo and offered little
or no support for a system of equality for all the peoples of South Africa. Although, in many
ways the press was severely restricted in performing its proper role, ultimately it was a whitecontrolled press which profited from apartheid.
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This thesis argues that despite its efforts, fundamental political change was never the
agenda of the press, nor was equality of the various races. Definitely not the Afrikaans press
and certainly not the English press despite the role that it seeks to claim in the post-apartheid
era as a de facto opposition and a constant nagging thorn in the side of government.
At times the English press wore the mantle of the opposition press and chided the
government on various excesses but at the same time remained a conservative institution that
practised much the same discriminatory policies of apartheid. Now, as South Africa continues
along a new path of democracy, it is not a question of whether there is need for a reappraisal
of the media in the post-apartheid era, but what shape or form it should take.
This thesis aims to redirect the functions and role of the national print media and
suggests that while the owners and the gatekeepers remain the same, on their past record,
there is a justifiable cause for concern in a country struggling to come to terms with
democracy and concludes that fundamental change is needed.
By way of conclusion, I attempt to show that the South African print media, despite
being hindered by a variety of laws to suppress criticism of the government, was at best
hypocritical, at worst inherently racist and secular, tacitly supportive of the apartheid regime
during the rule of the Nationalists and is now in need of reorganisation and fundamental
structural change to meet the future challenges in a redeveloping nation.
It is not a case of whether that change is effected but how it will be done that is at
issue. How that change will be effected depends both on a willingness for change on the part
of the major publishers, full integration and a more balanced racially-representative staff, as
well as a commitment to open government on the part of the ruling establishment.
With the demise of the National Party government and the introduction of the first
non-racial parliament, it is my contention that it is now timely to forge a new media order,
incorporating the best of what is good in the rest of the world and shedding that which is
cumbersome while at the same time being sensitive to the development of an emerging
democracy. This does not mean that the new media order should be of a restrictive nature, nor
is it a call for the media to be less vigorous in its role of keeping Government honest.
The press must be free to criticise, investigate and chide the government. However, in
the early years of nation building the role of the press should in some ways be more
supportive rather than fiercely antagonistic, defiantly critical or adversarial. In short, the new
media order should work towards reconciling the need for openness and the right to speak
one’s mind with the necessity for healing the wounds created by racism. In the words of
African National Congress stalwart Albie Sachs (1990):
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We must remember that the objective is to open doors that are at present
closed, not to create more blockages to the free circulation of ideas and
information. We would have gained little if we were to replace the present
media controls with new ones that simply switch the propaganda and
biases around; if one realm of banality takes over from another. Truth has
always favoured the democratic cause, and our people are tired of forever
being protected in the name of what others think is good for them.1
The press in South Africa does not exist in a vacuum. Large sections of the South
African print media grew fat on the machinery of apartheid. Racism was rife in many
newsrooms and evidence given to both the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the
Racism in the Media inquiry amply illustrates this. At the very least there is now a moral
obligation on the part of the media to participate constructively in the transformation just as
there is an obligation on all sectors of South African industries and trades to adopt Black
Economic Empowerment objectives.

Notes
1.

Sachs, Albie, Protecting human rights in a new South Africa, Oxford University
Press, Cape Town, 1990, pages 51-52.

7

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Certification

2

Acknowledgments

3

Dedication

4

Abstract

5

Table of Contents

8

Prologue

10

Introduction

14

Chapter One
South African press freedoms − an historical context

22

Chapter Two
South African press structure and practice

30

Chapter Three
Apartheid and press repression

68

Chapter Four
Post-apartheid paradoxes

100

Chapter Five
Towards a free press

131

Chapter Six
Racism and the media

170

8

Chapter Seven
New directions and options for change

194

Chapter Eight
Changing of the guard

228

Bibliography

255

Appendix A
Main newspapers of South Africa

273

Appendix B
Mission statement South African National Editors Forum

275

Appendix C
Aspects of Independent Newspapers’ submission to TRC

278

Appendix D
Comment piece by Professor Guy Berger, in Mail & Guardian

286

Appendix E
ASEAN Consultation on Press Systems in Asia

289

9

PROLOGUE
Job reservation and discrimination in the workplace were features of the South African
political landscape as far back as the 1920s. Many jobs were reserved for whites with no skills
and only the very menial jobs were reserved for blacks. By blacks I mean the coloured, Indian
and Bantu population. It was intended to provide unskilled and poorly educated whites with
what was described as “European living standards”.
This colour-based job reservation was “legitimised” with amendments to the Industrial
Conciliation Act (job reservations) introduced in 1956 and 1959. Under the Industrial
Conciliation Act of 1956, categories of work were reserved for particular races. For example,
trades such as electricians, plumbers, motor mechanics were reserved for whites while black
people were restricted to manual labour, servants and mineworkers. The small white
community was given the best and highest paying jobs to reinforce the beliefs of white
superiority. Coloureds were given second best and black people were largely restricted to
menial work.
The apartheid government’s Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 can be
regarded as another attempt to provide a measure of insurance for white
labour against unemployment. The Act enforced job reservation and racial
separation in trade unions and was designed to afford the white group
another legal barrier against non-white encroachment.1
The system of apartheid has left a legacy of inequality in the labour market and this
inequality reveals itself in the distribution of jobs, occupations and incomes according to race,
gender and disability.
However, job reservation did not apply to journalism. It was unnecessary because there
were no training facilities for black journalists and universities that offered journalism/media
studies as a career option were reserved exclusively for whites. In addition, publishers of the
major newspapers steadfastly refused to employ black and coloured journalists.
There was no place for them. The focus of the news was directed towards whites, the
content of the papers was geared towards whites, the advertisers were chasing the high
spending power of the whites and black people did not fit into the equation. The first black
journalists only started trickling into the profession in the early 1970s and then only on
specific, racially targeted newspapers.
It is this history of oppression and exclusivity during the apartheid years that sowed the
seeds of discontent between the ANC-led government and the national press. By the time the
apartheid system collapsed in the early 1990s and the election of the Government of National
Unity in April 1994, there was growing optimism for a new era of national transformation.
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The national media were expected to be a part of this transformation. More than that,
government expectations were that the media would be supportive in the early years of nation
building. Instead, the government faced a critical media which it considered antagonistic and
hostile. Instead of the developmental approach which the government desired, it faced the full
scrutiny of a Western libertarian media which operates in much stronger and older
democracies.
This was illustrated in a presidential address by Nelson Mandela at the 50th ANC
conference held in Mafeking on December 16, 1997.
We have to confront the fact that during the last three years, the matter has
become perfectly clear that the bulk of the mass media in our country has
set itself up as force opposed to the ANC.
In a manner akin to what the National Party is doing in its sphere, this
media exploits the dominant positions it achieved as a result of the
apartheid system,
to campaign against both real change and the real agents of change, as
represented by our movement, led by the ANC.
In this context, it also takes advantage of the fact that, thanks to decades of
repression and prohibition of a mass media genuinely representative of the
voice of the majority of the people of South Africa, this majority has no
choice but to rely for information and communication on a media
representing the privileged minority.
To protect its own privileged positions, which are a continuation of the
apartheid legacy, it does not hesitate to denounce all efforts to ensure its
own transformation, consistent with the objectives of a non-racial
democracy, as an attack on press freedom. When it speaks against us, this
represents freedom of thought, speech and the press − which the world
must applaud!
When we exercise our own right to freedom of thought and speech to
criticise it for its failings, this represents an attempt to suppress the
freedom of the press − for which the world must punish us!
Thus the media uses the democratic order, brought about by the enormous
sacrifices of our own people, as an instrument to protect the legacy of
racism, graphically described by its own patterns of ownership, editorial
control, value system and advertiser influence. At the same time, and in
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many respects, it has shown a stubborn refusal to discharge its
responsibility to inform the public.2
Accusations of bias and threats of prior restraint and censorship further muddied the
waters. Black journalists were accused of being manipulated by their white masters; the media
was accused of being slow to change in a way that reflects the new South Africa. And then
there were complaints that the government was trying to nobble the press.
From my research, it is clear that there is no quick fix for this complex problem.
Demands for racial transformation of the press, simply replacing white staff with black, is not
the solution. Not every black journalist is an Uncle Tom and not every white journalist is a
racist.
The problem of transforming the media now transcends racial inequalities and it
includes factors such as improving journalistic standards, better pay to attract better
journalists, improved training facilities, even reshuffling the decks so that the gatekeepers of
information reflect more broadly the markets in which they operate.
Since the historic democratic elections in April, 1994, South Africa has undergone
swift and varied changes. In the 10 years since the election of a Government of National
Unity, the country has had two presidents. Nelson Mandela was president from 1994 until
1999 when he was succeeded by the ANC’s heir apparent and Deputy President Thabo
Mbeki.
The bulk of my research was done while Mandela was president. However, the
problems faced by the national press under Mandela continue under Mbeki.
During the period of Mandela’s government, many black journalists were promoted
to the executive levels of the country’s major newspapers. In the fast changing world of South
African journalism, there have also been many editorial changes. Newly promoted editors
have changed newspapers, some were sacked and others switched camp to work for rival
organizations.
Under Mbeki’s leadership, changes are evident in the way that the government and
the national press are working towards settling their differences as each becomes more
relaxed about its role in society. However, my PhD studies, which began in1996, are based on
research on the South African press conducted from 1990 to 1999 while I was working as a
journalist with The Canberra Times. I have tried to indicate in this thesis where I know of
people who have changed jobs or switched allegiances.
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This thesis is written from the perspective of a black former South African journalist
who worked on South African newspapers during the 1970s. It should be read within the
context of someone who has seen and experienced the discriminatory effects of the apartheid
system.

Notes for Prologue

1.

Visser, Wessel, Shifting RDP into gear. The ANC government’s dilemma in
providing equitable systems of social security for the “new” South Africa,
Paper presented at the 40th ITH Linzer Konferenz, University of Stellenbosch,
17 September 2004

2.

Mandela, Nelson, Presidential Address at the 50th ANC conference, at
Mafeking, December 16, 1997.
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INTRODUCTION
As South Africa undergoes radical social and political transformation, the question is how
should the media respond to the very difficult problems that the new government encounters
as it struggles to cope with the AIDS crisis, extreme poverty, high illiteracy, poor housing and
a lack of basic facilities such as running water and electricity.
In a climate of change, there is a need for the national media to change in a way to
broadly reflect concerns in the wider community. The press has been accused of being “too
white” and faces increasing demands for change from various quarters including veiled
threats from President Thabo Mbeki for a more accountable media.
Against a background of statements made to the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission and the Human Rights Commission’s inquiry into racism in the media, there
emerges a polarisation of ideas. Essentially, the national press remains a microcosm of the
apartheid era with black journalists demanding a more prominent role as the gatekeepers of
information. White editors are contending they were at the forefront in the fight against
apartheid and have no axe to grind with the new government and the African National
Congress. One view is put by ANC Women's League president Winnie Madikizela-Mandela
when she addressed the Johannesburg Press Club in Braamfontein in 1998. MadikizelaMandela accused the media of being wedded to the old order of Western racist supremacy,
and out of kilter with the new social order.
They (the media) use the conventions and values of a small section of our
society to define what constitutes a standard free press. They use their
freedom to push an agenda that is totally out of touch with African society.
The media would continue to be perceived to be loaded with the agenda of
racism and white superiority as long as editors remain loyal to parties'
political ideologies and are controlled by a business sector that is aligned
to (those parties') paradigms.1
Madikizela-Mandela accused the media of becoming an impediment to the idea of an
African renaissance, that it lacked sensitivity and was out of step with the majority of South
Africa’s people.
The media is in a dilemma, caught between two major cultures a dying,
fossilized European, conservative liberalism, and an assertive emerging,
African renaissance … If it is to play a meaningful role, it needs an urgent
introspection followed by radical transformation.2
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It is a view that is by no means unique and finds favour with a large section of the
former oppressed as well as advocates within the white community.
In some ways it is a view shared by the former Rand Daily Mail editor Allister Sparks
(1995) of the Institute for the Advancement of Journalism:
After a political revolution that astonished the world, we are now entering
an even more profound second phase of socio-economic change. The
transformation of the media is part of it. Like all revolutions, the outcome
is uncertain. All we know is that it will be important for the quality of our
emerging democracy, for the media to provide the vocal system through
which public debate takes place. If they are defective, the democracy will
be defective. Hopefully, there will be change but that will require a change
of attitude and commitment of resources by those who control the media.3
It is the way in which the media should change that poses a dilemma. The thesis asks
the questions: Did the national press do enough in the fight against apartheid? Can the liberal
English press rightfully claim the mantle of de facto opposition in the fight against apartheid
or was it more often than not in collusion with the racist regime and little more than an
irritation when it opposed National Party policy? And, what is the future of the national press,
how will it meet new demands it faces in the democratic new South Africa?
Gordon Jackson [1993] also concedes there is necessity to rewrite the map but is
unsure whether a developmental media system could prevail. Jackson finds that a
developmental media system “is highly unlikely to become preeminent” in South Africa
mainly because “the traditions of an already established mainstream press put these papers at
odds with many elements of developmental media”. There are also fears the ANC-dominated
government would promote developmental journalism “seeking to use the press with some
level of compulsion to advance government policies”. And he arrives at the conclusion that:
As a whole the press is likely to cling to the social responsibility approach
and First World standards for as long as possible, as indeed it should.
Should the society as a whole move towards liberal democracy, it will be
easier for the press to maintain its allegiance to and practice of First World
standards. By contrast, should the country move further from liberal
democracy, maintaining its present orientation would be difficult.4
Jackson concedes elements of developmental journalism will be incorporated into the
evolving South African media and it should be welcomed but he suggests that despite the
ample shortcomings of the press, “developmental journalism as a whole offers little to redress
those weaknesses”.
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Transformation of the media is already underway following the fall of apartheid in
1994 and the changing relationship between the press and the new Government of National
Unity, South African media analyst and academic Eric Louw [1996] notes. Louw describes
the new political order’s relationship with the press:
A new hegemonic order has been born and is forcing the press to radically
change the ways which, to a large extent, mirror the wider reform process.
Essentially, the Government of National Unity-times represents an altered
political and socio-economic context to which all institutions in society
(including the press) are having to adjust.5
One of the aspects focused in this thesis is the commitment to and the speed of
transformation in the press.
Chapter One offers a broad historical overview of the development of the South
African print media. It identifies four main strands of the South African print media during
the period commonly known as the apartheid era. These are the Afrikaans press, the English
language press, the “Black” press, and the so-called alternative press, each with its own
agenda. They all operated under the same severely oppressive and restrictive laws but each
reacted in a different way.
The chapter aims to show the complexities of the media in the political spectrum and
the role of the mainstream English press as opponents of the government’s racist policy, the
Afrikaans press evolving from a government propaganda machine at conception to grow into
a disobedient and defiant appendage towards the end of the apartheid era.
Set against this background, there was the marginal role of the “black” press and the
defiance of the alternative papers of the late 1970s and 1980s that caused much trouble for the
government trying to crush rising civil unrest and anti-apartheid riots across the country. The
alternative papers were often accused of fanning the flames of unrest in the townships.
The structure and foundations of the South African press is discussed in Chapter Two
including the early days of the press, the struggles against authoritarian controls and the move
towards greater accountability in the 1950s. Chapter Two also considers the role of the
Afrikaans press in National Party politics, the effect of apartheid on the development of the
national media leading eventually to the establishment of the alternative press in 1980 and its
eventual decline and demise 10 years later.
Chapter Three continues with the legacy of government oppression and focuses on
the early struggle for press freedoms against this background friction, the emergence of a
pioneer press and later the impact of the “Magna Carta” in 1829 and briefly looks at the
emergence of the “black” press.
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Chapter Four considers post-apartheid paradoxes. The end of apartheid brought with
it additional and new pressures on the press. Just as the English language press was accused
of being unsupportive and biased against the National Party government, so too did the nonracial Government of National Unity stir up old conflicts by accusing the media of being
fundamentally racist and unsupportive of change. The new masters ushered in old fears of
repression and censorship while repeating the common appeal for greater support and
consideration in the face of overwhelming social disunity. The Truth and Reconciliation
hearings into the role of the media during the apartheid era are also considered in Chapter
Four as well as considerations from former Argus company editors who defended their
stewardship of the English press as antagonists of the government and proponents of change.
Chapter Five focuses on new directions and options for change. Among the new
directions considered are options from the government-directed Reconstruction and
Development Program (RDP), as well as the ANC media policy before it came to power in
1994, options from a reformed National Party as well as warnings from then President Nelson
Mandela urging the media to adapt and change in the spirit of the national and social
transformation and similar threats from his successor Thabo Mbeki who put the national press
on notice.
Chapter Six considers the effects of racism in the media and looks at efforts by the
South African Human Rights Commission to facilitate a free and open press. It focuses
mainly on two major submissions to the SAHRC, Cultural Bloodstains by Claudia Braude
and a report by Media Monitoring Project that looked at racial stereotyping in the media, as
well as individual submissions by interested parties including a loosely formed group of
“black” editors, a response from a group of “white” journalists. It concludes with an
assessment of the recommendations of the human rights commission.
Chapter Seven considers options for change in the South African press against a
background of various theoretical academic studies.
Chapter Eight concludes that real changes within the South African press will only
become a reality when there are corresponding meaningful changes in South African society.
It also offers modest options for a new media order in the emerging democracy and promotes
an expanded role for black journalists to better reflect the diversity and needs of all sections of
society.
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Research Framework
Issues considered in this thesis include a scope for a meaningful journalism Code of Conduct,
aspects of a developmental media approach despite its shortcomings, a review of ownership
and monopolies, levels of overseas ownership, improved prospects and training for black
journalists at the highest levels to provide a more equitable balance of opinion, options for
self-regulation, and the impact of constitutional guarantees of press freedom amid government
calls for a more sympathetic and supportive national press.
The image of South Africa making a smooth and trouble-free transition from
oppression looks rather tarnished, especially with rising crime, poor housing, rampant poverty
and a host of other problems threatening the very fabric of democracy and offering soft and
easy targets for a critical press. Here the national media must take much of the blame as it
pursues an adversarial role against the government. That is a role demanded and expected of
the press in a strong democracy. But in South Africa the bonds of democracy are strained and
still fragile.
Mandela puts the government’s case:
I know that these comments will be received with a tirade of
denunciation, with claims that what we are calling for is a media that acts
as a lapdog rather than a watchdog. We must reiterate the positions of our
movement that we ask for no favours from the media and we expect none.
We make no apology for making the demand that the media has a
responsibility to society to inform. Neither do we doubt the correctness of
our assessment of the role the media has played in the last three years. All
of us know too much about what happens in the newsrooms ….
Conference will have to consider what measures we have to take …. At
the same time as we consider these matters, we must also reaffirm our
commitment to the freedom of the press and demonstrate this in all our
practical activities.6
There are many arguments against the media adopting a developmental role in society
as opposed to the more traditional Western model but it is clear that in developing countries,
the arguments against the traditional Western model of the press has validity in that it has
been less than successful.
This thesis does not propose some form of censorship for the South African press but
rather that the gatekeepers of information need to seriously re-assess their role in society. Are
newspapers going to remain inactive and passive yet critical bystanders in a changing
landscape or are they going to be interactive players adopting some sort of role in the process
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of nation building? This thesis suggests there is an urgent need for the national media to adopt
a more positive and proactive role, yet it is one that they may be reluctant to embrace.
The thesis suggests that while the fundamental make-up, ownership and staffing,
especially at senior management and editorial decision-making levels remain the same, the
impetus for change will be slow and the political agenda tinged with the mistakes of the past.
Staffing needs to reflect the diversity of a nation in transition and a definitive press policy
needs to be spelt out − even if this is by way of legislation as in a Press Act within the
boundaries of the constitutional guarantees on freedom of speech.
By and large the executive roles in South African mainstream print media are
dominated by white people who remain stunted by a lack of basic knowledge of the lifestyle
and affairs of the vast majority of South Africans. Proper journalism education for a new
generation of South African journalists, especially black journalists, and participation at
senior decision-making levels is an important and necessary start even before political or
legislative considerations for the evolution of a dynamic press in South Africa are considered.
This is not to say that with affirmative action, by employing more black journalists or
promoting more black journalists to positions of influence on South African newspapers,
changes will necessarily follow. Thabo Mbkei, the South African president, and his
predecessor, Nelson Mandela, have already levelled serious allegations of bias against senior
black journalists whom they accuse of unbalanced comment on policy matters of national
importance and of carrying out the hidden agendas of their white masters.
This complaint is not peculiar to South African journalists where the government is
often at odds with the press. However, the South African society is in the process of major
transition socially and politically and the media has also to transform in a way that it will be
meaningful to the broader community, not just the wealthier influential whites that have been
served so well.
Mathatha Tsedu, deputy editor at The Star in 1997 and one of the few senior black
journalists appointed to a management position, explains the dilemma in a report Journalism
in transition in South Africa to the Nieman Foundation at Harvard University:
In actual fact, the threat to journalists, unlike in the heyday of apartheid
repression is their [black journalists’] conscience. The challenge is to
decide what is right and wrong and sometimes national priorities might
interfere with what would ordinarily be good journalism … Exposing
corruption is another area in which black journalists have excelled,
debunking the myth that because they are black and the government is
black, they would therefore spare them the rod”.7
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The thesis methodology is largely descriptive and based on empirical observations,
drawing on historical analysis and earlier research by South African media academics
including Keyan Tomaselli, Eric Louw, Guy Berger, Arrie de Beer, and Gordon Jackson and
is assisted by the works of William Hachten, Anthony Giffard and John Phelan. South African
newspaper editors, among them Raymond Louw, Harvey Tyson, Moegsien Williams, Ryland
Fisher, and Thami Mazwai among many have contributed significantly to the ever evolving
media debate and substantial use is made of their observations. It covers opinions from the
extreme views offered by Mazwai, a former political prisoner and now programming
chairman of the national broadcaster, the South African Broadcasting Corporation, who
dismisses objectivity in journalism as an illusion to Keyan Tomaselli who sees the need for
improved research skills as essential for the improvement of journalism and Ryland Fisher
who argues for the radical reform of South Africa’s predominantly white newsrooms in the
hope that more racially balanced newsrooms will provide a broader scope of news coverage.
My own experience as a South African journalist during the turbulent 1970s on the
“coloured newspaper” The Cape Herald and later The Cape Times in Cape Town also
provided some useful observations and impetus. Submissions and interviews to the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission’s inquiry into the role of the media during the apartheid era as
well as submissions to the South African Human Rights Commission’s inquiry into Racism in
the Media offered varied perspectives on the way the South African press operated. This
research is limited somewhat by personal interpretation and subjective standards of what is
being represented in the news.
There is no shortage of theories suggesting means and ways in which the press needs
to change in what is described as “the new South Africa”. This thesis does not aim to add to
the plethora of theories canvassed. However, it hopes to determine an urgent need for greater
participation of “black” journalists at the executive and gatekeeper levels of the media to
influence the national agenda, to facilitate a broader spectrum of opinion and media coverage
and to ensure full participation to the widest levels of a segmented society. It also looks at
ways in which this change can be achieved.
This thesis hopes to draw attention to the continuing difficulties faced by “black” journalists
in the post-apartheid South African press. By highlighting a need to change the direction and
focus of the national press, it also suggests an expanded role for the previously disadvantaged
journalists and an opportunity to reshape the national agenda. This needs to be reflected at
senior editorial or executive levels rather than at the lower and entry levels of journalism. This
thesis then proposes some specific steps to implement such change for the gatekeepers of
information.
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CHAPTER ONE
SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS FREEDOMS − AN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Introduction
Chapter One offers a broad historical overview of the development of the South African print
media. It identifies four main strands of the South African print media during the period
commonly known as the apartheid era. These are the Afrikaans press, the English language
press, the “Black” press, and the so-called alternative press, each with its own agenda. They
all operated under the same severely oppressive and restrictive laws but each reacted in a
different way. The chapter aims to show the complexities of the media in the political
spectrum and the role of the mainstream English press as opponents of the government’s
racist policy, the Afrikaans press evolving from a government propaganda machine at
conception to grow into a disobedient and defiant appendage towards the end of the apartheid
era.
Legacy of oppression
The fight for press freedom in South Africa has been a record of struggle, oppression,
political interference and racial bias in a deeply divided country. Its roots lie in the
complexities of a colonial dispensation extraordinary even in the eventful annals of European
imperialism. From the mid-16th Century two great colonial powers, the British and the Dutch,
vied for supremacy in South Africa. This ensured an inheritance that was bilingual and bicultural, akin in some ways to the later settlement of Canada. For more than 150 years, the
Dutch were predominant in the Cape, until the early 19th Century when the British outmaneuvered them by an adroit combination of political strategy and militarism.
The Dutch trekked from the Cape inland and north from the 1830s, recreating their
imperialism in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The inevitable result was a seesawing military struggle, culminating in British sovereignty following the successful South
African (Boer) War of 1899-1901 and the inauguration of the Union of South Africa in 1911.
Through much of the 20th Century, the Union simmered under an uneasy alliance
between British institutions and the traditions and culture of the thrusting Afrikaners.
Gradually, the Afrikaners asserted a political ascendancy which enabled them to fulfil by
ostensibly democratic means their political, racial and cultural aspirations in South Africa.
The fulcrum of this hegemony was a rigorously controlled separation of black and white
South Africans, a policy known generically as apartheid. South Africans of British origin and
culture lacked the numbers, the political will and the strategical dexterity to withstand the
development and enforcement of institutional and cultural separation based on race. Apart
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from the chasm between black and white, the British and Afrikaners were often uneasy
bedfellows, the British inclined towards moderation but mostly compliant with the political
majority.
The labyrinthine twists and turns of imperial history, and apartheid, ensured that two
contending white cultures, the British and the Afrikaners, emerged in South Africa, each
producing its own distinctive newspaper press. White supremacy flourished in the enduring
presence of a vast, tribal-based black majority, ruthlessly controlled and oppressed but never
subjugated or marginalised. Heterogeneous in composition, the black majority reflected
traditions of protracted resistance, even spasmodic military glory in the combative Zulu
nation.
The size and distribution of the overwhelming black population ensured that from the
mid-19th Century it would also produce a diverse press. Thus, the colonial press traditions of
the British and Afrikaners were augmented by a rich and politically potent press whose primal
impulses were racial.
Stimulated by political forces, particularly apartheid, an alternative press tradition
emerged in South Africa during the second half of the 20th Century. In short, the emergent
framework of the South African press was anchored in three powerful traditions: colonial
with enduring British and Afrikaner press systems; racial, with a black population and press
much coerced but never subdued; and a lesser, though still influential, political press
influenced by alternative attitudes and stances.
The following account does not analyse in any conceptual sense the origins and
institutional development of South Africa. It aims, firstly, to account for the emergence of
print news technology and print newspapers in the country since its foundations in the mid17th century. On the basis of this analysis, it proceeds to define, describe and conceptualise
the four quintessential press systems identified above:

British, Afrikaner, Black and

Alternative.
Beginnings
It took nearly 175 years after settlement for the first newspaper to appear in South Africa, and
at that, a strictly-controlled government gazette. The Dutch, who first settled in 1652,
discouraged the establishment of a free press. For most of the first 150 years after Jan van
Riebeeck arrived at the Cape Colony, there was no print technology there. Monetary policy
dictated the procuring of crude print technology to provide currency. In 1782, the Dutch East
India Company allowed Governor van Plettenberg some printing type to produce emergency
currency when war with England disrupted normal consignments of specie from Holland. All
requests for a printing press were denied.

23

The arrival of the first printing press in 1794 was the reluctant product of constant
representation by burghers at the Cape to the colonial government which transmitted them to
Holland, but Amsterdam rejected pleas for presses in 1783 and 1786. The colonial
administration urgently needed a press for printing proclamations, government orders and
other state documents.
It was a pattern not dissimilar to early settlement in the United States, and Australia
where a printing press was dispatched in 1788 with the First Fleet. In many respects, the
printing press legitimised first settlement. In Australia, government decrees were printed and
distributed from the early 1790s, and the first newspaper, a government gazette, appeared in
1803. In the United States, where early settlement was broadly contemporaneous with South
Africa, newspaper production began virtually from the early 18th Century.
In 1793, the Council of Policy at the Cape established a printing plant. It appointed
Johan Christian Ritter as superintendent, but he lost the position in 1795 when the British took
over the colony. Ritter and another master printer, Harry Harwood Smith, scrounged some
basic printing equipment and lobbied the British Governor, Sir George Younge, for the
government printing licence. Ignoring Ritter and Smith, on July 15, 1800, Younge issued a
proclamation appointing Alexander Walker and John Robertson as government printers.
They were established Cape merchants who had imported a printing press, type, three
printers and a Dutch translator. Walker and Robertson began printing on February 1, 1800 but
the decision to grant them government sanction was challenged by Ritter and Smith. The
Governor proclaimed a heavy fine and confiscation of plant if other printers entered the field,
and sole right of printing was vested in the colonial government. The government offered to
buy a press on order from Ritter, but Smith was ordered to hand over all his printing
equipment.
Walker and Robertson were also given permission to start a weekly paper and so
began publication of the Cape Town Gazette and African Advertiser, on August 16, 1800.
Some historians regard this publication as South Africa’s first newspaper. But it was not a
newspaper in the traditional sense as material was restricted to government proclamations and
public notices. This initiated what Cutten described as the start of a romantic era in South
African journalism, lasting until 1828. These were epic, landmark years for the South African
press.1
Essentially, the Cape Town Gazette and African Advertiser was a government gazette
but it contained small news stories and a modicum of commercial advertising. Its staple fare,
however, was the constitutional, legal and administrative documentation of colonial
government. It was a bilingual paper known both as the Cape Town Gazette and African

24

Advertiser and the Kaapsche Stads Courant en Afrikaanse Berigte [Cape City News and
Afrikaans Reports]. With a return of Dutch hegemony, the newspaper was known only as the
Kaapsche Courant from 1803 to 1806, but resumed its original name when the British
occupied the Cape again in 1806.
This name it retained until July 7, 1826 when it appeared as The Cape of Good Hope
Government Gazette. Changing nomenclature reflected alternating periods of Dutch and
British rule. The first British occupation of the Cape lasted from 1795-1802. Constitutionally,
the Cape colony reverted to the Dutch rule in 1803 when it was handed back to the Batavian
Republic to comply with the Treaty of Amiens. This was signed by Britain, France, Spain,
and the Batavian Republic (Holland) in March 1802, marking the end of the French
Revolutionary Wars. The second British occupation of the Cape started in 1806, when
Anglicisation of the Cape Colony began in earnest.
Towards a free press
The first commercial newspaper was published 170 years after the first Dutch settlement in
the 1660s. Almost a quarter of a century after the first British settlers arrived, the
fundamentals of a free press were initiated. Following a sequence of campaigns and petitions,
the Governor, Lord Charles Somerset, reluctantly, in December 1822, permitted a nongovernment newspaper. Thomas Pringle, a poet and writer of some note, and a fiery Dutch
clergyman, Dr Abraham Fourie, inaugurated the South African Journal and the Nederduitsch
Zuid-Afrikaansche Tijdschrift [loosely translated as Netherlands South African Magazine].
These publications appeared in English and Dutch in alternate months from March 5,
1823, signalling the emergence of a privately-owned newspaper press in the colony. The
South African Journal published only two issues after an article critical of Governor Somerset
led to its closure. Pringle was bluntly warned to cease publication or face the consequences.
The Dutch edition, though, lasted for nearly 20 years, steering well away from official
business, politics and social controversy to focus largely on ecclesiastical matters until its
demise in 1843. From it stemmed the official mouthpiece of the Dutch Reformed Church, Die
Kerkbode [Church News]. Thus, the foundation press of the Afrikaners owed its emergence
and survival largely to a religious audience.
Meanwhile, the more venturesome Pringle also persuaded his close friend John
Fairbairn, an experienced writer and journalist, to join him at the Cape and embark on a new
venture, The South African Commercial Advertiser. A printer, George Greig was foundation
proprietor of the Advertiser which first appeared on January 7, 1824. It is generally
considered to have been the first independent South African newspaper. Greig edited the first
two editions, then responsibility passed to Pringle and Fairbairn as joint editors.
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The authoritarian Somerset opposed the publication with a vehemence that prompted
its early closure. Pringle refused to continue publication unless the press was protected in
accordance with well-established British traditions of press freedom. In a battle that lasted
five years and closed the Advertiser on two occasions, Pringle asserted his right to “petition
the King for the extension of freedom of the press in the Colony”. He pressed his case in
London and in 1828 was allowed to publish again. On May 8, 1829, the press was freed from
the control of the governor and his council with the proclamation of Ordinance 60 of 1829,
(Ordinance for Preventing the Mischiefs arising from Printing and Publishing Newspapers
Ordinance 60 of 1829) the “Magna Carta" of the South African Press.2
It was introduced by General Bourke and it provided among others libel laws as
remedies for abuses of the liberty of the press. De Kock describes it as the cornerstone for a
free press and its proclamation "a time of vigour remarkable in any country's annals".
Twenty-one of the 23 sections of the charter spelt out rules and regulations which newsmen
had to abide by, but with a guarantee that only proven libellous and irresponsible statements
could in future

prompt government

intervention.3

Governor Sir George Younge’s

proclamation of 1800 restricting all public printing to his nominated appointees was also
repealed.4
A pioneer press
In another strand of rapid growth, other newspapers had followed in the tracks blazed by the
pioneers. On August 18, 1824, The South African Chronicle and Mercantile Advertiser
appeared and was published until 1826. It was perceived as a government mouthpiece that
reflected the views of Governor Somerset and deflected any criticism of the colonial
government at the Cape. Apart from the religiously-inclined Nederduitsch Zuid-Afrikaansche
Tijdschrift, the father of Dutch journalism was a Portuguese-Dutch Jew, Joseph Suasso de
Lima, a lawyer who started his newspaper, De Veerzamelaar [The Gleaner] in 1826. Meurant
described De Lima’s newspaper as “a Dutch version of [London] Punch”, indulgent of society
gossip.5
The New Organ, edited and owned by Fairbairn and Greig, (see above) also emerged
in 1826. As with De Veerzamelaar, it too was launched without the necessary licences and
De Lima soon encountered financial difficulties from the contentious content of De
Veerzamelaar. Neither lasted long, folding in the face of levies and stamp duties on published
newspapers and periodicals. Under Ordinance 26 of 1826, Governor Somerset levied stamp
duties on publications, not so much to raise revenue as to hinder their development. The
newspapers at the Cape were too few; it was another attempt to stifle a struggling and
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developing press by fiscal means. The small newspapers were mostly unable to pay but
struggled through as a philanthropic press until the stamp duty impost was repealed in 1848.
De Lima followed the model of the press pioneers but steered wide of politics in his
weekly publication. It was always going to be a struggle for his small newspaper to survive
and after just two editions it became clear there was little demand for it. Other newspapers
starting in mid-1828 included the Zuid-Afrikaan [South African] which arose out of the
demise of De Veerzamelaar. It was edited by De Lima and C. E. Boniface, a Frenchman who
later produced the first newspaper in Natal. The Colonist, a weekly English publication, lasted
from November 22, 1828 until September the following year. The Zuid-Afrikaan was the first
newspaper to embrace Afrikaner nationalism and was intended to counter the efforts of
Fairbairn which were mainly aimed at the English settlers. Thus, the dichotomy between
newspapers directed to English and Afrikaans emerged early in the press history of South
Africa, although some semblance of a joint approach occurred with alternating bilingual
issues.
In the wake of Magna Carta
Several newspapers appeared in the wake of the “Magna Carta”, Ordinance 60 of 1829. The
most important included The Cape of Good Hope Literary Gazette (June, 1830), The
Graham’s Town Journal (December, 1831), a religious four-page weekly De Kaapsche
Cyclopedie (February, 1833), a missionary monthly The South African Christian Recorder
(1835), a bilingual journal The Moderator and Mediator (1837), Leesvrugten, a religious
journal (1837), The Eastern Province Government Gazette (1838), The Price Current (1838),
De Ware Afrikaan (1838), The Cape Times (1840, not the present Cape Times which was
established in 1876), The Colonial Times (in Grahamstown 1840) and the Cape of Good Hope
Shipping Lists, in Cape Town (1840).
This diversity of newspapers reflected a number of well-established press traditions,
most emphatically the religious press. The introduction of a dedicated literary journal and a
commercial shipping list were also typical of patterns followed in other colonies.
The practice of bilingual publication continued but does not appear to have insinuated
itself into the common practice.
Contentious had been the spread of John Fairbairn’s South African Commercial
Advertiser into the Eastern Province which angered Dutch trekkers in December 1830 as
settlers prepared for war with the indigenous people.
The Graham’s Town Journal was established under Louis Henry Meurant, as a voice
for the trekkers occupying new lands in the north and east of South Africa. It sought to fend
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off criticisms of the Afrikaners from Fairbairn’s more liberal newspaper in Cape Town.
Fairbairn, a missionary’s son and a libertarian, was regarded as representing a clique of
fanatics obsessed with outrages on defenceless natives. The Graham’s Town Journal was
troubled by what it perceived as an attack by Fairbairn’s paper on the frontiersmen of the
Eastern Province. In response, the Afrikaners launched De Zuid Afrikaan to “defend the good
name of the Dutch residents against the libels of a hostile English party at the Cape and in
England”. It opposed what the settlers viewed as the “radicalism of the negrophilist
philanthropists”.6
By 1840, the South African press had grown to seven newspapers and nine printing
houses from the origins of the four small newspapers publishing in Cape Town in 1826. By
1881 the Colonial Office in Cape Town had registered more than 125 assorted journals and
newspapers. The rights of a free press had been established with control of the press shifting
away from the Governor. Further church newspapers and magazines also appeared in the late
1840s, including The South African Christian Watchman printed by the Wesley Mission,
launched in January, 1846 and the Natal Witness (1846). In January 1851, the South African
Church Magazine and the Ecclesiastical Review were first published. The last newspaper
published at the Cape before mid-Century was The Cape Monitor, October 15, 1850, at Cape
Town.7
It would be futile listing new publication between 1850 and 1900 because many
newspapers were started with the discovery of gold in the Transvaal and it would assume an
intolerable magnitude.8
Some of the more notable publications of this period of development included The
Friend (1850), Natal Mercury (1852), Cape Argus (1857), The Star (1871), De Volksstem
(1873), The Cape Times (1876), Diamond Fields Advertiser (1878), and South African News
(1899). As the nomenclature indicates, the trend was firmly in the direction of general
newspapers, perhaps with a slight orientation towards an English-language press.
Appearing in the early 1900s, the dwindling days of colonial South Africa, were the
influential Rand Daily Mail (1902), Sunday Times (1906), and Die Burger (1915). These
landmark publications evolved into major metropolitan newspapers of South Africa, and
several of them were still publishing in the late 1990s. The Cape Argus and the Cape Times
remain the major English newspapers in the Western Cape and Die Burger is one of the most
popular Afrikaans newspapers. The Rand Daily Mail went under in 1985, perhaps due to
mismanagement and financial difficulties but it also might be argued that it finally succumbed
to government pressures. Thus, there is a sustained and enduring tradition of significant press
publication extending through almost the whole of the 20th Century.

28

The South African Catholic Magazine, a monthly review of ecclesiastical news and
opinion, was launched in 1891 with a prominent intellectual and Catholic priest Dr Friedrich
Carl Kolbe as founding editor. For more than a decade Kolbe wrote much of its copy and
gained a reputation as a fierce anti-war campaigner and a feeble voice against British
imperialism. His opposition to the second Anglo-Boer war was not well received in many
quarters. The editor of the Cape Mercury castigated the cleric’s logic, chided him for
meddling in secular affairs, and by 1899 Kolbe had to relinquish editorship of the magazine
temporarily to spare the Catholic church embarrassment over this public feud.
However, he continued his anti-war stance and opposition to martial law in the
editing of Albert Cartwright’s anti-war newspaper the South African News, first published in
Cape Town in 1899. In it, Kolbe’s editorials and viewpoints clashed frequently with the
editorials advanced in pro-war newspapers such as the Cape Times and the Argus.
He seriously underestimated the magnitude of the ecclesiastical opposition to his anti-war
stance and by March 1900 it was clear that his continued role at the South African Catholic
Magazine could not continue and he resigned as editor. 9
Founding fathers
This overview of how the South African press evolved has emphasised the paramount role of
the intertwining colonial struggles between English and Dutch that brought colonial
settlement to South Africa. The role of the black press and, particularly, idiosyncratic
publications outside mainstream journalism, do not blend readily into this account of press
evolution. Before taking them up in detail, a brief summary of the British and Afrikaner press
is necessary.
The English-language press as it had emerged by the end of the colonial period was
showing clear signs of settling into two main publishing groups predominant in Englishlanguage press and, over time, a formidable presence in the national press structure. These
were the Argus Printing and Publishing company and its smaller rival South African
Associated Newspapers (SAAN). The traditions and heritage of the English-language press
were steeped in the British experience and tradition, particularly adherence to conventional
Western models of freedom of the press. They can be traced in large part to the arrival of the
British settlers in the early 1820s. However, the influence of the early Dutch rulers cannot be
ignored, even though they showed great reluctance to accept the conventions of a free press at
the Cape for more than 150 years. The Dutch masters, despite their opposition in the Cape,
also derived from a free-press tradition in Holland extending back to the spread of the printing
press through Western Europe in the late 15th Century.
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The Afrikaans-language press had its roots in the Afrikaner language, religion,
politics and nationalism. The Afrikaners created it largely to further their national and cultural
aspirations. Unlike the English-language press, the Afrikaans press strove through much of
the 20th Century to get the dogmatic, racist National Party into power, and then to keep it
there.
Remarkably, at the time of Union in 1910, there were no Afrikaans [language]
newspapers in South Africa. The structure of Afrikaans publication outlined above was
extinguished in practical terms by the brief triumphs of English imperialism and patriotism in
the late 19th Century.
Accordingly, newspapers in the Afrikaans language targeted at a national and cultural
Afrikaner audience did not survive the Boer War (1899-1901). The traditions of an Afrikaans
press were deeply imbued, however. A resurgence of Afrikaner nationalism led in 1912,
shortly after the promulgation of the union, to the establishment of Die Week [The Week]
founded by editor Harm Oost. This patriotic Afrikaner newspaper lasted two years before
foundering financially.
It focused on Afrikaner politics, culture and economic efforts to assist and uplift the
Afrikaner people. Hachten suggests that this resurgence in Afrikaner nationalism and the
launch of Die Week spawned the Afrikaans press as it exists today.10
Black and alternative
According to Rosenthal, Bantu journalism in South Africa had its foundations in missionary
journals about the mid-18th Century, and developed with the proselytising British and
Foreign Bible Society which aimed at providing the Scriptures in every language.11 The
scope of this evangelical journalism is unclear, although it must of necessity have been
largely oral or hand-written in character.
The first printing equipment was brought by a group of American missionaries who
came to Natal in the Voortrekker era of the late 1830s and used it to publish the first
periodicals in the Natal region of eastern South Africa.
Thus, the first tentative steps of the black press lay in providing religious pamphlets
and sermons, creating a system of writing and the spelling of African words never recorded
before. It helped to prescribe basic rules of typography, led to the training of printers and
compositors, and the consequential start of the first authentic Bantu presses in South Africa.
The Bantu press made its first modest appearance at Esidumbini Mission Station in Natal with
the publishing in 1844 of the Xhosa language magazine Ikwezi [Morning Star]. This was
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followed in 1862 by Indaba [The News] edited by the Rt Rev Bryce Ross. Circulation was
around 600 copies with two-thirds of the content in Xhosa and the rest in English.12
Indaba had a rival when the Wesleyan Mission Press at Kingwilliamstown launched
Isitunywa Senyanga [The Monthly Messenger] in the late 1860s. Both publications were
devoted to spreading the Christian message. The religious affiliation of Indaba was
transferred in 1870 to the head of the Presbyterian Mission College at Lovedale, in the Cape,
and the paper was renamed The Kaffir Express. It was published in both English and Xhosa
for six years then split into The Christian Express, all in English, and Isigidimi Sama Xosa
[The Xhosa Messenger] all in the Xhosa language. In the Transvaal, one of the earliest Black
publications was The Native Eye, started in Pietersburg in the decade between the Boer War
and unification by Simon Majakatheta Phamotse. It enjoyed some prestige under Phamotse as
editor because of his close association with the administrator of Basutoland, Sir Godfrey
Lagden. The Native Eye folded when Phamotse returned to Basutoland and became secretary
to Paramount Chief Jonathan. Among other publications, Daniel Simon Letanka started the
Motsoalle [Friend] in 1910 but, not satisfied with the name, he changed it to Moromioa
[Messenger].
The first real newspaper for Bantu people was the Sechuana publication Molekudi ua
Bechuana which first appeared from 1856 to 1857, published at the Wesleyan Mission at Tha
‘Nchu, edited by Rev Mr Ludorf. This newspaper included religious matter, a section on
current politics, illustrations and photographs of social occasions. A monthly publication, it
was followed by the Mahoko a Becwana [The Bechuana News] printed in the town of
Kuruman at the Moffat Institute under the auspices of the London Bible Society. Again, the
focus of news was religious, social and political. Following the London Mission Society
example, the Lutheran Mission later supported a newspaper in the Transvaal, Moshupa-Tsela
[The Guide].
The turbulent development of a black press, largely independent of religious and
other influences, began in 1884 with the establishment by Jo Tengu Jabavu of an African
language newspaper in the Ciskei called Imvo Zabantsundu [African Opinions].
By the late 19th Century, several newspapers under Bantu control were publishing. Most
lasted only briefly and are hard to trace. In 1901, Solomon Plaatjie published the Koranta ea
Becoana [The Bechuana Gazette] in English and Tswana, and the Rev Walter Rebusana
launched Izwi la Bantu. Rabusana later became the vice-president of the South African Native
National Congress.
Other minor independent Black publications started around 1900, including Ikwezi le
AfricaIan dUmlomo wa Bantu, but these did not last long. In 1903-4, Dr John Dube produced
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the Ilangai and Lase Natal [The Natal Sun] in the Zulu language. Dr Dube, a minister
educated in the United States, is considered a pioneer of black journalism in South Africa
along with Solomon Plaatjie, Tengo Jabavu, and Mark Radebe. Radebe aimed to start a
national newspaper, Ipepa lo Hlanga [The National Paper] as a national platform for his
people. Radebe’s enterprise was unrewarded. He lost money and was forced out of
newspapers into the law and private enterprise
Under the editorship of its founder, Alfred Mangena, The Native Advocate launched
in 1912 was the first African newspaper published in the national capital, Pretoria.

It

foundered financially and closed after a year of publication.
The Alternative press
The Alternative press was a much later development. It emerged in the 1970s, and so was
indisputably a post-colonial phenomenon. Perhaps more importantly, it was a post-apartheid
phenomenon. The genesis of the Alternative press can be traced to the wave of national unrest
that swept South Africa in 1976, starting with the Soweto riots of June 16, 1976 and the
subsequent banning of four newspapers. Unrest spread to Natal, East London, Port Elizabeth
and the Western Cape where the resistance movement gathered momentum.
Appropriately, the first South African grassroots press was established in Cape Town,
where the seeds of both English and Afrikaans press systems had also been sown. Coloured
activists were largely responsible for mostly improvised, ad hoc journals initiating an
alternative system. A fortnightly tabloid called Grassroots was launched in 1976 against a
background of protest and resistance to apartheid. The community paper was a response to the
privately-owned liberal press that was seen as being white-orientated and pro-establishment.
It was against this background that Grassroots and the papers that followed were called
collectively the Alternative press by their founders.13
Johnson [1991] links the importance of Grassroots to the growth of democratic
organisation in the community, with the newspaper acting as the epicentre for that growth.
No longer was the newspaper a mere chronicler and herald of resistance. It
became part of that very process, influencing the direction it took.14
Staffed largely by unpaid volunteers and anti-apartheid political activists, the
Alternative press struggled against police harassment and limited resources. By 1983, the first
wave of community-based Alternative press publications had begun to falter. It was given a
renewed surge of life by several professional journalists who joined grassroots papers and
gradually shaped them into professional weekly products. The Weekly Mail, in 1985, was the
first, followed over the next four years by New Nation, South, Vrye Weekblad, and New
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African. Several smaller magazines such as Work in Progress and the SA Labour Bulletin,
which dated from the 1970s, were given renewed vitality by the new press movement.15
The concept of “alternative” newspapers in South Africa found a niche market in the
political upheavals of the late 1970s and early 1980s, but its foundations can be traced back
much earlier. In 1952, Prime Minister Danie Malan moved to silence the voices of criticism
and dissent by banning South Africa’s Communist Party-controlled newspaper, The
Guardian.
From it developed the Advance, which was also banned two years later, and then
reappeared in various forms as New Age which was outlawed in 1962. Other minor
newspapers that could loosely be defined as the alternative press in the 1960s all met the same
government resistance. Some were banned, and all of them were constantly harassed.
The main players
By 1994, more than 5000 newspapers and magazines were registered with the Department of
Home Affairs. Another 66 new publications had been approved for publication. Registration
of newspapers and other publications was no longer required after November 1994. (See
Appendix A for a list of national newspapers and circulation figures.)
In the early 1990s, the Argus company produced more than 60 per cent of the 1.5
million newspapers sold daily in South Africa and, with Times Media Ltd (TML) commanded
almost total national coverage. South African newspapers and magazines, however, were still
dominated by four organised press groups. The major group was Argus Newspapers, owned
by Tony O’Reilly’s Independent Newspapers PLC, based in Great Britain and Ireland. It
published The Star, in Johannesburg, Cape Times and Argus as morning and evening dailies
in Cape Town, Natal Mercury and Daily News as morning and evening dailies in Durban,
Diamond Fields Advertiser, a morning daily in Kimberley, Pretoria News, a 24-hour daily in
Pretoria, Sunday Tribune in Durban on Sundays, and several weekly newspapers. It was also a
controlling shareholder in the Newspaper Printing Company, which printed Argus and TML
newspapers throughout South Africa, and of Allied Publishing, which distributed Argus and
TML newspapers nationally. TML had shares in both companies. Times Media Ltd was
owned by Omnimedia Corporation, controlled by Anglo American. TML published The
Sunday Times, in Johannesburg, Business Day, a morning daily newspaper, and the weekly
Financial Mail, in Johannesburg, The Eastern Province Herald, a morning daily in Port
Elizabeth, and the Evening Post, an evening daily in Port Elizabeth. TML also owned several
weekly and monthly newspapers, newsletters and magazines and information services.
The Anglo American mining group enjoyed large cross-media ownership and moved
swiftly after the fall of apartheid in 1994 to sell its controlling interest in Argus to the
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Independent Newspaper group. This further reduced the players in the small newspaper
market in South Africa. This media monopoly was a worry for the ANC which considered
compulsory steps to dilute the effects of the concentrated media ownership and to give access
to the media to those excluded. In its media charter, in 1992, the ANC stressed as one of the
cornerstones of its policy that the media should be open and that it should be absolutely
accessible to anybody, either in print or the broadcast media.
The Irish media group, Independent Newspapers, bought a 31 per cent controlling
interest. It lifted its stake to 34.98 per cent shortly afterwards and in February 1995
announced it planned to raise its stake in Argus Newspapers by R150 million ($A58.11
million) to nearly 70 per cent of the group.
By the end of 2002, Independent Newspapers was the leading newspaper group in
South Africa, publishing a total of 14 daily and weekly newspapers in three major
metropolitan areas of South Africa. Independent Newspapers has aggregate weekly sales of
2.8 million copies in Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape. The group currently
attracts 48 per cent of the total advertising revenue spent in the paid newspaper market and
reaches 63 per cent of English newspaper readers in those three areas. Independent
Newspapers also publishes 13 free weekly community newspapers in Cape Town and holds a
number of profitable commercial printing and distribution centres in South Africa. In
addition, the group also has interests in magazines, book publishing, radio and broadcasting
and television.
Times Media Ltd was acquired by the black empowerment group, Johnnic
Communications which has diverse media and telecommunications interests. It is chaired by
Cyril Ramaphosa, a presidential contender and trade union leader. Johnnic shares 50 per cent
ownership of Times Media Ltd with the Pearson Group of the UK, owners of the Financial
Times. Johnnic Communications was incorporated on June 11, 1988 as The Argus Printing and
Publishing Company Ltd. The name changed to Argus Holdings Ltd on August 17, 1988 and
to Omnimedia Corporation on September 26, 1994. On May 10, 2000 shareholders approved a
further name change to Johnnic Communications to reflect the restructuring of the company.16
Nasionale Pers was owned by its directors with a large percentage of shares held by
Servgro, which in turn was owned by the Sanlam insurance group. Nasionale Pers published
Beeld, the Afrikaans morning daily in Johannesburg, Die Burger, the Afrikaans morning daily
in Cape Town, Die Volksblad, an Afrikaans evening daily in Bloemfontein, City Press, a
Johannesburg-based Sunday newspaper, Finansies en Tegnies, a weekly business magazine in
Johannesburg, plus several weekly and monthly Afrikaans magazines. Nasionale Pers was
also the biggest distributor of school textbooks in South Africa. Perskor, the smallest
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Afrikaner publisher, was owned by Dagbreek Trust, the Rembrandt tobacco and liquor giant,
and Nasionale Pers. Perskor published the Johannesburg morning daily, The Citizen,
Transvaler, the evening daily in Pretoria and numerous magazines, several small weekly and
monthly newspapers and was also involved in book publishing. By 2003, Naspers rationalised
its operations as Media24 to embrace all aspects of its publishing empire. Wholly-owned by
Naspers, its operations include newspapers, magazines, internet ventures, distribution
companies and printing works. The group owns four dailies, two weeklies and three Sunday
newspapers as well as 37 community newspapers countrywide. The magazine division
includes over 33 magazines in every sector of the market.
Other important publishing houses were Caxton, Thompson’s Publications,
Republikeinse Pers, Publico and Penrose. Independent Newspapers took up 31 per cent of
The Argus Newspapers in February 1994 (see above).
It also transferred control of the Sowetan newspaper to the black-owned New Africa
Investments group in response to growing criticism of a concentration of media ownership of
South Africa’s English-language press. Except for the two Sunday newspapers which were
variously printed in regional centres, Rapport and the Sunday Times, there was no national
daily newspaper in South Africa. This was caused by the large areas to be served, a changing
market place and distances to be covered, as well as a perceived lack of support for a
nationally-circulating daily newspaper.
There were 33 daily and weekly newspapers and more than 100 country or provincial
newspapers operating in South Africa in 1994. Most were small bilingual publications
avoiding politics. There were also hundreds of small community newspapers or “free sheets”
that circulated in the suburbs and townships, reflecting mainly suburban issues and
advertising or promotional material. Politics in the community newspapers was by and large
ignored.17
By 2001, a number of publications with varying degrees of success have extended their
coverage to the majority black community, away from the traditional white media audience.
Conglomerates still own all the newspapers in South Africa. Independent Newspapers
controls 75 per cent of the English language newspapers. Among the major conglomerates,
New Africa Investments Limited is a black-owned consortium that controls the country’s
major black-orientated newspaper, the Sowetan, along with Times Media Ltd. Despite postapartheid improvements, the print media in South Africa remain dominated by the white
minority, and reach only about 20 per cent of the population due to illiteracy, the lack of
newspapers in rural areas, and the cost of the publications.
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By the end of 2002, nearly 10 years after the end of apartheid in South Africa, race
continues to affect the media in the country despite other improvements in freedom of speech
and the press.18
A comparative model
Although I have outlined four basic strands of the South African print media, others have
suggested the group could be further stratified to reflect narrower interests. Although the four
major divisions are considered adequate here, a further segmentation into nine categories by
Tomaselli and Louw is useful for comparative purposes. These were:
(a.)

the conservative pro-apartheid Afrikaans press linked to the National Party
(since the 1930s);

(b.)

the anti-apartheid conservative-liberal press linked to monopoly “English”
capital since 1850);

(c.)

the anti-apartheid press aimed at black readers owned by either monopoly
“English” capital or paradoxically, by pro-apartheid “Afrikaner” capital (since
the 1970s). This press functioned within the state’s strategy of creating a black
bourgeoisie;

(d.) regional and/or free sheets, tied to the English liberal and conservative Afrikaans
presses, offering “apolitical” local interest items. A rapidly-growing press in both
black and white areas, government, and the economic pressures of advanced
capitalism are increasingly steering print media into this uncontroversial
direction;
(e.)

the social-democratic independent press (since 1985);

(f.)

the left alternative press (since 1980);

(g.)

the neo-fascist pro-apartheid press serving factions which broke from the
National Party in the 1980s;

(h.)

newspapers linked to the Bantustan infrastructures, for example Mafiking Mail
and Illanga, and;

(i.)

government propaganda sheets produced by state news agencies, the largest of
which was the Bureau of Information (since 1986).19

Switzer [1997] further complicates the media landscape, claiming the alternative
press in South Africa constituted a unique political, social and literary archive the oldest,
most extensive and varied collection of indigenous serial publications of its kind in subSaharan Africa and he notes four distinct phases in the history of the alternative press:
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1.

The African mission press (1830s-1880s) represented by the pioneering
missionary societies and their converts. The earliest African protest
literature can be traced to the last three decades or so of this era.

2.

The independent protest press (1880s-1930s) represented primarily by
the black petty bourgeoisie with African nationalist newspapers the
dominant organs of news and opinion.

3.

The early resistance press (1930s-1960s) which gradually embraced a
popular, non-racial, non-sectarian and more militant alliance of leftwing working- and middle-class interests. During this period,
traditional protest publications were brought out, closed down or
depoliticized and merged with a new captive black commercial press
controlled by white entrepreneurs.

4.

The later resistance press (1970s-1980s) which represented primarily
the Black Consciousness movement and its press (1970s) and the socalled progressive community press (1980s). 20

Summary
This chapter has provided an overview of the historical development of the South African
press and its struggle for legitimacy in the early days of settlement. It traces the struggle
towards a free press against the background of an intertwining colonial struggle between the
English and the Dutch.
It also identifies four basic strands during the apartheid years: the Afrikaner press, the
English language press, the Black press, and the so-called alternative press, each with its own
agenda.
The aim has been to show the complexities of the media as it operated within the
political spectrum, particularly that the role of the mainstream English press as opponents of
the government’s racist policy and apartheid cannot be down-played. Reviewed in the context
of African politics and black liberation aspirations, the English language press was clearly
deficient in content and insufficiently defiant. This was as much the result of legislative
restrictions and police harassment as from a reluctance to confront the status quo. It also
struggled under repressive legislation and faced constant government threats, banning orders
and censorship. Chapter Two will look at authoritarian controls on the media during apartheid
and the establishment of an alternative press that challenged government policies.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS: STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE
Introduction
The structure and foundations of the South African press is discussed in Chapter Two
including the early days of the press, the struggles against authoritarian controls and the move
towards greater accountability in the 1950s. This chapter also considers the role of the
Afrikaans press in National Party politics, the effect of apartheid on the development of the
national media leading eventually to the establishment of the alternative press in 1980 and its
eventual decline and demise 10 years later. This chapter details the complexities of the
national press against the backdrop of apartheid and the way the political system of separate
development shaped the development and focus of the press.
Foundations
A legacy of the Afrikaner press is that it dedicated itself to the preservation, interests and
advancement of the Volk, the hereditary Afrikaners. It was a news media born in response to
perceived ideological differences with the so-called “enlightened”, or verlig, English press
and the transcending objective of promoting Afrikaner nationalism. The first newspaper to
propagate the interests of Afrikaners and the Dutch, De Zuid-Afrikaan, was started in 1830 by
Christoffel Joseph Brand, an advocate who was unpopular with the British colonial
authorities. In its third year its subscription base rose to 3,000 when Afrikaners from the other
British-annexed parts of South Africa embraced it. It folded in 1904.
In the early years of apartheid there was no argument that the Afrikaans press was
dedicated to Afrikaner nationalism, especially in 1948 when the Nationalists took office. The
battle for survival between conflicting interests which started out as a colonialist’s struggle
against authoritarian controls continued through the history of South Africa, polarising the
society. It created a rift not only between burgeoning black African nationalism and Afrikaner
domination in the early 1900s, but also spawned a growing animosity between the white
English settlers and the Afrikaner nationalists. This was especially so during the Boer War
and 40 years later during World War II when the National Party and its leaders were
sympathetic to Hitler and the Nazis. Consequently, the Afrikaans press was consumed with a
strong nationalistic fervour having clear racist overtones.1
South African newspapers observing the British traditions of a free press while
operating within a framework of racial oppression faced an extraordinary dilemma. They
juggled between the case for apartheid and the role of the media as public watchdog. This
ambivalence − not clearly supportive, yet selectively oppositionist − isolated the English press

40

from the Afrikaner print publishers, who regarded it as a virtual enemy. The English language
press was perceived as supporting the Opposition parties, mainly English, and soft on
supporting apartheid. The Afrikaans press was overwhelmingly staunch, loyal National Party
stock, unstintingly committed to apartheid. In the eyes of the Afrikaans press, the English
press fell short of maximising support for the national policy. Paradoxically, the English press
was vexed by blacks who claimed that, fundamentally, it was a white press for white people.
A watershed in this deeply-ingrained antipathy as it affected South African news
media history can be discerned in the period preceding the election of the Nationalist
Government in 1948. After World War Two, and the reconstruction period, widespread
international demands emerged for an extension of democratic institutions in South Africa.
A closer look at the mechanics of the press, its freedoms, role and influence, was an
inevitable part of this phenomenon, following the processes of self-scrutiny of the press in
leading Western countries. In the United States, a privately-financed Commission on the
Freedom of the Press was established in 1942 and suggested “reforms from within” the
industry. In 1946, the Labour Government in Great Britain established a Royal Commission
to “inquire into the financial control, management, and ownership of the Press”. The
precedents were there for the South African government to establish its own inquiry.2
Parliamentary scrutiny
The initiative was taken in the House of Assembly by United Party MP Dr Bernard Friedman.
He moved on February 24, 1948 that a select committee be established with the following
objectives:
. . . to ascertain whether the financial and technical control of the press in
South Africa is such as to prevent a completely free expression of editorial
opinion and expression of news; whether the conditions of employment
are

such as to ensure to the reading public an adequate supply of

journalistic talent capable of free and competent reporting of the wide field
of social and economic activities in South Africa; and whether there exists
any restraints on honest news through censorship, loaded transmission
rates, economic sanctions and other devices.3
The Argus company interpreted this as an attempt to curb its growth and perceived
dominance in the South African print media industry. Parliament was dissolved in 1948 for
general elections and the motion was still in committee. The United Party was defeated at the
polls, General Jan Smuts resigned as leader, and it was assumed that the print inquiry would
disappear from the agenda.
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Instead, the incoming National Party quickly revived it. On January 31, 1950, Dr A. J.
R. van Rhijn, a National Party parliamentarian, moved in the House of Assembly that the
government consider the “advisability of a commission to inquire into the existence of
monopolistic tendencies, press combines, and group interests in this country and their
influence on the press, and the advisability or otherwise of controlling internal and external
reporting”. On October 23, 1950 a Press Commission was announced with Justice J. W. van
Zyl as chairman. The first sittings were held in January, 1951.
The English-language press saw the Commission as an attempt to muzzle the press in
general and, in particular, to restrict the growth and financial success of the English language
newspapers. It was an ironic consummation that a measure conceived as liberalising South
Africa’s press should actually open the way for greater repression. It enabled the English
press to be painted as the voice of opposition to the Nationalists, driven by financial and
corporate interests rather than politics.4
During the apartheid era, the English-language press was perceived by the Nationalist
government as the “hostile and foreign press”. Perhaps this had some justification because the
mainstream English press was a constant thorn in the side of the Afrikaners. It took much
credit for what was depicted as its persistent opposition to government policy. But over the
years of apartheid rule and the constant overwhelming electoral successes of the National
Party at elections, it was incongruous that this dominant “white” press was consistently out of
step with the white voters who resolutely supported the National Party.
In its opposition to the Nationalists, the English press certainly were not promoting a
radical change in the political status quo, the concept of equality or black majority rule. The
two major black revolutionary groups, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan
African Congress (PAC) were still referred to as “terrorist groups” in the major “white”
newspapers even in the lead-up to their final “unbanning”. For the black majority, it was
difficult to determine the agenda of the “white” press.
Certainly they were not working in the interest of the blacks as their recruitment
policies made clear. Staff ratios, both for the Argus group and South African Associated
Newspapers, from 1949 to even the late 1990s, showed only small numbers of black or
coloured staff journalists, and even lower percentages at managerial levels. These were the
two dominant newspaper groups in South Africa.
Apartheid and the Afrikaans press
The greatest ambition of the Afrikaans press had been achieved in 1948 with its government
in power. Towards the late 1950s, however, a subtle change was apparent. No longer satisfied
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with merely being the vehicle for pro-apartheid government policy, the Afrikaans press took
more positive steps to highlight factional differences within the Nationalists.
Any opposition to the National Party by an Afrikaans paper, however, revolved
around how apartheid policy was applied rather than the principles involved.5
As noted above, the ideological rift between the Afrikaner and English press was
already clearly defined. Ultimately, it widened to a gulf linked only by the slender thread of
“white man’s superiority”. The Afrikaner-dominated Nationalists were in power and its
sharply-distinguished Afrikaans press stoked the fires of the Afrikaner nationalist movement.
The English language press was regarded as the “enemy” of the government and a
supporter of its enemies, the black majority. The Afrikaans press, without any pretence,
aligned itself over the apartheid years to government aims and aspirations.
Robert Sobukwe, the leader of the Pan-Africanist Congress, described the freedom of
the press as a white freedom:
Not only the vehicles of communication but also the laws that they [the
newspapers] obey are white men’s law for white men’s purposes.6
The former editor of Die Burger, Professor P. J. Cillie, succinctly stated the newspaper’s
ethos and its dominance in the Cape Province:
Die Burger, of course, is an example of a newspaper that was published
not primarily as a commercial proposition, but quite frankly as the
pioneering opinion-forming journal with a very definite political message,
that of the then still small Nationalist Party. The first shareholders did not
expect early dividends, and for very many years did not get them.7
More subtly but with equal determination, the English press segregated its
newspapers along racial lines and stifled the development of its black staff both in terms of
hiring staff and providing separate newspapers staffed exclusively by “black”, “coloured” or
Indian staff for black, coloured or Indian newspapers. Examples of these were the World
aimed at blacks around Soweto and greater Johannesburg, The Cape Herald aimed at
“coloured” markets around the townships of Cape Town and Port Elizabeth, the Johannesburg
edition of Post and the Durban edition of Post aimed at the Indian market in the two major
cities.
By contrast, the Argus in Cape Town was almost entirely white staffed with token
non-white appointments only made mid-1970 when Sharkey Isaacs was appointed and later
Rashied Seria was transferred from the Cape Herald. At the Star, in Johannesburg, the pattern
was similar. It was a pattern that was consistent and would continue for over a decade more.
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Seria was later to quit the Argus in disgust and was a foundation member of the alternative
newspaper Grassroots. While “coloureds” were an invisible minority on the reporting and
editing staff of the white English press, not a single “black’ journalist was employed on an
English newspaper in the entire country.
Even so, the English press managed to cultivate and to preserve this image of a
protagonist for change, antagonistic to the excesses of apartheid, a fearless and strident antiapartheid campaigner in the face of adversity. In retrospect, this perception can be seen to
have been invalid when the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1997 inquired into the
workings of the press in South Africa during the apartheid years.
But it is only partly correct to conclude that the Afrikaans press was solely an
instrument of oppression and a government propaganda machine. In the complexity of South
African politics and changing loyalties, the thrust of the Afrikaans press was different both in
tone and direction. For example, the progressive Dr Willem de Klerk was editor of Die
Transvaler [1973-87] and editor of the mass circulating national Sunday newspaper Rapport
[1987-92]. In both editorships, De Klerk did not share the extreme views of Nationalists such
as Hendrik Verwoerd. During the 1980s, political change sparked nationwide political unrest
and riots. The Afrikaners were split into two rival publishing groups loyal to different
regional factions of the National Party. These were Perskor, the more conservative faction in
the Transvaal, and Nasionale Pers in the Cape Province. The Cape’s citizens generally were
perceived to be wealthier and more liberal in terms of Nationalist policy than the Transvalers.
Political policy division even in National Party circles was not unusual.
Die Burger and the Afrikaans press
The role of Die Burger in National Party politics is well documented, especially its
relationship with the government post-1948. It began in 1915 as the National Party’s official
newspaper.
As the oldest and most successful of the Afrikaans newspapers, Die Burger was always
closely linked with the party, and had a decisive role in charting policy and direction. Daniel
Malan was appointed its first editor in September 1915 when he

became leader of the

National Party in the Cape. Malan was a Dutch Reformed minister from 1905 to 1915 but
became a hardliner who abandoned the ministry to edit Die Burger. Malan led Die Burger
until 1924. He became Prime Minister in 1948, having held senior party positions in
Opposition from 1924. Malan resigned as Prime Minister in 1954, but never wavered from his
uncompromising belief in white supremacy. He was not an editor in the traditional mould and
left most of the news and reader services to others, concentrating on leader writing which was
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mainly political. During his Prime Ministership, Die Burger maintained close relations with
the power structure.
This close relationship with government had diminished by the time Dr Hendrik
Verwoerd took over as Prime Minister in 1958. Verwoerd, a former Stellenbosch University
sociology professor, edited the fiercely Afrikaner newspaper Die Transvaler from 1937 to
1948. He became vice-president of the National Party in the Transvaal in 1946 and, in 1958,
party leader and South Africa’s sixth Prime Minister. But earlier he was embroiled in
controversy for his anti-Semitic outbursts. In 1941 The Star, in Johannesburg, accused the
ultra-conservative nationalist of promoting Nazi sentiments in the editorial comments of Die
Transvaler.8
Verwoerd sued the newspaper, published by the English-language Argus Group but the
court ruled against him, declaring his newspaper, Die Transvaler, a “very useful addition to
the German propaganda service”. In finding for The Star, Justice Millin of the Transvaal
Supreme Court ruled that Verwoerd’s “right to publish what he did was not in question”.
The Star defended on the grounds of justification, while Verwoerd pleaded his right to free
speech. Justice Millin said that on the evidence, Verwoerd was not entitled to complain
because "he supported Nazi propaganda, made his paper a tool of Nazis in South Africaand he
knew it".9
Verwoerd’s political strictures were aimed not only at blacks but also on South
Africa’s other minority groups, especially the Jews:
From the very first editorial in October 1937, in which Verwoerd
lambasted Jewish meddling in Afrikaner financial affairs, and advocated
deporting all the Jews, Verwoerd’s outspoken views antagonised not only
[Jan] Hofmeyr [later deputy prime minister to Dr Malan] but also English
[largely Jewish] financial and mining capital in the Transvaal.10
De Klerk described the Vorster era from 1966 to 1978 as a time of renewal and change
of media policy direction:
During the Vorster era 1966-1978, in the face of considerable opposition
from the government and its own readers, the Afrikaans newspapers
initiated several enlightened schools of social thought. Against the inborn
resistance of many readers, these newspapers persisted in their motivations
for change and renewal. As a result of this, a process of change has begun
in the National Party. This eventually led to the splitting off, rifts and new
policy statements which characterise the present politics of reformation.
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The Afrikaans newspapers were, and are in the vanguard of the Afrikaner
(r)evolution which is breaking through.11
De Klerk accused the English press of often stretching press freedom “to the extent that
the patriotism of the press is questioned”. The Afrikaans press, on the other hand, had a
commitment to Afrikanerdom, and thus was vulnerable to criticism for undermining the
freedom to know, to inform, to differ, and to resist.
Harvey Tyson, editor of The Star, recalled a loose arrangement of editors, both
English and Afrikaans, who met occasionally to discuss the role and direction of the media in
South Africa. English-language editors “listened wide-eyed while Afrikaans editors lashed
out, in secret, at their government or argued with each other”.12
Out of these meetings a sense of professionalism was enhanced and many sociopolitical issues were scrutinised effectively by Afrikaans editors. As a consequence, some
Afrikaner editors later consulted privately with trusted cabinet ministers to seek a broader
understanding of the role expected of the print media. This had some similarity to the way in
which the House of Commons would lobby correspondents in the UK who are given “off-therecord” briefings by senior party officials. The UK practice, however, was more regular and
formalised.
Press freedom and apartheid
Despite the acknowledgment of standard professional values and standards, commitment to
traditional journalistic practice was hardly the benchmark for Afrikaans newspaper editors. It
was their commitment to apartheid that mattered most. Status in the Nederduits
Gereformeerde Kerk [the Dutch Reformed Church] was another major factor, as might have
been expected from the emphatic role of the church in the colonial development of Afrikaans
journalism. (See above)
Political advancement through newspaper editorship and the church was a familiar
path to party success for senior National Party members.
Andries Treurnicht, another Dutch Reformed minister and ultra-conservative National
Party cabinet minister, edited the official Dutch Reformed Church newspaper Die Kerkbode,
an influential conservative publication in Afrikaner circles, and later edited Hoofstad an
equally conservative newspaper in Pretoria. His ultra-conservative views later led him to
abandon the National Party in 1982 to start the ultra right-wing Conservative Party.
Prime Minister John Vorster had also been chairman of Perskor, the Transvaal
publishing arm of the Nationalists. He was Prime Minister after the assassination of Verwoerd
in 1966 but quit as Prime Minister in 1978 amid a growing rift between Perskor and the
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Cape-based Nationale Pers. In 1978 irregularities surfaced in the Information Department
which used government funds to launch a pro-government newspaper, The Citizen. Vorster
was implicated in this embarrassing scandal that led ultimately to his resignation. He was
succeeded as Prime Minister by P.W. Botha who insisted that Cabinet members should not
hold newspaper directorships. Restrictions were placed on who held directorships of the
major Afrikaner publishing houses, the source of major party funds through lucrative
government printing contracts. The companies, however, remained in the hands of the party
faithful, dominated by the senior members of the secretive and powerful Broederbond
organisation, an exclusive, secretive Afrikaner “brotherhood” that determined apartheid
policies and direction.
It was a sinister organisation with secret membership contacts and influence that
extended into every aspect of South African society.
Potter [1975] concludes that the Afrikaans press “saw itself and was seen by the
Government as the communications arm of a political party which claimed to represent an
entire people”.
The Government’s messages were directed primarily and often exclusively
to the ‘Volk’. Ideologically, the Government did not recognise the rights
of the independent press to information, for the English press did not
represent the ‘Volk’ nor could it be trusted to communicate the political
message.13
In summary, press freedom as espoused by Afrikaans newspapers differed from the
robust English language papers which regarded press freedom as a basic human right. From
the Afrikaans point of view, however, press freedom could not be elevated to where the
stability of the state might be endangered.14
For Afrikaners eager to foster the unity concept of volk en staat (people and state), press
freedom was linked to national development and perception of the common good.
Apartheid and the black press
In a context where power and control lay with the white press, particularly the politicallydominant Afrikaners, it was always a hard road for black journalists to carve any niche,
whether as journalists or in newspaper management. Employment opportunities were few,
black ownership was extremely limited, and the potential market largely poor and semiliterate.
The ingredients for development, and ultimate economic success of an independent,
robust black press were lacking from the start.
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The high illiteracy rate among the target audience was a formidable obstacle for any
emerging black press. Except for a few small grassroots publications in the townships and
other minor publications of various churches or community groups, a vibrant black press did
not emerge in South Africa. Turning back to its professional evolution, the Bantu press was
defined by Rosenthal in 1949 as falling into three categories − produced by Europeans for Africans,
produced by Africans for Africans, and a joint effort of both Europeans and Africans.
Its evolution can best be described as extending

through four distinct stages of

development − the missionary era from 1837, the emerging independent period from the 1880s to
the 1920s, the white-owned period of the early 1930s, and the multi-racial period post-1976.15 The
colonial development of the Bantu newspapers was outlined through its colonial origins in
Chapter 1. The story is picked up here from the early 20th Century.
Among the more influential and vigorous early Black papers was Abantu-Batho [The
People] founded in 1912 as the mouthpiece of the Native National Congress, a forerunner of
the African National Congress. Like all the independent small black papers, it lacked capital,
newsprint, staff and distribution agents. Above all, it was pitched at a readership that was
largely illiterate and poor. It was a publication that changed hands repeatedly and with some
unusual owners. In 1931, it was briefly acquired by a consortium with Asian financial backing
that called itself the African and Indian Trading Association. In 1920, white business and
financial backers started taking an interest in the independent black press. The Transvaal
Chamber of Mines launched Umteteli wa Bantu [Mouthpiece of the Bantu] in May 1920.
Supervised by the Native Recruiting Corporation, it was staffed and produced by Africans in
English, Sesotho, and Xhosa languages.16
The paper established a large circulation on the goldfields of the Witwatersrand and
further afield into the native territories and reserves. There were suggestions that the entry of
the Chamber of Mines into the independent black press market and its establishment of
Umteteli wa Bantu set the stage for the white takeover of the black press by the early 1930s.
All of the early black papers succumbed to political pressure and financial disaster.
In April, 1932, Bantu Press Ltd was established by Bertram Paver a white South
African farmer motivated by commercial gain as well as a desire “to provide the Native
people with a platform for fair comment and presentation of their needs and aspirations”.17
Bantu Press controlled six publications including its flagship The Bantu World with a weekly
circulation of 14,600. The newspapers of Bantu Press circulated throughout South Africa,
Northern and Southern Rhodesia.18 Paver's foray into black journalism was short-lived, and 14
months later it was subsidised by the Chamber of Mines through the controlling interests of
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the Argus Group. Argus remained the major stockholder in Bantu Press from 1933 and by
1945 had increased the number of newspapers in its stable to ten.
In 1959 Bantu World had a circulation of some 11,000. By 1968, it was around
90,000 and by 1976 it rivalled the 145,000 copies daily sold in the Johannesburg region by the
Rand Daily Mail. In 1962, the Argus took full control of Bantu Press and its main paper
Bantu World which became simply World, a lively tabloid newspaper styled in the mould of
London's Daily Mirror.
In the 1940s and early 1950s, the second generation of black newspapers emerged. Also
mainly political by nature, these included Inkundla la Bantu [The Bantu Leader] in 1946,
established by the African National Congress, Torch, and Spark. All were banned following
the Sharpeville massacre of March, 1960 when 69 people died after white police opened fire
on black protesters. By 1963 Anglo American, as the major stock holder in Argus and the
Chamber of Mines, had full control of Bantu Press and acquired a thriving and profitable
stable of black newspapers. Independently owned black newspapers, however, did not have
similar success, as Potter points out:
It was impossible for any independent African newspaper to survive the
competitive power of the white-controlled Bantu Press, and indeed, this
was the intention.19
After the World was banned in 1976, it emerged again as a bi-weekly named Post with
similar editorial content emphasising sex, sport and crime. Both newspapers ignored political
comment.20 Some exceptions to the populist World concept of black newspapers emerged
with the publication of Drum, a monthly magazine flourishing in the 1950s and 60s. It was
owned by Jim Bailey, son of Sir Abe Bailey of South African Associated Press, and focused
on contentious issues such as brutality to black prisoners, prison labour on farms, and the
evils of apartheid for blacks. Jim Bailey also launched Golden City Post in 1955, a successful
and racy tabloid with some political comment. It was bought by the Argus group in 1972.21
News vacuum
In a country with three million whites, the other 25 million people lived in a news vacuum.
Throughout the 1950s, the news media was directed more to the educated whites and largely
ignored the mainly poor and poorly-educated black masses. There was no particular economic
or commercial enthusiasm to embrace a newspaper market of mainly poor and semi-literate
blacks when a more affluent middle-class market was already within grasp.
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Middle-class readers underpinned the advertising market so crucial to the success of
any newspaper. Simply expressed, it was a case of no funds, no newspaper. No place for
black journalists.
The development and progress of a meaningful black press was restricted by a
complex variety of hurdles. The problem of illiteracy, though not a defence for an imbalanced
media, also presented problems for black African publications such as the magazine, Drum.
This was launched in the 1950s to secure an untapped market of more than nine million
readers stretching from Johannesburg to central Africa. But Drum struggled in the 1950s.
Efforts to boost circulation involved a variety of promotions that included reader
participation. The results were hilarious at times but disturbing because of basic
communication problems. Readers could not even distinguish between advertising and
editorial material. Amusement came first and education second for Drum readers.22
During the 1960s, editorial vacancies for black and coloured persons had still been
scarce with most black journalists employed as stringers or casuals, or paid a “tip off” fee for
news opportunities. In 1963, the Rand Daily Mail moved to redress the imbalance by
launching a news “Extra” for the black market. Two black journalists were employed and
Township Mail was launched as one page of “black” news, replacing the sharemarket page.
Otherwise, the edition remained the same. By 1970, circulation of the “township” edition had
grown to around 20,000 copies a day and was renamed the Rand Daily Mail Extra. Not only
was the Extra offensive to black people, but it questioned the sincerity of the “liberal” or antigovernment English press. Even the Nationalists and the pro-Government newspapers were
scathing in condemnation of this apparent hypocrisy.
The Citizen relished the opportunity to denigrate the Rand Daily Mail, then
considered one of the most outspoken newspapers against apartheid policies. “What is
happening is that the Mail is already too black for white readers but not black enough for
black readers,” The Citizen commented.
It was a view reflected on both sides of the racial divide. The black-consciousness
movement condemned the practice as condescending and discriminatory, suggesting that what
was printed in the Mail Extra was not necessarily good enough to be read by the Mail’s white
readers. Percy Qoboza, the first black editor of a major metropolitan paper and the editor of
the World, described the Extras as a monumental insult to blacks. His own paper, owned by
the Argus company and directed to the huge Soweto market, had a firm white hand on policy,
direction and economics.
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Like the World, the Mail Extra was started as a financial rather than a political
exercise but with the perverted nature of South African politics, it became ultimately a
political exercise with an economic twist.
Black press late century
The buy-out of independent black newspapers was the precursor to the black press of the
1970s and 1980s black-orientated newspapers owned either by South African Associated
Newspapers or the Argus group. Among these “secular”, racially-orientated English-language
newspapers were The Cape Herald, an Argus publication aimed at coloureds in Cape Town
and Port Elizabeth; Imvo, a Xhosa language newspaper; and Ilanga, a Zulu language
newspaper in the Natal region. Controlled by the major white-owned publishing houses under
black or coloured editors, these newspapers faced legislative pressures and also, to some
degree, white editorial policies.
At the Argus-controlled World, the content was decided by its white editorial director
in consultation with its black editor. It mainly reflected, however, the establishment view that
black readers preferred “crime and funeral news to political or international news”.23 Other
racially segmented newspaper markets emerged apart from the blacks, for example, Post,
aimed at the Indian population in Durban and Johannesburg.
Another business ploy adopted by both English and Afrikaans newspapers was to serve
black readers with “Extra” editions. These were appendages to the main newspaper as a wraparound or 12-page supplements inserted into the main newspaper targeting

specific racial

groups. “Extra” editions such as The Sunday Times Extra and Rapport Extra, although good
money spinners, did almost nothing for black political aspirations. Nor did they scrutinise
government in the public interest, offering instead a mix of sport, sex and township crime,
with “social scene” coverage by extensive photographic presentation of community dances,
sports awards and school reunion dinners.
In a misguided concession to black politics, under the separate tiers of government of
the late 1970s, the “Extras” also devoted increasing space to the Coloured Representative
Council [CRC] in the Cape Province, a much-scorned political institution created by the
Nationalists to offer limited political development to coloured people.
This major failing of the English-language press to criticise and oppose the
establishment of the CRC and its concept of separate development left an indelible mark on
its integrity and severely challenged the credibility of the white press.
Rather than opposing such a blatant discriminatory practice by the Government, it
provided an opportunity for the major media groups − both English and Afrikaans − to
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develop their newspapers along parallel pro-apartheid lines. Apart from giving credibility to
the CRC, an essentially meaningless political institution which had no real executive powers,
the English-language press provided the mainstay of political reporting for the “Extras”.
Thus, the four main media groups developed their metropolitan newspapers in a way
that easily excluded “non-white” newsmakers and journalists. For example, it was considered
unnecessary for the Sunday Times to focus on news as it affected coloureds in the Cape
because the Sunday Times Extra did this. It was unnecessary for Rapport to employ black or
coloured journalists to gather news in coloured and black areas because the Rapport Extra did
this. Admonishing and censuring the racist policies of the government on the front pages,
while relegating more than 90 per cent of the nation to an appendage was a juggling act of
huge magnitude, particularly for the English newspapers. It was not easy to reconcile with the
public interest role of the press in a democratic society.
This paradox was further complicated by a lop-sided editorial staff ratio that included
usually a few coloured staff and virtually no black Africans. These contradictions were
highlighted by Chimutengwende in 1978:
The South African Government is also keen not to damage continually its
international image; this partly explains why the English-language
newspapers have been tolerated up to the present. The other reason is that
these media do not in fact advocate fundamental changes to the present
system, but campaign for social reforms which will help bring nonEuropeans into the economic life of the country for the betterment of the
present economic system.24
According to Hachten [1971] the inability of the press to influence national politics
deepened into helplessness and ignorance where the disenfranchised masses were concerned.
Given the proper conditions of political and economic equality, the nonwhite Press might have become the most vigorous and effective of any
indigenous press system on the African continent. But this the white
minority government did not permit. 25
Chimutengwende’s judgment and Hachten’s findings would hold largely true for the
next two decades, until the 1980s. Hachten and Giffard [1984] concluded:
Journalism is one of the most dangerous occupations for blacks in South
Africa today. Furthermore, a black press hardly exists in South Africa. If
asked to describe the black press, a Johannesburg black journalist is likely
to say, ‘There is no black press. It is wrong to even talk about it’.26
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Editorial appointments for black and coloured people on major South African
newspapers before 1963 were virtually unknown. The editorial direction and news focus of
both English and Afrikaans language newspapers were oriented to the prosperous whites and
their advertising preferences in terms of maintaining the political status quo.
The media was undoubtedly for the whites, staffed by whites and setting a political and
social agenda that reflected not necessarily the National Party’s racist line, but certainly the
overwhelmingly pro-Nationalist line of the whites. When the role of the national press is
dissected against this backdrop of white politics, white superiority and baaskap, it is clear
why there was no place for black or coloured people on the editorial staffs of the metropolitan
newspapers and why separate or Extra editions were produced.
Thus, the major newspapers reported issues relating to the two major black political
organisations, the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress. Both these
organisations, which held overwhelming support among the black majority, were regularly
depicted as “the terrorists” almost up to the fall of apartheid and the first non-racial elections
in 1994. Even the most superficial review of South African newspapers between the 1940s
and 1960s indicates a serious imbalance in the editorial content and direction of the national
press. It was only towards the mid 1970s, and in the wake of growing social unrest that it
became imperative for South Africa’s press to address this imbalance.
The alternative press
For a decade from 1982, the alternative press enjoyed status as the voice of opposition. It was
born out of disillusionment with mainstream English print media in a context of Afrikaner
nationalist thrust resonating through the Afrikaans press, coupled with oppressive legislation
and restrictions on free speech. Thus, the alternative media aimed to provide a representation
of sorts for the majority of the politically unrepresented people of South Africa. It was always
faced with financial problems, was understaffed and lacked resources. Its achievement can in
some ways be measured by the efforts of the Government to suppress these publications with
banning orders, legal restrictions and constant harassment.
Ameen Akhalwaya, a pioneer in alternative press publication, concluded that the
alternative press in South Africa developed because “black journalists were thoroughly
disenchanted with apartheid in the news rooms, even at newspapers which espoused a nonracial society”.27 This fundamental ideological bias diminished an English language press
fundamental to any independent or alternative political and social expression in South Africa.
More directly, there were imperative needs to set an alternative political agenda for those
excluded from the alignment of the English and Afrikaans mainstream press, and to respond
positively to the propaganda-driven Afrikaans press. Akhalwaya offers this explanation:
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The mainstream newspapers by and large believe in either supporting the
government’s political structures or wanting these structures to be
modified to include blacks. All of them believe in the free enterprise
system. The emerging newspapers believe that the political and economic
structures must be radically altered in a society based on universal
franchise irrespective of racial or other considerations. 28
This was a radical departure from the commercial mainstream press and it is
debatable how well the alternative media (established and subsidised in many cases by
overseas aid funds) measured up to this challenge.
For the fledgling independent newspapers of the 1980s, it was a constant battle for
survival because aid funds could be impeded by government intervention, or just dry up. If
these independent newspapers became too troublesome, the government would not hesitate to
impose hefty fines or simply shut the newspaper.
The alternative press’s efforts to set a news agenda different from the mainstream press
meant that it was constantly at risk. It operated under a veneer of tolerance from an
authoritarian government keen to portray itself as non-interventionist yet having a vast web of
complex laws limiting press freedom. Other problems were inadequate journalism training,
ill-equipped and under-staffed newsrooms, and an inability to match metropolitan pay rates.
Constant police harassment, legal threats, advertiser reluctance and distribution problems
created further difficulties that frustrated struggling independent newspapers.
In shifting away from traditional commercial structures and adopting a crusading
approach, the alternative press was vulnerable to the same criticism of bias, selectivity and
lack of objectivity prevalent in the Afrikaans press at the other extreme of the political
spectrum.
The editorial objectives for the proposed alternative newspaper South, for example
included much similarity with the mainstream press but its manifesto went further. Among the
tasks included in its manifesto was a desire to articulate the needs and aspirations of the
oppressed and exploited, to supporting and promoting media, political, community and
worker campaigns, and challenging the monopolistic control of newspapers.
These, of course, are worthy social aspirations, but neglect equally important issues
about the role of the newspaper in society: fair reporting, propaganda and agenda setting. It is
not, however, an unusual concept. In the United States, black journalism also had its genesis
as a crusader in a time of adversity, political struggle and social and cultural prejudice that
were reflected in America’s mainstream media. In its charter, Freedom’s Journal, the first
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black newspaper in the United States, established in 1827 and published by John Russworm
in New York City, stated its aspirations:
We wish to plead our cause. Too long have others spoken for us. Too long
has the public been deceived by misrepresentation in the things that
concern us dearly.29
Nearly a century after the establishment of America’s first black newspaper, a group
of Nieman Fellows, at Harvard University, in 1947 accused the US media of being
“consistently cruel to the coloured man, patronising him, keeping him in his place,
thoughtlessly crucifying him in a thousand big and little ways”.30
This is similar to the development of the alternative media in South Africa where the
fringes of society wanted to establish a presence and work for social and political change.
The white-dominated press in South Africa excluded the black people, mirroring the
historical attitudes of the mainstream American press towards black people, and also
demonstrating the need for an alternative.
Charles Loeb, a senior officer of the Negro Publishers Association in the US,
observed in 1948 that the metropolitan newspapers “continue to play down Negro
achievements while playing up Negro crime,” with only “passing thought to the Negro citizen
as an American citizen”. This is comparable with South Africa’s English and Afrikaans
newspapers during the apartheid era in their highlighting of black crime and general portrayal
of black people in news stories.
The alternative black press in South Africa, like the alternative press in the United
States, developed in response to restrictive access and attitudes in the conventional press. It
established a new market place of its own making, opposing discrimination and prejudice, and
offering a more accessible forum.31
Grassroots
By 1987, more than 200 alternative newspapers had been established in South Africa. Mainly
comprising small and struggling publications, the burgeoning alternative press was often
subjected to brutal harassment and attacks by the Nationalists. As a descriptive term, the
alternative label did not sit comfortably with these independent publications. The assumption
was that alternative suggested something inferior to the established mainstream media when
in fact it aimed to challenge the established newspapers while reflecting the changing face of
South African politics.32
One of the first alternative publications Grassroots, a non-commercial community
newsletter, started in early 1980 in the Western Cape to fill the vacuum left by the English
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and Afrikaans press. In its first issue, the objectives were outlined in an editorial headlined “A
paper for you that fills the void”. It clearly spelled out the pioneering role intended for what
was hardly a traditional newspaper but more a community newsletter with wide community
input:
The newsletter has been born out of a tremendous need for a
communications medium for community organisations in the Western
Cape. Civil and community news (items) are increasingly being kept out
of newspapers ... (and) we know that these newspapers have never really
shown an interest or concern for civic and community matters, especially
in the areas where the disenfranchised live. When civic and community
news items are highlighted, these are in most cases restricted to separate
‘extra’ editions. Even then, preference is shown for sensational news or
the development of ethnic bodies working within separate development
institutions … we, therefore, believe that a vacuum exists in the
publication of community news and hope that Grassroots will to a certain
extent fill that void.33
As an innovative media communicator, the success of Grassroots can be measured in a
rapid increase in circulation, which reached 20,000 copies a week in two years focused on
basic community affairs and a direct approach to politics, industrial affairs and health related
issues. The organisers of Grassroots claimed the support of 80 community-based
organisations by 1984, including church groups, youth groups, civic organisations, unions,
and women’s groups working closely with it. When the Government cracked down on
Grassroots in 1984, the reaction increased its distribution to 40,000 copies a week. This
modest community effort served as a catalyst for similar community newsletters in various
regions of South Africa. Among the first was The Eye in 1981 in Pretoria and Ukasa, in
Durban in 1982. Despite several attempts, Grassroots failed to penetrate the black townships,
its organisers forced to admit that “it cannot be denied that Grassroots is seen as a “coloured”
newspaper in [African townships].34 Grassroots identified one of the main reasons for this
failure as the low level of community organisation, but there were other complex reasons for
this.
According to author and media analyst Sean Johnson, a major factor was that the
majority of the people behind Grassroots were “coloured”.
Thus a problem endemic to resistance in South Africa was played out at
the level of the alternate press: how to achieve unity amongst the
oppressed and thereby increase the strength of the movement towards
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change. In the case of Grassroots, there were a number of complex
reasons for the existence of such divisions, not least of which was that the
majority of the people behind the newspaper were coloured. Although the
policy of non-racialism was vociferously espoused and practised, it faced
prejudice and fear entrenched by decades of rule by coercion and division.
Grassroots itself identified the core reason for the failure in the African
townships as the low level of community organisation there.35
By 1984, the continued general community support of Grassroots encouraged the
formation of Saamstaan [Unity], another community newsletter established in the small rural
town of Swellendam in the Cape Province. It soon moved base to Oudtshoorn, a larger,
mainly rural town, also in the Cape. From the start, Saamstaan faced enormous hurdles
financially, in part because of the large rural area that it covered. It encountered constant
police harassment in an area where police vigilance was high compared with Cape Town, a
major city.
The 1985 declaration of a state of emergency seriously affected the development of
Saamstaan, as did the crackdown on Grassroots. Key people in both organisations were
banned. This constant disruption and harassment proved costly for the Grassroots board
which by 1985 numbered around 400. By 1989, it had dwindled to nine still with the paper.36
The intensity of the restrictions finally took its toll on Grassroots. The distribution of
the paper collapsed in 1989, sales income dropped sharply and financial problems developed.
Papers were secretly dropped off outside mosques, churches and shops but it was an
unsuccessful experiment as the publication still lost touch with its readership. Even a doubling
of the print run from 20,000 to 40,000 copies while battling for survival and compensating for
copies lost or confiscated by police barely managed to keep the project alive. The last edition
of Grassroots appeared in 1989 during the defiance campaign.
Grassroots published six editions in 1980, its inception year, increasing to nine in
1981. Between 1982 and 1989, it appeared 10 times a year. The project developed a basic
learning program in 1985, launched New Era magazine in 1986, and initiated an education
and trading program, a rural organising division to train “media activists”, and developed
Saamstaan newsletter as an offshoot of its activities.
Johnson described the Grassroots strategy as playing the game of producing a
newspaper that appropriated the appearance and style of the capitalist press, but subverted its
purposes. Grassroots aimed to present news “differently” and it went further than merely
covering “different issues”, it also demanded coverage of the same issues as the capitalist
press, in different ways. Often the difference between a Grassroots article and the commercial
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liberal papers was one of emphasis and angle. In pursuit of these aspirations, Johnson
summarised the questions posed by Grassroots:
•

How can this article make a contribution to initiating organisation or
strengthening it?

•

Does it expose injustices in our society?

•

How can it best be written from the peoples’ point of view, at a level
where it relates to their experiences?

•

Will it inform, educate … and raise a critical awareness among the
oppressed? 37

Other Alternatives
A later commercial independent newspaper, South, reflected similar disenchantment with the
mainstream media, and extended the pioneering work done by Grassroots. With the rapid
proliferation of new anti-apartheid organisations such as the United Democratic Front, and the
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), with its links to the African National
Congress, alternative newspapers such as New Nation, Weekly Mail, South, Grassroots, and
Saamstaan gave a growing platform to what were described as “progressive democratic
organisations”. A group of journalists and students established the Concord News Agency
which operated for three years, then launched the New African newspaper.
The initial aim was to offer an alternative to the white middle-class mainstream press
in the Durban region and opposition to the Zulu-language bi-weekly, Ilanga, later controlled
by the media network of Gatsha Buthelezi’s Zulu nationalist movement, Inkatha. Natal
Newspapers, a subsidiary of the Argus company sold off Ilanga to an Inkatha-controlled
company, Mandla Matla, on April 15, 1987.
From a fairly independent newspaper it was transformed into a mouthpiece for
Buthelezi’s political ambitions and the Inkatha nationalist movement. In opposition, the New
African published its first edition on March 20, 1989.
Ilanga was formed in 1903 by Dr John Dube, the first president of what became the
ANC. During the 1950s, the paper was acquired by white business interests and remained in
white hands until 1987 when it was taken over by the Zulu-dominated Inkatha political party,
becoming the first major African newspaper wholly owned by black South Africans.
The board of directors was headed by Dr Oscar Dhlomo, a former secretary-general
of Inkatha. All the other directors had close links with the Inkatha movement or the KwaZulu
government. In November 1987, Dr Mangosuthu Gathsha Buthelezi, the leader of the Inkatha
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Freedom Party, removed from the board of Ilanga all the directors who had links to the
KwaZulu government.
In its policy guidelines, Ilanga stated it would adhere to independent and honest
standards of journalism that did not pander to personal and sectional interests but were
concerned solely with the public interest. While these newspapers were alternative in the
sense that they offered black readers a different perspective to what was available in the
mainstream press, the fundamental objectives were far removed from an alternative press
targeted at social and political reform.
Ilanga faced many serious problems including efforts to disrupt distribution and
threats to shut down the newspaper. This came largely from opponents and critics of the Zulu
political party, reflecting less the disruptions that the alternative press faced during the late
1970s and throughout the 1980s. A particular bane was the Home Affairs Minister, Stoffel
Botha, who in 1987 initiated a torrid campaign to stifle the alternative press. The government
sought to eliminate these alternative publications which Stoffel Botha accused of brewing
revolution. Having silenced two of the biggest alternative newspapers, the attack covered a
wide spectrum from the working-class and openly partisan Saamstaan in a remote Cape
Province to the more professional New Nation, an alternative preserving detachment from
political partisanship.
Alternatives in Decline
Manoim [1989] concluded that the South African alternative press was born partly to fill the
gap left by the closure of the Rand Daily Mail and partly with frustration at the blinkered
mainstream South African press. The mainstream press, Manoim suggested, was like any
other commercial press. It was aimed at the readers most attractive to advertisers:
In South Africa, inevitably, these readers are predominantly white and
middle class and their values shape the newspapers they read. It would be
unfair to say that the mainstream South African newspapers ignored events
in the black townships and rural areas. They are conscious of injustice and
have spoken out strongly often enough in the past. But they tend to cover
the townships as if they were foreign lands: exotic, remote, of sporadic
interest.38
Thus, the alternative press developed with the aim of redressing these “blind-spots”,
but with indifferent results. As journalism, many alternative newspapers probably did not
match the technical standards of established newspapers. Some lacked substance, objectivity
and balance while others were hampered by mismanagement, surviving by dependency on
church and overseas funding. Despite the many differences between the alternative
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newspapers, one thread linked them a concentration on political news, (primarily news of
township unrest and labour issues), activist groups, community organisations, security
crackdowns and detentions. At their worst these papers were turgid and monotonously
“preachy”. At their best they pushed back the edges of what could be published, exposing
issues that the mainstream press ignored.
The growth of the independent newspapers, up until the mid-1980s, though prolific,
tended towards community-based newsletters reliant on overseas funding. The New African
depended on overseas funding for 93 per cent of its running costs with advertising generating
4 per cent and sales just 3 per cent. Despite its public policy of independence from party
political affiliations or bias, the New African was attacked by critics as the African National
Congress’ leaflet. By 1990, the New African was in serious financial trouble flowing from
distribution costs, mismanagement, consumer resistance and threatened loss of essential
overseas aid.
It called in foreign consultants to assess its viability. After constant attacks by the
government, New Nation folded after nine years including a three-month shutdown and at
least seven bannings. Its demise was little mourned by white public opinion. South
encountered a similar fate. According to Manoim:
These were never larger or highly successful newspapers. But they were
brave reflections of a particular South African reality which the
government would prefer to wish away. Today New Nation and South.
Tomorrow perhaps the more widely known Weekly Mail. And the next
day? 39
The demise of the alternative media was swift as political change in South Africa
gained momentum. The new media that was so important during the liberation struggle was
seriously affected when the mainstream media started muscling in on the traditional territory
of the independents. As the apartheid system crumbled, foreign funding for the alternatives
dissolved.

The choice of switching to a viable commercial newspaper was politically

unacceptable and unaffordable for many. Smaller publications that had ably served the cause
of change, such as South, Work in Progress and Speak were among the casualties.
Sparks says that the alternatives folded mainly because they failed to establish
commercial viability, partly because their readers lacked spending power and therefore
advertiser appeal: “...also, to be frank, because they were badly managed and slumbered in a
culture of dependency. When their life-support systems were switched off, they expired”.40
Berger concedes the alternative press collapsed in conjunction with the apartheid
system that made it so strong. The mainstream press, which for so long had ignored black
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politics and labour issues, was compelled to improve their coverage of issues dealt with in the
alternative papers.
And with new democratic freedoms evolving in the 1980s, the alternative newspapers
had to find new niche markets or face rejection as repetitive, sounding what Berger described
as “campaigning vehicles sounding the same old drum”.41 By the time President De Klerk
lifted the ban on the ANC in 1990, the old white mainstream press had already started to
encroach by reporting issues including black politics, human rights abuses, even investigative
and educational journalism. The alternative press survived the revolution in South Africa but
succumbed after liberation to the commercial realities of South Africa’s subsequently skewed
media market-place. This was compounded when overseas aid for the establishment of many
of the alternative newspapers either ceased or was drastically reduced.
Alternatives − another view
Tyson departs from the established view that the alternative press evolved from a need to
redefine the national media because the “liberal English media” failed in its duty to confront
apartheid despite its repression of the media.42
Following the collapse of the Rand Daily Mail in the mid-1980s, Tyson suggests
change was so rapid that The Star (edited by him), had to shift focus and respond more
aggressively to cope with President Botha’s Total Strategy-Total Onslaught policy. Change
was not forced upon The Star because of the burgeoning crop of alternative newspapers with
a radical new approach. Although not as technically efficient, adequately staffed, or
economically strong as the leading national daily, the alternatives impeded the expansion of
The Star as Tyson admits:
... The new vigorous, aggressive approach was accelerated to some extent
by the death of the Mail in 1985. Its demise left a gap in the national
debate which The Star expanded its role to fill.43
But it was a dangerous balancing act for the conservative daily. Traditional readers
responded that The Star was “giving too much exposure to allegations against the police and
to people with grievances”. Tyson admits many readers felt he was allowing The Star to lose
its “balance”, and this placed it at odds with the vast majority of oppressed South Africans.
The consequent “imbalance” of the mainstream English language press provided impetus for
the alternative press:
All [alternative newspapers] made themselves instantly felt. They ranged
from that most interesting and unheralded experiment in co-operative
community effort, Saamstaan, to the well publicised edge-of-mainstream
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Weekly Mail ... These and other ‘alternative’ journals such as Grassroots,
played a vital role in the final battle for press freedom under the National
Party even though their combined circulation hardly matched a single
small mainstream newspaper. Their influence went far beyond their size. It
reached deep into all communities.44
Tyson criticised the viewpoint of the subsidised alternatives that the commercially
independent newspapers were all part of “the system” and therefore allies of the Government.
The alternative press actively attacked the opposition press for failing to bring down the
National Party and to express the “view of the people”, but their critique had been eroded by a
lowering of their journalistic standards.
According to Tyson, most alternative newspapers believed “that things like balance,
objectivity and all those other old-fashioned values” were not only irrelevant, but a hindrance
in the war against a total onslaught on freedom. While sincere, they felt they had to denigrate
the mainstream opposition English language newspapers to justify their own existence and
garner overseas funding.
Under the new Government of National Unity, this assertion of the liberal English press
as de facto opposition during the apartheid struggle was severely challenged. Black journalists
suggested that the Truth and Reconciliation hearings should also investigate racism in both
the national press and liberal English language newspapers during the struggle against
apartheid. Merrett viewed the emergence of the alternative press as “a quest for unbannable
media”. It focused on increased news about the ANC, trade unions, and democratic
organisations committed to overthrowing the apartheid government, and favoured a “shift in
popular communication practices from mere propaganda to cultural struggle”:
The alternative media became a vanguard in anti-apartheid politics,
eliciting a response from the authorities that reached its apotheosis in the
States of Emergency declared from 1985 onwards.45
In the period of national reconciliation, post-1994, the unfairness of apartheid was
readily admitted by the displaced whites. While it prevailed, the English press in content,
direction and, most importantly, in staffing, showed that black people had little place in the
mainstream print media. The English press was often reactionary, and offered too little and
usually too late. To the more acerbic critics of the national press, the difference between the
English press and the Afrikaans press was merely that one went further in supporting
government policies.
The Afrikaans press was always an extension of the government, although in varying
degrees. There were superficial differences between Transvaal and Cape Nationalists, evident
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in the Cape Province organ of the National Party (Die Burger), and the mouthpieces of the
Transvaal Nationalists (Die Transvaler, Die Beeld and Die Vaderland). Fundamentally,
however, there was little difference between “grand apartheid” and the major cornerstones of
separate development policy. Tinkering at the edges of “petty apartheid”, the offensive
offshoots of the system may have caused some rifts over the years between the verlig
(enlightened) and verkramp (right-wing conservative) camps.
Commenting on the role of the national press as outlined to the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission in 1997, Guy Berger, professor of journalism and media studies
at Rhodes University and a former editor of the alternative weekly South, said the media was
less than honest in their statements to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (see below).
The liberal press operated in, and took its cues from, the prevailing white landscape. A
handful of white editors rose above the conventional wisdom of the day. Berger states:
They “opened an account” and they paid a price: exile for Donald Woods,
loss of their jobs in the cases of Raymond Louw, Allister Sparks and Tony
Heard. White journalists like these, who tried to lead the white readership
market, rather than follow its prejudices and its interests, also ran into
falling circulations. The decline was not compensated for by black readers
who failed to attract advertising revenue. If it wasn't such a context that
constrained the role of the liberal press, it was the confined outlook of
most white journalists.46
And Berger chides the liberal English press for lack of vision and selective opposition
to the apartheid system.
Many of these journalists did campaign against “petty” apartheid. But
macro-apartheid – especially after Bantustan independence – got less
critical attention. Coverage sometimes pilloried the pass laws; it routinely
neglected the wages paid to migrant workers. The problem with the liberal
press is not only that its opposition did not go far enough. Nor even that its
champions like Tyson did not realise that there was a lot further to go.
What was worse was the day-to-day reflection of what South Africa was
about. Black people were invisible in most newspapers. If you were
Desmond Tutu, you got coverage – usually negative – in The Star. If you
were a golf caddie featured in a Daily Dispatch picture, you'd be lucky to
have even been photographed in the rain standing next to white men
enjoying the shelter of an umbrella, with your name captioned as
“Jackson”.47
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Summary
Chapter Two highlights the complexities and changing loyalties of the South African press
against a background of race discrimination, separate development policies and oppression.
In the decade after 1948 and prompted by factional wrangling within the National
Party, the Afrikaans press underwent some sort of metamorphosis that changed it from a loyal
servant and mouthpiece of the government to a more critical press. That is not to say the
Afrikaans press shifted from an apartheid supporting press to a critic of apartheid. It was more
a struggle for identity and independence.
During the 1980s, as the alternative press moved into previously unexplored territories
as the voice of the oppressed, the Afrikaans press again had to make substantial and far
reaching policy changes as the apartheid regime struggled to maintain its grip and ultimately
lost power.
For the English press, maintaining a profitable balance between white readership who
felt that the papers were leaning too far towards the Left and agitated blacks demanding a
more critical focus against apartheid, it was always a difficult balancing act. Black readers
mainly reject the efforts of the English press in opposing the apartheid policies of the time as
being usually too little and too late, most white readers felt otherwise. But it would be harsh
and unfair to demean the efforts of the English press. It worked within the scope and
limitations of strict authoritarian controls, faced constant government scrutiny and police
harassment, especially during the 1970s and 1980s. And with a predominantly white
readership, the English press could not afford to alienate its advertisers by pandering to black
social and political aspirations. The English press was a white press with advertisers drawn to
the economically powerful white readership.
At the other end of the spectrum, the alternative newspapers struggled for survival on
many fronts. Small circulation figures, unattractive to advertisers, mainly local content news
and distribution problems hampered all of the alternative newspapers. Driven by a desire to
change the status quo but hindered by a lack of experienced journalistic staff and financial
constraints, the alternative news papers struggled from first edition until they folded. Chapter
Three will focus on apartheid and press repression. The thrust of Chapter Three is on the
minefield of legal hazards and obstacles placed on publications critical of government
policies.
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CHAPTER THREE
APARTHEID AND PRESS REPRESSION
Introduction
After the Second World War, before the apartheid era, the South African press resembled the
contemporary British press in its functioning. It was subject to legislative enactment, but
retained the commitment to free and independent expression and the lack of government
interference characteristic of British press traditions. After the Nationalists came to power in
1948 and committed to racist apartheid policies, this ethos rapidly dissolved. The national
print media was drawn inexorably into a constant battle against drastic authoritarian controls
designed to ruthlessly restrict press freedoms, despite lip-service to the truths.
By 1990, when apartheid disintegrated, more than 100 different legislative provisions
moulded the character of press freedom operating in South Africa. Even in 1996, with a black
majority, an ANC-dominated government and a commitment to a free press under the South
African constitution, the iniquitous and restrictive laws and conditions remained on the statute
books. However, by 2002, positive changes were noted. In an annual international survey on
freedom in the world, Freedom House found that South Africa continued to provide a
remarkable, powerful example of a positive democratic transition in an extremely diverse
country but some doubts remain.
The South African press remained one of the most restrictive in the world.
Overwhelming political and constitutional transformation was not reflected in any equivalent
transformation of the news media. This paradox is examined in this chapter which considers
the design and implementation of government coercion and media censorship under apartheid.
This chapter takes up the theme of retained controls and consequent repression in the postapartheid era under a new constitutional dispensation.
Bound by legislation
The apartheid years saw the introduction of many Acts of Parliament and related statutes, for
example the Suppression of Communism Act 44 of 1950, and amendments that made it a
punishable offence to further the aims of communism and the Communist Party. The Defence
Act 1957 was one of the first laws that had serious implications for restricting press freedom
in South Africa. The wide-ranging view of what constituted “communism” meant that the
government, the Defence Minister and the State President could effectively decide what
constituted a “communist”. In reality, the Act was used extensively against non-communists,
communists, and even opponents of communism.1
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Under the legislation it was an offence to advise, support or encourage the aims of
communism and provisions for the banning of newspapers considered to be supporting or
advocating change. Under its wide net, several newspapers were banned or shut down during
the 1950s and 1960s. It was also a costly burden for media owners. Under the Suppression of
Communism Act, newspaper owners had to put up a deposit of R20,000 when a new
newspaper was started if there was any possibility that it could be banned. This was later
increased to R40,000 when the Internal Security Act was reviewed in April 1982. The deposit
was forfeited to the state if the newspaper was banned by the government. The government
also reserved the right to censor the post, telephone, telegraph or radio services and any other
form of communication including written or printed material.
The Unlawful Organisations Act (No 34 of 1960) and amendments leading to the
Internal Security Act enabled the State President to declare “any body, organisation, group or
association of persons, institution, society or movement” as an unlawful organisation.2
The consequence of this action had the effect of a banning order on publications. Under
the Internal Security Act, it became an offence to publish the names or anything written or
said by a person or persons banned under the provisions of the Act. This included opinions or
statements made by banned persons prior to their banning orders and also included
organisations that had been declared unlawful.
Among other restrictions on publication were the Official Secrets Act (No 16 of 1956)
and the Riotous Assembly Act (No 17 of 1956 and amendments). These restrictive laws
operated in combination with a variety of other equally repressive measures. In total, these
curtailed freedom of speech and the way in which the press was allowed to report on
prohibited gatherings, recording or reproducing speeches of prohibited people and reporting
in ways that might incite public violence. For example, the Native Administration Act and the
General Law Amendment Act also made news reporting restrictive, difficult and a minefield
for an unwary publisher.
Under declared states of emergency, additional restrictive measures came into force.3
These further restrictions outlawed filming, photographing or reporting on any matter
involving the security forces in action. Prohibitions also covered reporting on any public
disturbance, riotous behaviour, destruction of public property, killings or assault or any of a
broad-ranging number of events that could loosely be construed as “subversive”. Under a
declared state of emergency, coverage of any disturbances or unrest was restricted to vetted
information from the Bureau of Information in Pretoria. Not complying with the regulations
could be a dangerous and costly exercise.4 Laws restricting the press during a state of
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emergency were additional to the 100 or so different pieces of legislation that already affected
the freedom of the press in South Africa.
Legal hazards

Even with the lifting of the state of emergency regulations, continued restrictions on press
freedoms placed a South African journalist in constant legal jeopardy, and facing a constant
threat of imprisonment and detention.5 Seemingly innocuous laws such as the Post Office Act
(No 44 of 1958, amended in 1972 and 1974) gave the post office administration the power to
intercept postal articles, telegrams, telephone messages, telexes and news reports.6 The
Publications and Entertainment Act (No 26 of 1963) was enacted among other things to keep
“undesirable” material out of the country. Under section 5 (2) of the Act, “undesirable” was
applicable to material “if it, or any part of it is indecent, obscene, offensive, blasphemous,
offensive to the religious convictions of any sections of the inhabitants of the Republic of
South Africa, brought any section of the inhabitants into ridicule or contempt, was harmful to
the relations between any sections of the inhabitants, or was prejudicial to the safety of the
state, the general welfare, peace, or good order”.
This Act was superseded by the Publications Act of 1974 to include films, records,
stage shows, artworks, amateur photography etc.7 The Customs and Excise Act (No 91 of
1964) placed restrictive controls on the importation and distribution of foreign publications or
goods deemed to be “indecent or obscene or on any ground whatsoever objectionable” by the
Publications Control Board. The offending material could be seized or banned at the
discretion of the Publications Control Board. The Extension of University Education Act (No
45 of 1959) not only provided for the establishment of separate and independent universities
and colleges of the various racial groups.8 It also placed restrictions on publications by the
student representative councils at these institutions.
Under the Act it was an offence to publish or produce magazines, newspapers or
pamphlets without the permission of the rector of the university. No student was allowed to
make a statement to the press by or on behalf of the students without the permission of the
rector.
In addition, provincial laws were passed in the Provincial Councils of the Transvaal,
Natal, Orange Free State and the Cape to restrict publications on the grounds of profanity,
indecency, offensiveness and material generally considered objectionable.
Under the Prisons Act it became a punishable offence to photograph or sketch any
prison or prisoner without permission from the Police Commissioner, or to attempt to portray
or report on prisons or prisoner conditions.
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The need for such a profusion of laws to restrict and stifle the press suggests there were
vigorous and powerful news instruments at work for meaningful political change in South
Africa, and that the Government felt threatened. But this was not so. It would be wrong to
suggest that the South African media did not at times campaign harshly against the National
Party policies. Opposition varied in degrees. The Afrikaans press more muted, the English
press more critical. Fundamentally, the government’s policy of separate development was
overwhelmingly acceptable to the whites though at times the ugly face of racism and
differences of opinion caused diversion in the press which basically served the needs of the
white community.
The role of the media as critic of the government had limits making it inadequate to
appease the aspirations of more than 95 per cent of the population. Black people in the main
saw no hope in the campaigns of the mainstream “white press”. Also, with the majority of
black people being illiterate and newspaper readership low, the impact of newspapers
criticizing the government was minimal. Even so, the need for oppressive media restrictions
formed only part of a bigger system to entrench and support the racist legislation in place.9
The cumulative effect of these restrictive laws was a form of censorship. But not only
censorship in a way to prevent or restrict the individual’s “right to know” but also to enhance
the repressive machinery of the state. Thus, censorship in South Africa was part of the
apartheid system, aimed specifically at imposing this ideology on the public.10
Oosthuizen argued that the Publications Act of 1974 was not the only censorship law
but that censorship was also exercised in terms of such statutes as the Internal Security Act of
1982, the Prisons Act of 1959, the Riotous Assemblies Act (1956) and the Official Secrets Act
(1956).11 Oosthuizen traced this interdependence of censorship legislation to an incident in
1987 when, after the Appeal Board had given the film Cry Freedom unconditional clearance,
the South African police nevertheless seized it. According to a report in the Sunday Times
(March 27, 1988) certain cabinet ministers were not happy that the film was released. Die
Beeld (January 6, 1989) said the ministers had the film summarily removed.12
Chimutengwende interpreted South African legal censorship in this way:
Law is used as an instrument of policy. Its purpose is to protect the state
apparatus and the power of the ruling class … In South Africa, the white
minority has power. It controls the state machinery and intends to keep it
by force and persuasion, forever if possible. The legal system, controlled
by the ruling minority, is there to ensure as far as it can that no other forms
of power opposed to the present set-up are exercised freely. The legal
system and other state pressures are geared to making the utmost
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endeavour to see that individuals and institutions facilitate the smooth
functioning of the social, political and economic system. They are not to
be given sufficient freedom to cause difficulties to or destroy the system.13
Allister Sparks, a former editor of the Rand Daily Mail, observed of press censorship in
South Africa that it created an information vacuum on black nationalist politics which the
government moved to fill with its own tainted version:
Thus, through a combination of censorship and propaganda, the
alternative of a negotiated settlement has been effectively closed to the
white South Africans and they have been locked into the confrontation
option.14
Benjamin Pogrund, a South African print journalist, media commentator and former
deputy editor of the Rand Daily Mail, divided South Africa’s pre-emergency press regulations
into three categories. The first were laws that curtailed individual freedoms in such a manner
as to harm press freedom as well. The laws of the second type forbade publication of certain
information without permission on topics such as atomic energy, oil supplies and the defence
forces. The third category of laws included those that did not ban sensitive topics outright, but
created legal hazards for publishers who might choose to cover them.
Total Onslaught

The culture of vigorously-policed censorship reached its peak during the so-called period of
Total Onslaught in the mid-1980s, continuing through the State of Emergency from 1985 to
1990. The Total Onslaught theory was coined by President P.W. Botha as a term for what he
perceived as a communist-driven attempt by anti-apartheid forces to overthrow his
government. South Africa descended into more violence as the government hardened its
opposition to the Total Onslaught of anti-apartheid forces who aimed to create an
ungovernable country
The repression originated in the early 1950s, starting with the Suppression of
Communism Act and the Riotous Assemblies Amendment Acts to the First State of Emergency
(1960), Van Zyl Commission Reports (1962), until the Steyn Commission of inquiry into the
mass media (1982) to nearly the end of the apartheid era in 1993. Merrett saw the history of
South Africa after 1950 as “characterised by an avalanche of security legislation which
among other effects, created a massive structure of censorship and self-censorship”.15
One reason [for censorship] was the suppression, so far as possible, of
information about the repressive tactics required to maintain the politicoeconomic status quo in South Africa for so long in the face of international
abhorrence. A second reason was to keep to a minimum contact between
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the different racial groups into which the country had been divided, so as
to perpetuate the myth that the differences between people are greater than
their common humanity ... Censorship was a device used to maintain the
illusion that the fine-sounding ideas of apartheid were not only desirable
and moral, but realisable. A third reason was the need to suppress the postwar history of non-racial opposition to the political order.16
The resort to censorship cannot be attributed wholly to apartheid. The roots had been
sown even before World War Two. In 1935, for example, John Gomas was convicted and
jailed for six months with hard labour for publishing an article under the banner of the
Communist Party of South Africa entitled King George’s Jubilee: 25 years reign of luxury,
pomp, and waste!
Thus, government intervention in freedom of expression was evident well before 1950
when the Van Zyl Press Commission was established to investigate media concentration and
monopoly tendencies.
In a massive agenda, it also scrutinised the activities of foreign correspondents and
stringers, the accuracy, responsibility and patriotism of the South African journalists,
restraints on the establishment of new newspapers, the incidence of triviality, and the general
condition of the national press. With the Suppression of Communism Act already in place,
reinforcing, government policy to ban newspapers or publications perceived as communist,
some of the Press Commission’s terms of reference were already irrelevant. Some were later
amended and others dropped. It was more than a decade before the Van Zyl Commission
finally completed its work and handed down its findings. By then, the horse had bolted
several years before.
In September 1957, the Commission of Enquiry in Regard to Undesirable Publications
reported about the undesirability of the propagation of communism, which in effect, was
broadly based, whatever the government found contrary to its separate development policy.
By this time two newspapers were banned. In 1952, the Guardian was banned and its
successor the Advance was banned in 1954, while Torch was charged in 1954 over an
editorial that questioned and criticised the Government’s education policy. The case was
ultimately dismissed in court. This was a time of consolidation of political power for the
National Party and included a steep rise in the number of publications banned as undesirable
by the Board of Censors. By 1956, this arbitrary Board had a list of 4,000 titles that were
banned and a waiting list of up to 16 months for imported publications awaiting
classification.17
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In the late-1950s, the State Information Office was revamped as the South African
Foundation, a propaganda machine. It offered a largely uncritical view of the National Party
government moving rapidly to implement the major building blocks of the apartheid system.
This was the time of the Defiance Campaign, reported extensively in the press. The
introduction of the Criminal Law Amendment Act and the Suppression of Communism Act
provided the legal basis to curtail press activity in delicate policy and administrative areas.
Foreign correspondents, among them Doris Lessing, Basil Davidson and John Hatch
were expelled from South Africa. The Minister for External Affairs at the time argued that a
great deal of South Africa’s internal trouble was due to the political articles in the English
press. But the English press, although not favouring the National Party, were not unbiased,
nor pro-African, non-racial institutions. It engaged in heavy self-censorship, and policy
differences between it and the racist National Party aims was largely a matter of degree to the
non-white majority.
Van Zyl Commission reports

In February 1962, the Commission completed its first report, a mammoth document of 2,376
typewritten folio pages. Yet it dealt with only two of the seven terms of reference. The second
report was tabled in parliament on May 11, 1964, another 1,400 pages plus 3,000 pages of
annexes. It focused on news collection and distribution, particularly the work of overseas
correspondents and “stringers” and news agencies. The main brief, to investigate the South
African print media, was largely ignored, the commission claiming it lacked the time to
investigate the role of the national press.
It did recommend the establishment of a statutory Press Council “for the self-control
and discipline of the Press”. The proposed Press Council was empowered to impose penalties
and fines, with no right of appeal to the courts against decisions. Every journalist had to
register annually with the Press Council and accept the Council’s 10-point press code.
The newspapers strongly opposed these plans and the government eventually backed
away from this somewhat Draconian model. The owners of the country’s major dailies and
magazines moved swiftly to introduce their own press code and board of control to apply a
degree of self-regulation. The government welcomed this, exempting members of the
Newspaper Press Union (NPU) from regulation under the Publications and Entertainment
Act.
During its lengthy investigation, the Van Zyl Commission seriously destabilised news
generation by publishers fearing investigation and interference from security police.
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The First State of Emergency

The Sharpeville massacre of March 21, 1960 was a watershed in South African politics. Led
by Robert Sobukwe, leader of the Pan African Congress, and supported by Nelson Mandela’s
African National Congress, a large crowd of black South Africans gathered outside the
Sharpeville police station to protest against the pass laws imposed by apartheid. The pass laws
were statutes that required all black men and women to carry a reference identity book with
them whenever they travelled outside of their home towns. In the end 60 protesters were
killed and 188 were wounded while trying to flee from police. It was an incident that
provoked international outrage and swift reaction by the South African government.
On March 30, 1960, the government announced the first State of Emergency under the
Public Safety Act of 1953.18 Widespread powers under the State of Emergency meant that
certain types of reporting could be summarily banned; for example, calls for boycotts,
advocacy of protests and strike action, and published statements

deemed

subversive.

Detention without trial and banning orders on journalists further eroded routine news activity
during this period. Police or government agents also had the right to search and seize printed
matter in newspaper offices.
The Government also sought to impinge on

press freedom by trying to force

journalists to reveal their sources to police under the provisions of the Criminal Procedures
Act. Several journalists were jailed using such tactics, including Brian Parkes for 16 days and
Patrick Duncan for eight days in October 1960.
Both refused to name sources. In 1962, Fred Carneson, of the New Age, was charged
for refusing to give information about a contributed article. Huge registration deposits were
introduced, subject to forfeit if newspapers were banned for contravening the rules. This
stifled the development of an independent and emerging radical or anti-apartheid press.
In addition, foreign correspondents encountered difficulties in sending their articles
overseas because of an interventionist policy at the Post Office. Often Post Office officials
would refuse to send cables dispatched by foreign correspondents. Among the publications
banned in the 1960s were titles such as Fighting Talk (1963), New Age (1962), Spark, Contact
(1963), African Communist (1964), New African (1965), Forum (1965), and Drum (19651968).

The national news distributors Central News Agency (CNA), refused to handle or

distribute titles perceived as left-wing.19
National Party, English press
The government attacks on press freedom and criticism were epitomised by Afrikaner
parliamentarian Blaar Coetzee in March 1962:
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One reaches a point where criticism stops and treason starts and the
English press too often exceeds that point.20
The Afrikaner press added its demand in Die Transvaler that the English-language
press should become “truly South African”. The animosity between the leadership of the
National Party and the English-language press can be traced back to the creation of the
National Party in 1934. During World War Two, when the South African [Nationalist]
Government advocated neutrality and relinquishing English control, Dr Danie Malan had
warned:
That section of the press which up to the present has served foreign
interests will have to be kept within bounds. Should it try to cause the
republic to be undone, this will be regarded as high treason and will be
treated as such.21
The National Party won the 1948 elections with an overwhelming majority despite
opposition from the “hostile” English-language press. Prime Minister Malan described it as
the most undisciplined in the world. In his view, journalists should be registered, like doctors,
and struck off the roll for unethical conduct. At the 1958 general elections, the National Party,
returned with an increased majority and launched even stronger attacks on the press,
especially the Rand Daily Mail.
The Mail fought back with an editorial accusing National Party MPs of constant attacks
on the English-language press, not only to denigrate it but also to justify further restrictions
and controls. Bitter and hostile attacks on the press were constantly reinforced by succeeding
Prime Ministers. Prime Minister Hans Strijdom, the National Party leader in Transvaal who
succeeded Malan, sustained a campaign of vituperation. Soon after taking office, Strijdom
accused the English-language press of “playing the venomous game of inciting the natives,
not only against the government but against the white man”.22
In Parliament, Strijdom immediately went on the attack against the newspapers which
he accused of being anti-South Africa. He obtained a vote recording parliament’s strongest
disapproval of newspaper attempts “to create strife between the two white language groups ...
as well as between white and black, and to undermine the good name of South Africa and its
economic stability by publicising incorrect and misleading statements”.23
Strijdom died in 1958 and was succeeded by Dr Hendrik Verwoerd, the former editor
of Die Transvaler, and an architect of apartheid. Verwoerd firmly believed that if the separate
development policy was to succeed, then the media had to be controlled. He viewed criticism
of the government or its apartheid policy as intolerable, vicious and disloyal. Verwoerd
demanded the loyalty of all whites to the principles of apartheid, and he regarded the English
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language press as a dangerous enemy to his plans. His increased crackdown on the press was
certainly not unexpected and he did not disappoint.
At the 1960 referendum, when whites voted in favour of establishing a republic, Dr
Verwoerd warned the press: “We cannot allow the future of the republic and the future
welfare of the nation to be ruined by sensation-mongering, incitement or the besmirching of
our country’s name or that of its leaders”.24
Merrett described as paranoiac the Government’s policy (bearing the imprint of
Hendrik Verwoerd) towards the English-language press:
It was frozen out of the information flow surrounding Parliament and was
subject to Government misinformation tactics. In Nationalist eyes, the
English press became not the Fourth Estate but a fifth column.25
The English press survived this onslaught because it was part of the white
establishment. It was necessary for the “democratic basis” of South African government,
without influencing the white electorate enough to unseat the government. Hepple agreed:
In its ceaseless efforts to maintain the apartheid system, the Nationalist
government recognises the fact that its position is not threatened by the
white electorate but by the rising militancy of the voteless black masses
whose cause is supported almost unanimously by the outside world.
Against such formidable forces, the Nationalists desperately need a
“responsible” press − that is a press which will represent apartheid and its
works in a most favourable light and thereby discourage discontent at
home and win friends abroad.26
Verwoerd to Vorster
Verwoerd was followed by a comparably authoritarian figure. John B. Vorster became Prime
Minister in 1966 after Verwoerd was assassinated in Parliament. A nationalist with
impeccable National Party credentials, he was jailed during the war years for his leadership of
the neo-Nazi Ossewa Brandwag movement. This was an anti-British, anti-democratic,
national-socialist movement with a clandestine membership of influential Afrikaners. Vorster
aimed to introduce laws against the media “that would provide not so much for the
punishment of reporters but to make the publishing companies pay for employing those sorts
of people”. And he threatened newspapers that he would be forced to legislate against what he
described as ascertainable factual lies in newspapers and magazines.27
When the Argus group moved to take over SAAN in 1968, Vorster stepped in to block
the move, saying Cabinet believed it was not in the interest of South Africa. Even if the

77

takeover went ahead he would legislate retrospectively, if necessary, to prevent it. Further
warnings followed over foreign investment guidelines, and control and ownership of South
African newspapers.
At a meeting on October 6, 1971, Vorster told 40 executives and editors of the major
national newspapers that he was holding off the planned legislation to control and discipline
the South African press because he was still negotiating. He appealed to the newspapers to
apply self-censorship so that legislation would not be necessary. Ministers savagely attacked
the English language press for colluding with the enemies of South Africa and undermining
the nation’s morale in its struggle for survival.28 This appeal for self-censorship was repeated
by the Minister of the Interior, Dr Connie Mulder, in May 1973. He urged the press to “act in
such a way with the freedom they have that it will not be necessary for the government to
decide against freedom of the press”.
The 1980s ushered in a renewed period of antagonism between the government and the
press. With violence and public unrest across the country seemingly out of control, Vorster’s
successor, President P.W. Botha was even tougher on South African journalists and overseas
representatives perceived as emphasising continuing civil unrest and instability. The 1980s
also saw the development and rise of the alternative or anti-apartheid press in response to
Botha’s authoritarian controls.
The Steyn Commission
In early 1980, President Botha established the Commission of Inquiry into the Mass Media –
better known as the Steyn Commission after its commissioner, Justice M.T. Steyn. It held
hearings from November 1980 to April 1982 and issued its final report and draft regulations
to Parliament on February 1, 1983. Justice Steyn held fundamentally antagonistic views on
modern trends in journalism. He had been a senior member of the right-wing and secretive
Afrikaner Broederbond. The inquiry was designed to reassure whites who were worried about
the growing pressure for change.29 The Steyn Commission was the first of many inquiries
initiated by Botha impacting on press freedoms and practice.
The mandate of the Commission was to inquire into and report on the question of
whether the conduct of, and the handling of, matters by the mass media meet the needs and
interests of the South African community and the demands of the times, and, if not, how they
can be improved. The seeds of the Steyn commission were planted in 1979, shortly after
Botha, a former Defence Minister, became President and warned the nation that there was a
Marxist drive which aims at controlling the subcontinent. Botha said that he needed the help
of the private sector to fully support the government in establishing national security and that
the co-operation of the press was crucial to these plans.
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Steyn and his Commissioners heard testimony from a wide section of the community
but no black journalists sought to appear. Although specifically assigned to inquire into the
media, the Commission spent much of its time on black nationalism and groups that
supported the anti-apartheid and black consciousness movements, the rise of “black
theology”, the World Council of Churches and its role in supporting black political
aspirations. The Steyn Commission also focused on disparate groups perceived as hostile
including the Organisation of African Unity, the United Nations and the Soviet Union. In the
eyes of the administration, these unlikely partners constituted part of a Total Onslaught to
overthrow the status quo in South Africa.
This could only be prevented by a counterveiling Total Strategy to confound these
forces of destruction.
The Steyn Commission was delivered in two parts, with a large section of the second
part devoted to a scathing attack on the WCC and South African Council of Churches:
The World Council of Churches is staffed by professional ecumenists and
conference-going ‘intellectuals’ who exhibit all the symptoms of the
sickness which is common in the West. Consumed by post-imperial and
post-colonial ‘guilt’, they are convinced that the West can only expiate its
‘crimes’ by humbling itself before its former ‘victims’, the Third World,
and its future destroyer, communism. Politics are for them, in effect, an
elaborate form of suicide for which Christianity affords a moral
justification.30
The commission said the South African Council of Churches was trying to provoke
internal socio-economic upheaval by means of political action. Included in this far-reaching
attack were several clerics and black theologians leading the anti-apartheid cause and the
black media workers’ organisation, MWASA (Media Workers Association of South Africa)
described as a front organisation for black consciousness. The major black newspaper the
Sowetan, a successor to the banned newspaper the World, was depicted as anti-establishment.
The two major recommendations were breaking the monopoly of the major national
newspaper groups, (the Argus group and SAAN,) and the licensing of journalists. According
to Hachten and Giffard:
The differing views within South Africa over the rights and duties of the
press and its proper role in that divided society surfaced clearly during the
extended hearings. The Government used these hearings as a sounding
board to express its unhappiness with the press and to lay the groundwork
for further legal restraints on newspapers. In a very real sense, the work of
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the commission was a continuation of the process of harassment and
intimidation that had begun in 1950, soon after the Nationalists took
control. The parade of government officials who testified revealed much
about the right-wing attitudes towards the press and echoed anti-press
statements heard years before.31
An interesting aspect to emerge from the Steyn Commission was the united opposition
from the English-language press and the editors of the leading Afrikaner newspapers. The
editor of Die Transvaler, Dr Willem de Klerk, urged the state to be careful not to restrict the
freedom of the press by any further legislation. Ton Vosloo, editor of Beeld, said the Steyn
Commission recommended “a revision of existing statutory restraints on the press”.
The sharpest criticism came from Harold Pakendorf, the editor of the National Party’s
mouthpiece, Die Vaderland, who called for fewer, not more curbs on the freedom of the
press, a constitutional guarantee of free speech and legislation based on the First Amendment
guarantees of the Constitution of the United States.32 This unexpected response from the
usually supportive Afrikaner press largely stifled the government’s efforts to implement the
proposed Journalists Bill. This aimed to “professionalise” journalism under a vague code of
conduct enforced by a central council of journalists.33
This would have made it compulsory for journalists to be registered on a journalists’
list, pass examinations and meet certain levels of qualifications to work as journalists. Any
person who had been convicted of “subversive activities” would not be allowed to work as a
journalist.
Given the widespread harassment, arrests and attacks on journalists from as far back as
the 1950s, the code would have ruled out some of the finest journalists in the country because
they had run foul of the myriad laws passed to restrict the free flow of information. After five
months of bargaining with the Interior Minister, Chris Heunis, the National Press Union
agreed to establish a media council of its own design with powers to reprimand and fine
newspapers, but not to de-register journalists.
The government was to formally recognise the new media council. Heunis accepted the
offer of self-discipline by replacing the old press council with a new one. But in June, 1982 he
introduced a Bill that made the new media council a statutory body, and all newspapers were
to submit to it by joining the NPU. The statutory requirement was later withdrawn but a final
compromise law that included the right to cancel the registration of newspapers if the
publishers did not subject themselves to the NPU’s new media council was passed in July
1982. This was the Registration of Newspapers Amendment Act, No 84 of 1982.34
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Although the Steyn Commission’s recommendation for licensing journalists was not
adopted by the government, the report was ominous in the continuing struggle to dominate
and control the press. In particular, it reinforced the two-pronged threat from Total Onslaught
and consequent riposte from Total Strategy.35 Hachten and Giffard

suggest that the real

message of the first Steyn Commission was that the press − in particular, the surviving
opposition newspapers − was to be co-opted into the emergent Total Strategy.36 (See below).
The parliamentary opposition rejected Total Strategy, as did a wide cross-section of the
community, including the editors of the English-language newspapers, some Afrikaner
editors, and the clergy. Respected Afrikaner academics regarded it as an effort to divert
attention from fundamental changes to apartheid. According to Jackson, “the (Steyn) report’s
conclusions resoundingly endorsed government thinking that a Total Strategy was the most
suitable way of addressing this perceived (outside) threat”.
This ignored widespread criticism of the report as unrepresentative of either the media
or the public “because the commission included no practising journalists and comprised only
of whites”.37
Total Onslaught – Total Strategy
The bizarre concept of Total Onslaught-Total Strategy was peddled by the Botha government
from around 1980-81. It was a sinister strategy which originated in the Defence Force. Its
ultimate aim was to maintain the support of the white electorate, get the disgruntled black
masses on side, and persuade the press to support whatever the national security forces
deemed to be in the national interest. This might be incursions into Angola, Zimbabwe or
other frontline states, or savage attacks against the “enemies of the state” and anti-apartheid
campaigners.
Tyson, as editor of The Star, became aware of this concept in 1979, when military
correspondents of his newspaper were allowed to eavesdrop on major briefings by the chief of
the Defence Force, General Magnus Malan, and his colleagues.
The Total Onslaught-Total Strategy campaign really took off after the then Defence
Minister P.W. Botha became prime minister, with General Malan as the driving force. This
need and desire for secrecy, Tyson suggests, was because of the military’s “dirty tricks”
campaigns. From 1979 this covert strategy involved the state security system in targeting
civilians in Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho with letter bombs. By the late 1980s “dirty
tricks” included unconfirmed reports of nuclear blast tests and the production of six atom
bombs by the South Africans all bigger than the Hiroshima bomb. In this climate of secrecy
and censorship, it was not until March 1993 that President F.W. de Klerk, under the emerging
new order admitted that the International Atomic Energy Agency had made at least 115
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inspections of South Africa’s nuclear facilities but found no evidence of any program for
developing nuclear bombs.
Overwhelmingly, the military rationale underpinned the Total Onslaught-Total
Strategy concept:
General Malan had earlier interpreted the rolling tide of Black Nationalism
and decolonisation in southern Africa as a Soviet-inspired Total Onslaught
by seeking by all available means to spread Marxist influence through the
neighbouring black countries with the ultimate purpose of attaining Soviet
dominance over South Africa and its strategic minerals. The South African
response [Malan] argued repeatedly, had to be a Total Strategy that would
meet the threat in the political, economic and psychological spheres as
well as the military one.38
This threat generated fierce attacks on the opponents of apartheid inside South Africa,
and signalled the start of repeated attacks on neighbouring countries that offered sympathy or
a home to ANC dissidents. In the Total Strategy concept, the ANC was targeted as furthering
Soviet domination. The perception was encouraged that the ANC was infiltrating certain
sections of the mass media, and presenting the Total Onslaught that would see the overthrow
of white rule in South Africa. For this reason Prime Minister P.W. Botha harassed and
imprisoned both black and white journalists through the 1980s. He implemented the most
restrictive legislation imposed on the news media in South African history under State of
Emergency regulations.
Under the Total Strategy concept, it became clear that Botha and Malan expected
opponents and dissidents in the media to get on side with the government. In short, they had
to support uncritically the work of the police and the security forces, and the policies of the
National Party regardless of where they led the country.
This applied not only to the press. All social classes had to band together in defiance of Total
Onslaught: businessmen, working people, political groups, the churches, but especially the
national press.
The Star made a spirited response on behalf of the press, launching a bitter attack on
the government and the shift into politics by the Defence Department:
The onslaught [against South Africa] of course, is not total. It is directed
more against apartheid and unjust laws than the existence or sovereignty
of South Africa itself. And South Africans can, and should, oppose those
same things without being branded as enemies of the State. The so-called
onslaught should be no excuse for cutting down civil liberties such as the
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rule of law and the freedom of information; still less for inflicting minority
racist prejudices on a whole country. It is apartheid that the black people
hate. If it stays, violent conflict is inevitable. The choice is in the hands of
the government. Peaceful change, in other words, will require a very
different kind of total strategy.39
The new security machinery included a complex national management system
consisting of a State Security Council comprising Ministers and/or officials of the Foreign
Affairs Department, police intelligence, and Defence. The Prime Minister was chairman.
Below the State Security Council was an executive committee of bureaucrats to carry out its
orders. The third tier was a secretariat that became the nerve centre of the entire system where
all staff work on national strategies was done. There were 15 interdepartmental committees
for planning purposes.40 Finally, a network of joint management centres worked under each
territorial military command, apparently to sharpen up government services and encourage
co-operation with black South Africans. The Total Onslaught-Total Strategy ploy cast a wide
net:
Various elements of the Total Onslaught are presumably all working to the
same end, so that even the New York Times and Washington Post as well
as the South African English press are aiding and abetting Soviet strategic
aims. But even so, there are certain identifiable enemies: Soviet
Communism, Western liberalism, black theology and Black Nationalism,
and the Black Consciousness movement itself. The main thrust of the
onslaught comes from Moscow itself. 41
From the Prime Minister and Cabinet down through all levels of the Botha
administration, the press was clearly perceived as an instigating factor for black activism.
During the 1980 school boycotts in Cape Town, the Minister for Coloured and Indian Affairs,
Marais Steyn, blamed the English press for exaggerating their extent, thus encouraging more
students to participate.
Steyn chided that this kind of “propaganda” would not be tolerated. He warned that the
newspapers would have to decide whether they were on the side of law and order or those
attempting to bring about change by force. In parliament, Prime Minister Botha warned that
he was prepared to curb the press if newspapers continued to give prominence to “activities of
subversives”.
States of emergency: 1985-1990
From the first half of 1981 through to 1985, South Africa’s civil unrest and uncontrollable
violence in the major cities and towns agitated the Botha Government. It was not able to
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organise an effective response, though, until the mid-1980s when it reverted to drastic
strategies of earlier apartheid years.
Under the Public Safety Act, President Botha declared his first state of emergency on
July 21, 1985. It covered 36 magisterial districts including the most volatile areas in the
country, mainly in the Transvaal and the Cape Province.
The State of Emergency was in effect until March 1986 and was followed by a second
declaration on June 12, 1986, covering the entire country. Under the State of Emergency, the
security forces were afforded almost unlimited powers to cope with what could not be quelled
or dealt with under the existing laws. According to Cape Times editor, Tony Heard, “pictures
of rugby and beauty queens have replaced township violence on many front pages ... the
darkness is almost complete”.
Merrett considered the censorship much more radical and effective than before 198586. It was not overly ambitious, sought to control information only from within South Africa,
depended almost entirely on state employees to enforce it, and encouraged self-censorship. A
major purpose of the Emergency was to minimise the crisis for whites so as to engineer a
psychology of normality. Thus, the declarations obliterated what was left of the independent
role of the newspapers in South Africa.42
The emergency regulations had an immediate stifling effect on the flow and control of
information, including a ban on the names of persons detained under the new regulations, and
an all-embracing ban on reports that could “cause anyone any harm, hurt or loss, whether to
his person or to his property or in any other way”.43 Part of this ban aimed to prevent
encouraging foreign countries from considering economic boycotts against South Africa as a
form of protest The partial emergency from 1985-1986 did not include additional curbs on the
media. But from June 12, 1986 the police specifically targeted news organisations.
Merrett described it as “a period of bizarre and surreal experience throughout South
Africa in which normal discourse, written and spoken, came to a virtual standstill ... all antiapartheid newspapers were in disarray”.44 Newspaper offices including Grassroots, New
Nation, the Weekly Mail, the Sowetan, Sunday Tribune and City Press were raided and
journalists detained. Overseas correspondents, both print and broadcasting, were accused of
damaging the image of the republic with harmful and inaccurate reports.
The Foreign Correspondents’ Association described the censorship regulations during
the emergencies as the toughest its members had encountered anywhere in the world. Some
correspondents qualified their reports as censored by the South African government. Others
indicated that the reports were “subject to the South African government’s reporting
restrictions”.45
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Official comment came via the South African Bureau of Information and its spokesman
David Steward who threatened journalists who refused to moderate reports. Examples of
contentious phrases included “white minority regime” and “riot-torn”. Such control over
language was necessary, Steward explained, to ensure that the population was properly
informed in a time of national debate.46
The Bureau of Information imposed additional burdens by insisting that it would only
respond to questions submitted four hours in advance. On September 25, 1986 the media
centre in Pretoria was shut down. The bureau would only respond to written questions by
telexes. Newspapers reacted in a variety of ways to the difficulties imposed by the
Government. Some appeared with thick black rules through the copy where it had been
censored.
Others chose to run stories with blank spaces to emphasise the paragraphs amended.
Ilanga, Weekly Mail, the Star, and the Sowetan all used blank spaces, and the Sowetan ran a
black box instead of a leader. The Weekly Mail used black lines and white space, to identify
paragraphs that had been excised. Such indications of censorship were themselves banned.47
Over an extended period during the mid-1980s; the Star carried a strip that reminded its
readers each day that the newspaper was produced under extremely harsh censorship laws.
This notice was dropped only after President F.W. de Klerk took over as National Party leader
from P.W. Botha in 1989.
[P.W. Botha was elected prime minister in 1979 and became state president in 1984.
F.W. de Klerk replaced P.W. Botha as National Party leader in February 1989 after Botha
suffered a stroke and in August 1989 De Klerk replaced him as president.]
New bureaucracies
At a meeting in Cape Town in September, 1987, attended by 32 editors representing leading
metropolitan newspapers and the “alternative” press, the Minister of Home Affairs, Stoffel
Botha, announced that the government had established a Directorate of Media Relations to
monitor observance of the new emergency regulations issued a week earlier. Journalists’
organisations, editors, media lawyers, commentators, and some opposition MPs condemned
the move as further erosion of freedom of speech and

press. The Media Workers’

Association of South Africa said it was clear the Government “would once more be
policeman, prosecutor and judge”. The editor of the Sowetan, Joe Latagomo, described the
move as the final nail in the coffin of press freedom [in South Africa]:
The Government’s intention must be seen for what it is: a sinister plot,
involving faceless people accountable to no-one, prescribing to people
what they can read in newspapers and what they cannot. The element of
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secrecy is nothing new in the Government’s onslaught against those who
disagree with them.48
The new powers under the directorate enabled Prime Minister Botha to suspend
publication of offending newspapers for up to three months at a time, or to appoint censors to
vet their material for publication. The Prime Minister defended the new legislation saying it
could act against newspapers which fostered a climate of violent overthrow of the state.49 It
was aimed both at the mainstream press and the Alternative press, although the initial
emergency regulations sought to curb directly the increasing role of the Alternative press.
The Star described Stoffel Botha’s new curbs as frightening:
In creating a Directorate of Media Relations to control ‘propaganda’, the
Minister of Home Affairs has fallen into the old trap. He believes his own
propaganda. It is sad to watch South Africa declining into the crude and
unsophisticated procedures of unstable banana republics. And puzzling
too.
Why should the State want yet another mechanism to threaten and frighten
the press? It already has a law which allows it to close down newspapers
without even giving a reason. Its actions in the past were ruthless and
unjust, but at least the Government avoided hypocrisy.50
Explaining the new Directorate of Media Relations, Stoffel Botha said the Government
would use a system of “scientific evaluation” to decide whether newspapers were promoting
violent revolution. In his briefing to the editors, Stoffel Botha tried to dispel notions that the
aim was outright censorship.
The proposed directorate, set up by the Department of Home Affairs, comprised a panel
of experts including political scientists, psychologists, sociologists, lawyers and journalists
drawn from universities and research organisations.
Action would only be taken against a newspaper after the Minister and his expert
advisers had satisfied themselves that the publication, as a general policy, was promoting
violent revolution. It was a wholly subjective exercise, but reviewable by the courts under
common law. Stoffel Botha had by this time managed temporarily to shut down the
alternative papers New Nation, Saamstaan, and South. His sights were then set on others,
including the journal Work in Progress, Weekly Mail, and the Sowetan.
Although the Minister was empowered under this new emergency legislation to place
censors in newspaper editorial offices, he resisted the temptation. Merrett suggested this was
“probably because of the poor international publicity which would have ensued, since it
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enabled him to argue that there was no censorship under the Emergency, and because he had
other effective weapons at his disposal”.51
Between 1986 and 1987, an average of one new Act a week was passed to tighten the
grip on suppressing vital topics. Percy Qoboza, of the World, (and later the Sowetan),
observed that the emergency regulations had reduced the credibility gap of the press.
Township people, who had suffered at the hands of the police, the army, and other elements
of the Nationalist government, came to distrust the newspapers because traumatic events were
not being fully reported.52
Shortly after the announcement of the new media directorate, Tyson tried to
explain the mechanics of the new legislation:
The Minister has announced a five-step censorship programme, but in
practice it comes down to three steps that pretend to be − or mock −
scientific and judicial process.
Step one: A ‘scientific’ assessment is made of the newspaper’s reports and
comments, weighing ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ news.
Step two: Should the anonymous panel feel that the accumulated impact
amounts to ‘subversive propaganda’, then the Minister issues ‘fair
warning’.
Step three: Unless an editor can satisfy the Minister, or voluntarily tries to
read the Minister’s mind more carefully in future, the newspaper must
accept total pre-censorship. (So papers are closing down, as I speak.) ...
My analysis does not claim to be scientific − there can be no such thing. I
offer only the opinion of an average newspaperman.53
Yet another ploy by Stoffel Botha and the Home Affairs Ministry was a plan for
licensing journalists under Section 11 of the Newspaper Amendment Bill making it
compulsory for freelancers, news correspondents and local news agencies to register with the
government.
The net was cast too wide by including organisations not gathering news in media
terms such as stock brokers, currency exchange staff dealing with overseas publications, and
other providers of information on a limited basis. The plan was much too vague, and legal
implications forced Botha to abandon it, claiming that he wanted merely to stifle some far
right-wing publications, among them the racist Patriot. Mathews concluded that the
fundamental problem with South Africa’s system of public law, “stated shortly and sourly”,
was that it was an instrument of power rather than justice:
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There is of course a strong power element in the most enlightened systems
of public law, but in South Africa it is so grotesquely bloated that it now
occupies − indeed overflows − all space within the system ... In the sphere
of censorship, the powers of the ordinary courts have been reduced and
their functions transferred to a Publications Appeal Board whose present
policy of liberalising censorship appears to be due to the transient factor of
the personality of the office-holders rather than to rules or institutions.54
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to public accountability was the statutory shroud of
secrecy which had been thrown over vast areas of State administration. The basic antidisclosure law was the Protection of Information Act of 1982, which re-enacted in
substantially the same form the former Official Secrets legislation inherited from Great
Britain.
This law enabled government to make a state secret of almost any official information
it did not want disclosed, including information relating to mismanagement, waste and
bureaucratic bungling.
Not unexpectedly, additional legislation extended the pervasive controls over
information permitted by official secrets legislation, especially involving

security matters.

The police and prisons department had long been protected by laws prohibiting the
publication of “untrue” material relating to their activities. These legislative trends reached a
climax in the media regulations which were promulgated under the 1986 State of Emergency
and reintroduced, with additional restrictions against court ‘“meddling”, in the emergency
provisions of June 11, 1987. The media regulations made a virtual state secret of the entire
law and order operation, with the public bottle-fed on government pap released selectively.
Van Der Merwe argued that the media curbs were not designed to stop all criticism of
the government but to stop the promotion of revolution.55 Stoffel Botha agreed, saying that the
government would not allow the press “to be used as a tool of war in the hands of foreign or
other aggressors”. According to the minister, “freedom of expression: would not be allowed
to the extent that it fostered chaos, murder, confusion and revolt in South Africa”.
Government intent was to “secure and promote the welfare of the people”, to promote
development and to rule according to a set of fundamental principles within a given system
and given parameters. The press must have a right to act as public watchdog but in a
“qualified” manner:
In this country, freedom in general, and press freedom in particular, must
be looked at in the context of an attempted revolution by such violent
organisations as the ANC and its mentor, the South African Communist

88

Party. When the leaders of these organisations themselves blatantly admit
that they collaborate with the mass media to further their violent struggle
for the take-over of South Africa, it should be clear to everyone that
sections of the local and international press in this revolutionary process is
no flight of the imagination on the part of the government. . . . Whatever
your reaction may be to what I [Stoffel Botha] have said, I must, in all
frankness, add that if I have failed to convey to you a perception that there
is substance in South Africa’s case, that will not deviate me from my
course and my obligation to my country.56
Taking a stand
At the height of the media clampdown in the mid-1980s, The Star took a defiant stand against
the continued assaults, threats of closure and harassment. It warned that South Africa was
rapidly relinquishing any differences it had from totalitarianism because of

the prolonged

state of emergency:
Even for unaware South Africans seeking no more than limited legal
protection and “responsible” freedom of information in these difficult
times, warning bells should be ringing loudly and urgently. The Star takes
the unusual step of editorialising on its front page today because the
dimming lights and warning bells appear to go unheeded ... the threat
facing all South Africans is that the new rules, given disguised
respectability through elaborate procedures and publications in the
Government Gazette, blatantly deny proper legal process to any
publication practising freedom of speech. Freedom is denied for the sake
of peace and protection of legal government, the public is told. A small
minority, mainly white South Africans, swallow this. Their forebears, the
Voortrekkers and the 1820 Settlers, would not – and did not.57
The Government had placed a severe restriction order on the ANC veteran Govan
Mbeki, released from prison a month earlier, and several other national activists. In December
1987, it banned an edition of the weekly New Nation alternative newspaper, declaring it
undesirable in terms of the Publications Act of 1947. (Three earlier similar decisions had
been appealed and overturned by the Publications Appeal Board.) Acting editor Gabu
Tugwana said the government’s actions had wider consequences:
People will probably only realise this when it [New Nation] is gone.58
At the time of this banning, the founding editor of New Nation, Zwelakhe Sisulu, one of
South Africa’s best known journalists, had been in jail for a year under detention orders
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invoked under the State of Emergency regulations. He had been arrested and detained on the
orders of Police Minister Louis le Grange on December 12, 1986. (New Nation was launched
earlier that year.) The South African Society of Journalists (SASJ) said the banning order on
New Nation was part of “a well-orchestrated state attack on what little is left of press freedom
in South Africa, the brunt of which is presently borne by New Nation and other newspapers
which fall outside the mainstream commercial press”. The South African Police
Commissioner, General Hennie De Witt claimed the orders were necessary to prevent
promotion of a revolutionary climate.
President P.W. Botha had an opportunity to fine-tune the second State of Emergency in
terms of the Public Safety Act. Two days before it lapsed on June 11, 1987, the Government
signaled its intentions to extend and toughen restrictions, and to close

loopholes in the

legislation. On June 10, 1987, notices were promulgated in the Government Gazette extending
all regulations under the expiring Emergency, as well as tighter controls on the media.
New restrictions under the third State of Emergency since 1985 made it an offence to
quote an unlawful or restricted organisation in any way, even by spokespersons who were not
banned. It became an offence for any person or organisation to encourage a boycott of the
municipal elections, with the exception of registered political parties.
All news agencies had to be registered, with the exception of 13 organisations which
included the established news agencies such as the big four international agencies and the
national news agency, South African Press Association (SAPA).
Regulations on periodicals published irregularly were tightened, and the Minister of
Home Affairs given powers to close down irregular publications for three months. This was
increased subsequently to six months, after which the Minister could order copies of the
offending periodical to be seized, or both. The government also assumed wide powers for the
seizure of television film and sound recordings if they were considered to contain subversive
statements. The new emergency regulations gave the Home Affairs Minister and the Police
Commissioner powers to seize all copies of the film, sound tape, or publication.
This was based on a judgment that the material, on publication or distribution, would
foment or promote revolution, uprising, unrest, feelings of hatred or hostility towards the
security forces, or promote banned organisations or boycotts. They also had the power to
enter any premises and use whatever force was “reasonably necessary to carry out the orders”.
The security forces were also empowered to carry out these orders.
National and international outrage was predictable and the national media was united in
its condemnation of the third State of Emergency, as it had been of earlier crackdowns. Jolyon
Nuttall, the vice-president of the National Press Union and manager of The Star, described the

90

additional powers to extend the suspension of publications simply by placing a notice in the
Government Gazette as particularly worrying for the media:
The Government seems intent on converting the written word to the
hidden word. It keeps adding to the list of things that may not be
published, in the apparent hope that ignorance will create bliss ... This is
censorship by edict in its worse form.59
Bob Steyn, of the South Africa Media Council, saw the new measures as seeming to go
further than the previous regulations which had been criticised by the council was critical:
Our task is to try to secure the freest possible flow of information in the
public interest.60
The regime changes
On August 14, 1989, President P.W. Botha resigned and was replaced the following day by
Acting President F.W. de Klerk as head of the National Party. The end of the

Botha era

signalled the passing of the most sustained and bitter attacks on the national media. Jackson
described the 1980s as “the blackest years of the press”. Even so, the South African press
carried a vast amount of legal baggage on its journey towards a post-apartheid society:
Especially ironic was that for all the power the security laws granted the
government, South Africa’s security situation was far worse in the 1970s
and the 1980s than when the laws were first introduced starting in the
1950s. In the absence of a solution to the country’s political problems,
even the far-reaching South African security legislation could not hope to
contain political opposition in the long term.61
Tyson [1993] considered the battle of an authoritarian regime against an independent
press as becoming, over the years, a game of chess in which both sides knew most of the
gambits:
Each side was too wary to try all in a single blow ... Instead, the general
pattern was for the authoritarian crocodile [P.W. Botha] to lash its tail and
snap its jaws, and hope that the press, with an irritated push from the white
establishment, would fall into the water in terror. The press, however,
would woo the public, then pretend to feed the crocodile a sacrificial meal
− which usually turned out to be an empty bag of bones.62
In the period immediately before the transition and continuing through into the postapartheid era, the South African media faced continued pressure to curtail press freedom. In
addition, the national press lost many of its most promising and talented black journalists.
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Disillusioned by a lack of career opportunities and low pay in journalism, many left the
profession for more lucrative jobs in newly created government positions.
Print Media Association of South Africa warned in April 2001 of South African
government plans to form an independent Media Diversity and Development Agency
(MDDA) to regulate the media industry. The PMA feared it could lead to political
interference with press freedom and responded to earlier comments by the Minister in the
Office of the Presidency Essop Pahad who complained that the South African media were still
suffering from a colonial mentality.
Pahad complained that the media only represented a narrow range of interests which
did not do enough to cover communities marginalised by gender, race, disability and the
broad democratic movements that fought against apartheid.63
In its 2001 annual survey on world press freedom, Reporters sans Frontiers also
targeted Pahad’s criticism of the national press and complaints that the South African
government was a victim of systematic hostility from the press. In February 2001, while
reaffirming his attachment to press freedom, Pahad denounced the “irresponsible journalism”
of certain publications:
We face a situation that is almost unique in democratic countries. The
ultra-majority political tendency in South Africa represented by the ANC
[African National Congress] does not have the slightest representation in
the media.64
However, Reporters sans Frontiers found that on the whole press freedom was still
observed in South Africa even though tension between the media and the State President had
become frequent. Throughout 2001, the South African press fiercely criticised the diplomatic
and Aids policies of President Thabo Mbeki and attracted fierce government hostility and
accusations of bias.
The Freedom House global survey of press freedom in 1999 found that after years of
apartheid and white minority rule, the democratic government of South Africa was still in
transition leading to an election later that year. Even after a new constitution was approved,
the oppressive apartheid legislation, including some 100 laws affecting the news media,
remained on the statute books, though not enforced. The majority of the print press — all but
two of 33 papers — remains in the hands of white owners. The daily and weekly black press
edited mainly for a black audience.
By 2001, the Freedom House global press survey indicated continued improvements
in press freedom in South Africa but laws allowing the government to restrict reporting on the
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police, national defence forces, prisons, and mental institutions remained in effect, as do laws
that may compel journalists to reveal sources.
However, these laws are not generally used to restrict the media. A freedom of
information law was passed in January 2001. Several journalists and media offices suffered
harassment during the year.65 Although South Africa has one of the world’s most liberal
constitutions to protect freedom of the press, in 2002 many of the old apartheid era
restrictions remained in effect such as laws that compel journalists to reveal their sources. In
addition, the restrictions on reporting matters affecting the police, the national defence forces,
and other institutions remained in effect and the government was considering an Interception
and Monitoring Bill to empower the police and defence forces, the intelligence agency and
the secret service to maintain monitoring centres. The government had already seized
journalists’ equipment and compelled them to reveal their sources under the provisions of the
Criminal Procedures Act.66
Summary
The National Party’s reign from 1948 was marked by ever tightening restrictive measures to
control and silence the press. Merrett confirms in 1986 and 1987, an average of one new
regulation a week tightened the net around vital topics. At issue was the preservation and
prosperity of the apartheid system. Restrictive legislation, banning orders, states of
emergency, shutting down and banning of individual newspapers and the imposition of hefty
fines all contributed to a growing authoritarian culture.
This chapter has considered the effects of such restrictive measures on the press and the
way in which the press coped with the restrictions. Harvey Tyson examines the issue in
considerable depth in Editors Under Fire and offers the view from the perspective of a senior
Argus executive and editor of The Star, that despite the obstacles placed in its way, the press
somehow managed to play a meaningful role in society and refused to cower to an
authoritarian government that demanded support. Tyson’s idea of a meaningful role for the
press was from the perspective of a white editor who worked on a conservative white English
language newspaper aimed at a select middle-class Johannesburg readership trying to appease
politically restless blacks and fending off intense government scrutiny and harassment. A
seemingly impossible task.
It is against this background that there emerges conflict. By white standards and in the
face of such vast government machinery Tyson claims credit for a defiant press while on the
other hand, blacks who suffered under apartheid felt the press, especially the liberal English
press, was not doing enough. There were accusations of self-censorship to avoid government
crackdowns, police spies in the newsrooms.
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In such a repressive era, mistrust and suspicion was rife. Accusations of bias against
white-controlled newspapers and complicity with the government’s aims were regularly
made. It is this sharp difference that still retards the development of the South African press in
the post-apartheid era.
While there remains significant validity in the argument, it is not simply a case of every
white journalist or every white editor being a closet racist and in the government’s pocket. Far
from it. A case of too little too late for some but the efforts of crusading editors like Tyson,
Donald Woods and Tony Heard in the fight against apartheid cannot be dismissed. Heard, in
particular, paid a huge penalty for publishing material in The Cape Times that the government
and his management found undesirable and he was sacked.
To answer the question of accountability, Chapter Four looks at post-apartheid press
paradoxes and the same complaints of media control, authoritarianism and government
threats. But this time it is the black Government of National Unity that stands accused of
trying to nobble the press.
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CHAPTER FOUR
POST-APARTHEID PARADOXES
Introduction
This chapter reviews the apparatus of apartheid, its impact on freedom of speech and press
freedom in general and its lingering impact after the disintegration of apartheid in the early
1990s and the transitional period to its eventual demise by 1994. Chapter Four also highlights
sharp differences of opinion between the emerging black press and some sections of the
Government of National Unity, it offers a snapshot of the post-apartheid press and the impact
of a submission by Independent Newspapers to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
New forms of attack
By 1994, a new interim Constitution was introduced to guarantee freedom of the press in
South Africa. On October 11, 1996, a revised new Constitution was adopted and came into
force on February 7, 1997. It has an extensive bill of rights section headed by a human dignity
provision which makes it similar to the German Constitution.
A black majority government was in power and a redevelopment program in place to
redress the imbalances of the apartheid years. Yet the cumulative impact of years of
interference, even sustained repression, was hard to dissolve. Indeed, new forms of attack
emerged to threaten hard-won rights and freedoms. The ANC-led Government of National
Unity claimed unfair treatment at the hands of what was still perceived by blacks as a whitedominated English and Afrikaner national media. In turn, the press responded to what it
perceived was sustained government pressure on its traditional prerogatives.
Mike Siluma [1996] then editor at the Sowetan, believes government criticism of the
press was a result of both the media and the new government trying respectively to define
their new role in society. The black press, defiantly opposed to the views and practices of the
previous apartheid government, now had to review this traditional opposition. In place was a
black government largely supported by the press. On the other hand, the transition from
liberation organisation to government and the closer scrutiny of the media attracted
unwelcomed criticism and led to a complex dilemma:
Both sides are grappling with new realities. We are trying to define a new
role for ourselves (as black journalists). Government is trying to grapple
with the idea of being in government, working very hard in their view to
transform society, and to make things better, and everyone continues to
criticise them. And, in many cases, justifiably so. Government should not
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be above criticism…but I think that this transformation is giving rise to a
lot of hot air.
There is a lot of confusion [in the media and government] some people
still feel that the media should be oppositionist. There are people, black
journalists who hold very strong political views and who do not agree with
the ANC for instance, who feel that the whole transformation has been a
sell-out. And then you have the white editors who are still rooted in the old
system who want to take a view that the media must distrust everything
and anything the government does. And then of course you have other
people who believe you have to support the ANC in the interests of the
transformation. So there is no universal kind of position the media is
taking.1
In August, 1993, the South African Institute of Race Relations assembled five senior
black journalists, a leader writer and a prominent celebrity entertainer to consider perceived
deficiencies in media coverage. The discussions revealed incipient pressures on publication
which amounted to new forms of censorship applicable to certain institutions and issues.
Thami Mazwai, a senior assistant editor and business editor of the Sowetan newspaper put it
this way:
We have now reached a point where the journalist is told: You are either
for us or against us. It is sheer political blackmail. Many of us have been
in jail several times, and we don’t mind going to jail if it is in pursuit of
what we believe in. I am a journalist and have been one since 1969, and I
don’t think I am going to write distortion simply because a law has been
passed by the government. I will take whatever risk I can to make sure that
the public knows what is happening.2
Although journalists under the new dispensation were far less exposed to arrest or
detention and incarceration by the government, they were threatened and manhandled by
political activists in the townships, and told to “toe the line or else”. In short, they were
expected to be propagandists. According to Mazwai at least 50 per cent of newspaper content
“takes up a particular political position, specific distortions and an attempt to influence the
reader − the public − to think in a particular direction.” Pressure from the so-called comrades
− mostly young and poorly educated black political extremists − could be extremely
persuasive and dangerous for reporters, particularly those considered as “against the
struggle”. Mazwai states:
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The weapon being used is to whisper, to spread the word around that soand so is against the struggle. Heaven help you should you ever be
cornered by youngsters. They will make you pay for being against the
struggle.3
Connie Molusi, a South African Press Association journalist, ascribed this radicalism
largely to political intolerance built up during a period of the mass insurrection era from 1984
to 1986:
[This was] when a culture of people’s war was born, which assumed
ideological homogeneity among black people; and as a result you had the
formation of street committees pursuing the political aims and objectives
of particular community organisations. No-one could absent himself from
those street committees because he would then be declared “an enemy of
the struggle”, therefore you had to participate even if you were opposed to
the decisions being made.4
These “street committees” gave rise to new fears about the integrity and direction of
the media, causing dangers for working journalists and in some cases threatening staff, who
invariably lived in the same townships, with death or injury.5 But the growing assault on the
role of the press in South Africa did not end there. There were rumblings of political pressure
from the Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, and Essop Pahad, a senior ANC member with close
links to the Communist Party of South Africa. Both adopted increasingly adversarial
positions, and some newspapers accused them of threatening the media. Pahad was
particularly sceptical:
It will take a sea change to convince me that sections of the media do not
have secret agendas or that some of them have not positioned themselves
as the political opposition of the ANC. I trust one day they will have the
courage to state this publicly instead of pretending that they are ‘objective’
observers, reporters, commentators and editors.6
Mbeki raised a more sombre hint of media intervention, urging changes in media
ownership dominated by whites “who prospered under the former apartheid system and
therefore were against reforms”. He called for African media to increase reporting on their
own countries and continent instead of relying on the international wire agencies:
Reuters, Associated Press, Agence France-Presse, the BBC ... what they
tell us about neighbouring countries, we must do ourselves honestly,
objectively, and accurately.7
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The South African President, Nelson Mandela, entered the debate in 1994, arguing
that the print media had to change and adapt to better reflect post-apartheid South Africa.
Mandela warned against an unproductive dogfight between government and news media. He
called for the “expansion and deepening of media freedoms” which should be linked to
greater access to information and freedom of expression for people disadvantaged by more
than 300 years of white domination and four decades of apartheid.
Mandela challenged South Africa’s editors to adapt South Africa’s media structures
developed under apartheid to fit South Africa’s new democracy:
What are the perceptions feeding what could develop into an unproductive
dogfight? It is in the nature of your trade and it is absolutely crucial that
you should be searching, critical, and even sceptical. At the same time you
also have to exercise the responsibility of accurately reflecting the hopes
and fears, the aspirations and apprehensions ... as they exist in society.8
Mandela’s address was made 100 days after the ANC took government and followed
growing concern within the ANC that the print media, owned almost exclusively by three
white organisations, were biased and deliberately antagonistic towards the new black
government. The ANC complained especially about biased print media comments about
legislators and ministers accepting lavish perks and pay, including luxury cars and free air
travel.
This growing tension between government and the press was also echoed by Tokyo
Sexwale, the premier of PWV province, which includes Johannesburg. Sexwale accused the
print media of trying to undermine public confidence in the new government and threatening
the initiatives of the Reconstruction and Development Program. 9
In our view society with all its elements, is constantly changing. South
African society is changing rapidly. The media must capture and address
itself to these states of affairs which is aimed at providing better quality of
life for all our people, entrenching political stability, the reduction of
crime levels, especially socio-economically related crime, and of course
serious crimes largely unrelated to adverse socio-economic conditions and
the creation of a healthy economic climate for both domestic and foreign
investment. 10
It was Sexwale’s thinly veiled threat that caused ripples of concern in the national
press:
Let us well, rectify an incorrect perception that suggests that the business
of media is only or largely related to being critical of government …
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Media should reflect fairly on the entire society … the media must be seen
to be critical of itself. When shall we hear media self-criticism? 11
What Sexwale alluded to was the need for the media to be more critical of its own
reporting and behaviour, and for the media to be more aware of the needs of a transitional
post-apartheid society. However, in the white dominated press Sexwale’s comments were
interpreted as a sinister threat to the role of the press and an attack on its criticism of
government and the Reconstruction and Development Program. The Freedom of Expression
Institute also challenged the statements by Sexwale, interpreting it as an attack on free speech.
The FXI expressed fears that the statements could be construed as fertile grounds for
restricting certain sections of the press critical of the government and demanded clarification
as well as a reaffirmation of the government’s commitment to freedom of expression
generally and press freedom in particular.
This episode from the Premier of the PWV region provided yet another avenue of
concern and an attack on the news media in South Africa. To interpret yet another paradox in
the long struggle of the South African press for political and legal tolerance of its freedoms, it
is necessary to go back to the dismantling of apartheid structures.
Beginning of the end
As President, F.W. De Klerk ushered in a new era which ultimately transformed South
African politics, seemingly pointing as well to profound change in the national media. In a
momentous speech to Parliament on February 2, 1990, De Klerk announced the
Government’s declared intention to normalise the political process in South Africa without
jeopardising the maintenance of good order.
With this announcement came dramatic changes: the lifting of bans on 32 proscribed
organisations including the African National Congress, the Pan African Congress and a
variety of groups ranging from Marxist to Far Left, all proscribed previously under the
Internal Security Act. All publications specifically banned under the Internal Security
legislation were also freed from bans. The State of Emergency was substantially amended and
relaxed. The effect on the national news media was not immediately apparent despite the
easing of some regulations that now permitted publication of news about unrest and riots.
Some controls were maintained over the right to publication and police retained the right to
restrict journalists from restive areas, but restrictions on photographs of unrest were lifted.
The changes ushered in by De Klerk did not immediately free up the national media,
whether English, Afrikaans or alternative. Despite some notable concessions, for example
newspaper registration fees were refunded to some newspapers. In November 1990, Vrye
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Weekblad received its registration fee of R30,000 plus R9000 interest dating to 1988 when the
fee was first imposed. In 1991, New African received R20,000 plus nearly R14,000 in interest
payments but efforts to suppress the news continued. This was especially so in the KwaZuluNatal region where legislation existed to exclude journalists from specific areas.
Under the Natal Emergency, passed into law on June 8, 1990, the security forces could
still restrain journalists from entering and reporting on what was happening in restive areas.
Provision was made for detention of up to six months for breaches of the legislation. By
October 18, 1990 it was dropped in favour of a comprehensive new law, incorporating the
Unrest Areas under the Public Safety Amendment Act, which included 19 magisterial districts
and 27 townships in the Transvaal alone.12 The government continued to use its Emergency
regulations, especially to pursue the radical Afrikaans weekly, Vrye Weekblad.
It chose to use powers under the Emergency regulations rather than the Defence Act
which required more specific amendment. In the changing environment of the early 1990s,
with the release of Nelson Mandela from prison, the move towards the first non-racial general
elections and later the installation of the ANC-led Government of National Unity, the role of
the media and the easing of restrictions would have resulted in an unprecedented free flow of
information. But this was also a torrid period of change for the mainstream and the alternative
press.
The Argus Group moved to acquire the Cape Times, and the Sowetan changed owners
and was acquired by a black consortium of businessmen. Consequently, the concentration of
media ownership was marginally reduced. It was a difficult period for the alternative press
with New African folding in 1992 and Vrye Weekblad less than two years later, in February
1994. It also signaled the end of the radical academic monthly magazine Work in Progress.
The Mail & Guardian, started in 1985 by Anton Harber and Irwin Manoim, struggled on as
an independent but failed to crack the big mass circulation market dominated by Independent
Newspapers’ metropolitan English-language newspapers.
New masters, old conflicts
In post-apartheid South Africa during the 1990s and leading up to the first non-racial general
election, emerging as it did from decades of oppression and harassment of the print media, the
expectation was that better days were ahead for the traditional watchdog role of newspapers.
But this was not to be.
The complaints came quickly and they came from across the political spectrum. The
common theme was that the national print media, more particularly the liberal English
language print media, was not doing its job properly. Newspaper criticism of government
policies and shortcomings were interpreted as an attack on the new black leadership. Critical
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reports on rising national crime figures, the slow response by the government to improve
housing and basic facilities such as domestic electricity and water supplies, fraud and rorts by
government officials were interpreted as an attack on the black government by a “white press”
unable or unwilling to come to terms with the new political dispensation.
There were accusations from the ANC-led government that the English press was
protecting vested interests and big business that thrived under apartheid, and that it also had a
hidden agenda that ran counter to the aims of the new administration. Now the complaints
came from a black government.
From the leading partner in the Government of National Unity, the African National
Congress, came complaints that the national media was slow to change and even slower to
embrace the new order, antagonistic towards the government, and largely staffed by the
agenda setters of the old regime. The implications clearly were ominous that the white
dominated print media was reluctant or tardy in its efforts to reshape to meet the new
challenges.
It was a complaint based on unfairness and lack of balance. The criticisms levelled
against the press included being unsupportive, and even dismissive, of government attempts
to improve the lot of the victims of apartheid, an almost obsessive focus on the nation’s
spiralling crime rates and its effect on foreign investment, a tendency to ignore major
instances of white-collar crime, and generally negative, confrontational approach to
government initiatives. The ANC complained especially about what it perceived as biased
comments about legislators and ministers accepting lavish perks and pay.
On the other hand, the National Party accused the ANC of trying to manipulate the
national news media to be a supportive and uncritical lapdog. The print media, for its part,
complained it was being pressured by the government, suffering because of poor government
communication networks and, in some departments, an absence of formal government
communications structures.
Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, who accused the media of perpetuating its apartheid
era role of criticising the government and looking for crises, said the media could guarantee
its own freedom by helping to ensure that South Africa’s fledgling democracy became a
strong and stable society. It was “quite correct” to seek to ensure that the press was not
controlled either overtly or covertly by government and that it remained independent “but one
could not view press freedom outside the context of freedom of society generally”.13
Mandela also raised the issue of growing confrontation between the new government
and the press. He admitted that after only a brief period, relations between the government
and sections of the media were at a relatively low ebb. In February 1994, Mandela gave an
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assurance that he believed a critical, independent and investigative press was the lifeblood of
any democracy and had to be free from state interference. But he said it was “clearly
inequitable that in a country whose population is overwhelmingly black, the principal players
in the media have no knowledge of the life experience of that majority”.
Mandela’s comment sparked criticism from media organisations who viewed it as a call
for some sort of affirmative action to dilute the upper echelons of the media and reflect
national diversity. The National Party immediately accused the ANC of trying to manipulate
the media while the interim constitution, the Bill of Rights and guarantees of freedom of
speech were still being formulated. The ANC replied that it had no lessons on media freedom
to learn from the South African media barons, again accusing the media of lagging in the
transformation process and calling for radical change to ensure the free and accurate flow of
information.
Kaizer Nyatsumba, political editor at The Star, conceded Mbeki’s complaints about an
unrepresentative national media were justified. He suggested, though, that the government
was in many ways to blame for how national unity was portrayed. Nyatsumba offered three
examples of how the government failed in its efforts both to lobby and to keep the media
informed of its basic programs, its difficulties and its plans for the immediate future.
The first involved a proposed informal briefing program by which senior government
officials and Ministers could get to know the political journalists writing editorials and
comment pieces about them. This was an initiative by The Star based on the British
parliamentary briefing sessions. Nyatsumba saw this as an important opportunity both for
political journalists and politicians:
For us it is an opportunity for an off-the-record briefing with the political
movers and shakers, and for them it is an invaluable opportunity to interact
with our political writers ... And yet the response was not exactly
overwhelming.14
The second weakness identified was simply the government’s failure at many levels to
communicate at all:
Among those represented here are ministries which have a non-existent
media profile. Perceptions of Government non-delivery abound in the
townships and frustrations growing in some Government circles, and this
leads to accusations from some top Government figures that the press does
not communicate sufficiently to the public the good things the
Government of National Unity does to bring about change. Reality,
however, is that there are key Government ministries and departments
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which are simply not aggressively communicating their successes, limited
though they may be, and not explaining what problems they encounter and
which may impact on the rate of delivery.15
The third complaint involved coverage of important overseas trips by the President and
his deputies and the government’s failure to accommodate news media in the travelling party.
“We don’t want to travel and be accommodated free of charge; we are more than happy to
foot our part of the bill,” Nyatsumba said.16 Arranging individual itineraries for journalists
however, was often difficult so formal visits were either not covered or covered less fully than
they might have been. These were all legitimate complaints, the government conceded, and
promises were made to rectify the shortcomings in government information.
Rumblings persisted about threats to media freedom in the new administration and
complaints about a lack of media diversity and ownership. Mbeki said, though, that the
government remained committed to “the policy of transparency and accountability to the
citizenry” and the rights of “members of society to participate fully in the shaping of the
destiny of our country”. He reiterated the aims of the Reconstruction and Development
Program:
The government fully recognises and accepts the role of the media to be a
critical commentator on government activity. The media should be beyond
the control of government. They should at all times retain the right to
determine how and what to cover. For the media to reflect the needs,
desires, and views of society, they must remain independent. Having said
this, the question rises in sharp focus: are the relations between media and
government of necessity hostile? Our own view is that such a relationship
is not generic to those two institutions. Hostility must, I believe, derive
from the pursuit of agendas that are inherently hostile to each other ... We
cannot afford a situation where the majority of our people are mere
consumers of information and opinion whose content is determined by one
sector of society. The people out there are crying out to be heard.17
With the majority of the country illiterate, the penetration of the print media was
estimated at only around 5 per cent of the population. According to Mbeki, the use of the
electronic media, particularly radio, appeared the most viable outlet, especially to the rural
poor.
Recalling the intensifying of media repression almost 20 years earlier [see Chapter 2],
the national secretary of the ANC, Cyril Ramaphosa, pledged that as long as the ANC was the
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leading force in government and for as long as it existed, it would resist any attempts to
undermine the independence and the integrity of the media:
We have inherited a media which reflects in its ownership and control
many of the economic distortions of our apartheid past. It is a situation
which mitigates against the free flow of ideas and the airing of a broad
range of views and ideas ... Some people have attempted to portray our
stated position as a challenge to media freedom. Nothing could be further
from the reality. The position which the ANC has expressed on several
occasions over the last few years … is intended to enrich media freedom
and give it real substance.18
This spirit of goodwill soon evaporated. A year after Ramaphosa’s declaration, Deputy
President Mbeki was pessimistic. He accused the four major newspaper institutions in South
Africa of going slow on implementing the previously disadvantaged program. Between them,
these institutions controlled more than 80 per cent of the South African print media market.
Yet staff recruited under previously-disadvantaged (affirmative action) programs were almost
non-existent, black journalists were few, and blacks occupying higher levels in the companies
were even fewer.19
Beeld, the Afrikaans paper owned by Nationale Pers, offered in-house training for
reporters with a marginally successful affirmative action recruitment program. Two black
reporters were employed in the news room − one at Beeld in Johannesburg, the other at Die
Burger in Cape Town. Nationale Pers editorial manager Dolf Els said it had difficulties
attracting black reporters to an Afrikaans newspaper for obvious reasons. In addition, many
black people were unable to write in Afrikaans, did not have the required entry standards of at
least a diploma or a first degree.
At Rapport, another Nationale Pers publication, there were no training programs for
journalists. Business Day (Times Media Ltd) had three black reporters out of 17 on its finance
side and four out of 16 news reporters. Business Day had no specific affirmative action policy
but preferred locals (or South Africans) for journalistic vacancies, provided they had the
necessary skills. The Mail & Guardian had five black journalists but the editor, Anton Harber,
said the independently owned paper had trained dozens of young blacks but they were
poached by the bigger news organisations.
These were either reluctant or slow to start their own training facilities for journalists
from black and coloured backgrounds. The Citizen, owned by Perskor, had no affirmative
action program or training facilities for young black journalists, but had some interest in
hiring black journalists.
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At Independent Newspapers, emphasis was placed on training all journalists but
focused on potential reporters from disadvantaged backgrounds. The Independent Group led
the way in training and appointing affirmative action candidates, for example, the first black
editor at The Cape Times, Moegsien Williams. The group had five editors in Natal, of whom
three were Indians, and there were two black deputy editors.
The government’s appeal for an aggressive affirmative action policy was supported by
the editor of the Sowetan, Mike Siluma, a former labour reporter at The Star and one of the
few black journalists to work in the Argus company’s London bureau. Siluma said a “whole
backlog of neglect” characterised black journalism in post-apartheid South Africa, and skills
of black journalists had to be enhanced.
He agreed that “the strengthening of a democracy is partially the role of the press, and
freedom of expression does not mean that reporters are unaccountable.20 Greater consultation
with government would help media stakeholders”:
If you assume that a democracy needs an effective press to assist civil
society to make informed decisions and ask intelligent questions, then we
need to ask ourselves what is our role. If you assume that proprietors run
commercial enterprises and are profit driven and we, as reporters and
editors, are involved because we want to inform people, then we need to
find some common ground because our objectives are far removed from
[government].21
This great divide between government and the press and the conflicting objectives of
journalists on both sides of the colour line, and effects, of a predominantly white newspaper
ownership was a driving force towards establishing an emerging black press. A black
consortium, New Africa Investments Ltd, led by Soweto medic Dr Nathato Motlana, was
formed to secure all or part of Anglo American’s 48 per cent stake in Johnnic, a strategicallyplaced media company. Among other core assets of Anglo, this company included
Omnimedia which in turn owned Times Media Ltd, the smaller of the two leading English
language newspaper groups. Included in this Group were titles such as the Sunday Times and
the Financial Mail, as well as some magazines.
With a prospect of new black ownership looming, Times Media Ltd editors moved
swiftly to incorporate a new editorial charter “as an appropriate means of preserving the
traditions within TML”. Johnnic and Omnimedia explained why: “With Anglo American
having been the custodian of newspaper publications for about 50 years, there is a sense that
they would want their traditions preserved”.22 This drew sharp criticism from black journalist
groups including the chairman of the Black Editors’ Forum, Thami Mazwai. According to
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Mazwai, it confirmed the desperation of some white editors eager to cling to the past of white
ownership. All of a sudden a charter had become a matter of urgency.23
The Government’s complaints against the national media reflected a perceived
reluctance by the white-controlled media to embrace the post-apartheid transformation. There
was also an accusation of bias and implied racism, although consistently and strongly rejected
by editors and journalists on the white English-language papers. They argued that they had
always been at the forefront of opposition to the apartheid policies of the Nationalists and
ultimately played a leading role in their demise. While it would be wrong and unfair to reject
outright the important role many of these newspapers played in the political struggle, it would
be just as much an exaggeration to suggest that the liberal English press took on the hue of the
society in which it operated. These were “white papers”, whichever way one looked at it.
At a Commonwealth Press Union meeting of editors, Reverend Frank Chikane, a
leading anti-apartheid campaigner closely linked to the ANC and the Mandela Government,
said that in the new order, there were new roles for the media. He questioned the future of
aggressive media policy and freedom of the press, suggesting instead a developmental media
that “helped the national project to develop a just, equitable, non-racial, non-sexist,
democratic society”. No place for a watchdog here! Chikane also suggested that the national
press only concern itself politically with the “different views of different parties in their
debate around the question of the national interest”. Chikane did not define his perception of
the national interest nor who should define it.24
Posts, Telecommunications and Broadcasting Minister Jay Naidoo saw the future of a
free and independent media in South Africa as based on the willingness of the press to be
accountable to the community at large and not to the government of the day. Naidoo also
supported a charter of the press to ensure a code of practice for journalists:
In South Africa, a stricter adherence to a press charter on the basic ethics
of professional journalism will greatly strengthen the credibility of the
press. 25
Climax of the debate
Towards the end of 1996, the simmering debate between the government seeking
transformation of a national media it did not own nor control, and the press accusing the
government of constant media bashing, reached a climax.
President Mandela accused

the press of failing to discharge its duties. He stridently

criticised the South African media for failing to expose the role of the so-called Third Force
behind political violence in the country. Mandela asserted that senior black journalists had a
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“secret agenda” and were doing the dirty work of their bosses by trying to destroy the
democratically-elected government. The black journalists were pawns because the
government could not accuse them of racism when they objected to government policies.
Mandela did not name journalists whom he said were acting in their own self-interest
and for promotion. It was a sharp and bitter rebuke, the government’s first stinging indictment
on the work of South Africa’s black journalists who, in turn, complained bitterly that the
President had got it wrong.
The outcry against the president’s accusations was swift and fierce. The Media
Workers’ Association of South Africa, representing the majority of black journalists in the
country, said it was “terrified by Mandela’s consistent attacks on black journalists”. The Star
was particularly fierce in its rebuttal of the president’s claims:
President Nelson Mandela’s smear campaign against unnamed senior
black journalists is as unsubstantiated, unbalanced, and ridiculous as that
waged by the Nats [National Party] during the worst days of the onslaught
... We challenge Mandela to name these Judases − and their masters. And
we challenge him to conjure up proof of their dishonesty and cowardice.
Of course, he cannot.26
In response The Star provided a centrespread to ANC MPs Carl Niehaus and Tony
Yengeni under the headline, The Star accused of gutter journalism to address the
government’s concerns. Three of The Star’s senior black journalists Kaizer Nyatsumba,
Justice Malala and Newton Kanehema were accused of spreading articles based on
“misinformed opinion”, “distorted facts”, and in some instances “outright lies”. The editor of
The Star, Peter Sullivan, was presented as sponsoring gutter journalism.
The South African Union of Journalists’ president, Sam Sole, feared that media
freedom was again under threat but from a new direction:
The frequency and intensity of the attacks on the media by senior
government figures, including President Mandela, are becoming very
worrying ... The protection granted to the media in terms of the law can
come to mean relatively little if journalists face brow-beating or even
intimidation ... Black journalists are particularly vulnerable, hence the
attacks specifically against them are of great concern.27
The Mail & Guardian was puzzled by Mr Mandela’s remarks, taking pride in its
investigative journalism into the “dirty tricks” and shady practices of the Nationalists. It
pointed to its extensive investigative coverage of the Caprivi invasion and several other
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atrocities committed during the apartheid years. The Mail recalled the Vlakplaas terror unit, a
clandestine security forces group accused of murder and torturing political opponents.28
Responding to Mandela’s criticism that investigative reporting on the so-called “Third
Force” in South African politics was inefficient or neglected, the Mail & Guardian argued
that its obsessive pursuit of the “Third Force” was commercial suicide and had bored its
readers:
To now be attacked by our own president for a dereliction of duty in
failing to pursue the Third Force, would be painfully ironic, were it not
laughably so.29
Ryland Fisher, a coloured editor at the Cape Times, was more conciliatory. In an open
letter to Mandela, he denied the accusations of bias and rejected suggestions that he and other
black editors were merely token figureheads appointed to appease public and government
concerns while doing the work of their white masters. Fisher rejected allegations that in the
three years that the Government of National Unity was in power, the bulk of the national
press was working towards the demise of the ANC.
I did not expect to be told that I was part of a “counter-revolutionary”
conspiracy, nor that I was a token. I plead not guilty on both counts.30
Fisher countered that the transformation for black newspaper editors was as challenging
for him and his colleagues as it was for the new government and that if they were failing in
their duties then it was by design:
[I] would readily admit that my colleagues and I sometimes fail in our
duty to inform the public properly. This is not because of lack of trying,
Mr President. It is also not due to conspiracy, complicity, or connivance,
but because of less flattering reasons such as ignorance or our inability to
always understand our complex society properly.
I think that most white journalists at English-language newspapers are
trying to understand a part of our society from which they were legally and
forcibly separated over many decades. At the same time, I believe that
black journalists at these papers are committed to make sure that our
newspapers begin to reflect this part of our society which has not been
properly reflected in the media.31
The post-apartheid press − a snapshot
This account of the post-apartheid period has focused so far on the general cut-and-thrust
between Nelson Mandela’s majority government and the traditional national press, firmly
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white in its orientation. The arguments articulated somewhat randomly in the mid-1960s were
refined and strengthened in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
Before looking more closely at the dialectic of the TRC, it is helpful to give a further
snapshot of the structure of the national press as it had evolved to the mid-1990s. In essence,
it was a near-monopolistic market in which 1.3 million newspapers were sold each day, a
market with too few players and an awesome grip on the market by Independent Newspapers.
Few countries in the world could boast such a massive concentration of power, as Cohen
observed:
Whether these monopolies employ black or white editors is a very
important issue ... but what matters more is their power in the market, in
their extraordinary influence and control over the advertising and
distribution channels whether anyone else (black or white) could ever get a
foot in the door.32
Of the 1.3 million newspapers sold each day, 57 per cent belonged directly to Tony
O’Reilly‘s Independent Newspapers or were controlled by it. Independent Newspapers took
over the Argus group in March 1994. If the Afrikaans press was ignored then 75 per cent of
all English-language metro daily newspapers sold in South Africa were controlled by
Independent Newspapers.
In the second and third largest cities, Durban and Cape Town, all the morning and
afternoon metro daily newspapers were controlled by Independent. In Johannesburg and
Pretoria, where around 580,000 metro daily newspapers were sold each day, Independent
controlled 70 per cent of the market via The Star, the Sowetan and its stake in the Pretoria
News. In the East London-Port Elizabeth area, the smaller rival Times Media Ltd group had
absolute control over the English metro dailies.
Unquestionably, Independent Newspapers dominated the national English press with
much the same power and reach that the Argus group wielded during the apartheid years,
which its editors had claimed credit for opposing and helping to dismantle. Independent
Newspapers published in excess of 160 newspaper titles and magazines worldwide. In South
Africa, Independent was the country’s leading publisher with 31 per cent of the total
newspaper market and 58 per cent of the English language market. It published 14 daily and
weekly newspapers in South Africa and also had a 14.9 per cent shareholding in Kaya FM
Radio.
By 1996, there was a dramatic shake-up of South African media ownership. The new
media barons include former trade unionist and ANC secretary-general Cyril Ramaphosa,
Mandela's personal physician, Nathato Motlana, former Robben Island inmate Eric Molobi,
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past Inkatha general secretary Oscar Dhlomo and Irish business tycoon Tony O'Reilly. It left
only two of the country's major commercial newspapers, Die Burger and Beeld, in the hands
of conservative white South Africans. In the past, the two Afrikaans press groups Nasionale
Pers and Perskor were unashamedly National Party mouthpieces.
Independent Newspapers and the TRC
In the context of transformation in the South African print media, a crucial factor was the
submission in February 1997 to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission by Jerry
Featherstone, the chief executive of Independent Newspapers (formerly the Argus group).
Featherstone’s expression of regret for the failures, shortcomings and omissions of the
company was a momentous and historic occasion in the South African print media.
Furthermore, it indicated a more profound role by the press in the political trauma of
the apartheid years and their aftermath than had been previously acknowledged. Furthermore,
it discredited the claims of an influential group of former editors who said they had nothing to
apologise for.
While the former white editors felt they did everything within their power and the law,
the new cluster of black executives considered that the former bosses did too little and that
often too late. Featherstone lent weight to the argument that the English-language press,
despite its constant carping and opposition to prevailing Government policy, still fell far short
of expectations. It was always a white press for, and staffed mainly by, whites. Now, in the
post-apartheid era, this English liberal press faced a formidable challenge in reflecting the
totality of South Africa’s mixed heritage, particularly 30 million blacks.
Written by a former Argus company executive and retired editor, John Patten, the
submission’s brief was “to provide an independent and objective overview of Independent
Newspapers (previously the Argus group) from 1960 to 1993. It sought to identify areas in
which the company and its staff were either victims or perpetrators of human rights abuses or,
either directly or by default, played some part in allowing human rights violations to occur”.33
Featherstone explained that the report recounted the hardships experienced by the
company’s editors and staff. It emphasised shortfalls in achievement while expressing regret
for failures. But, he said, there were successes in combating human rights abuses during the
apartheid years for which the company could be justifiably proud.
The 55-page document provided valuable insights into the way the largest newspaper
group in South Africa operated. It was an overview, and not definitive. While it considered
mainly the role of the editorial section of the group, the TRC approached the media in its
totality, with editorial only one facet of the inquiry. However, Patten’s efforts were

115

illuminating and it is worthwhile to focus on one specific section that goes to the heart of the
problem
Collusion with apartheid
In the submission to the TRC, under the heading, separate Black Editions [Section 11c],
Patten said that these had been a sore point with certain black journalists. Although it created
jobs for black journalists, and some black journalists liked them, it was an unsatisfactory
venture tinged with tokenism. Senior journalist Mathatha Tsedu said the Rand Daily Mail had
a black edition called Extra, “meaning by inference that blacks were the extra readers”.34 The
Sunday Times also had an Extra “which concentrated on lightning strikes and witchcraft
stories”. Patten had supported the abolition of an “Extra” edition in The Pretoria News, but a
subsequent editor had reintroduced a separate “Soccer” edition reflecting blacks’ greater
interest in soccer, while the other edition emphasised rugby to suit white readers.
Patten had introduced a Metro edition to The Mercury during the 1990s as an attempt to
provide a Natal paper catering to black readers wanting to read English. Such an edition had
the potential for hiving off as a separate newspaper catering specifically for black interests. A
change of ownership in 1993 re-positioned The Mercury as an upmarket newspaper, and the
Metro edition was abandoned as inappropriate. It was decided then to expand the Sowetan’s
circulation in Natal to cater for black readers wanting a paper in English.
In summary, there were two ways of looking at special editions for blacks. Some
journalists, like Tsedu, regarded them as apartheid editions. Management and other journalists
saw them essentially as zoned editions aimed at specialist readerships. There was no
suggestion of inferiority or discrimination in news selection; only special provision for
specific reader interests in certain sections of the paper. Ian Wyllie, editor at the Sunday
Tribune, long resisted a special edition for Indian readers in the Sunday Tribune. He changed
his mind when the Sunday Times’s metro edition in Natal started making inroads into the
Sunday Tribune’s readership in Chatsworth, a predominantly Indian area.
This seemed to show that targeted readers actually supported these editions and sought
them out, despite the connotations of apartheid. The argument raged on, with the Sunday
Tribune subsequently abandoning a special edition for Indian readers, and the Star also
jettisoning its extra edition. Though differences of opinion are very evident, there was no
human rights abuse in the practice, merely a difference in marketing strategy.
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Liberals versus liberationists
As if to deflect accusations of human rights abuses, Jon Hobday, editor of the Saturday Argus
and the Sunday Argus, observed that the Argus company was always a very conservative
company:
It paid conservatively, it took to innovation conservatively. It was a slowmoving company. To try to class us in the category of pioneers and pacesetters is a mistake. It was not the nature of the company. It was
conservative economically. It was conservative in every way. It was an
establishment company run by establishment people... but that is not to say
we did nothing.35
The confrontations of editors with the government, legal wrangles and court challenges,
harassment by senior government officials, warnings from successive authoritarian prime
ministers and the constant battle to negotiate a maze of legal hazards and determining the law
on an almost daily basis during the 1980s were all well documented and not in dispute. The
indifference of the Argus company towards equality for all staff, with career prospects for
black and coloured journalists, implied far-reaching bias in agenda setting and compromised
the role of the English press in South Africa. It facilitated the complaint that the liberal
English language press, just as much as the Afrikaans press, was a “whites only” press.
The role of the newspapers in South Africa, as Wilbur Schramm suggests, reflects the
society in which it operated.36 So, when Patten quotes Hobday as saying: “…we should
perhaps have recruited, done the process of getting more people of colour into our news
rooms earlier”, it may have been the wiser option. The political and social climates, however,
were just not favourable to integration. Hobday raises some of the ambiguities involved:
The fact is, I can recall recruitment beginning in the early 1970s, generally
in association to boosting soccer coverage. But you must remember, black
reporters couldn’t go anywhere. This was still apartheid. You could hire a
black reporter, but you couldn’t send him to court, because the magistrate
would throw him out. So there were practical problems.37
Certainly, black and coloured were taken on mainly as soccer writers where the white
reporters either would not go or it was supposedly unsafe for them to go.38 But to suggest
black or coloured reporters would be barred from the courts is inaccurate. The courts were
usually filled with black and coloured people, either facing trial or consoling friends or
relatives.
In the TRC submission, an unnamed former editor points a finger of blame at the way
in which the Argus company evolved and developed:
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The fault lies in the fact that we were almost exclusively white, male.
WASP [White Anglo-Saxon Protestant], certainly Western-orientated.
That was our heritage, that was our system.... It happens that the Western
liberal press is virtually the only free press in history and on earth. There
isn’t any other ... It is this very press which reports criticisms of
themselves. So I think if there is an accusation that we are liberal, that
does not require defence. It is a fact of life. And it is probably preferable to
any other ideology.39
Did the South African press, and more specifically the major English language press,
operate along the Western democratic model? The Afrikaans press was a party political
animal, the Government policy was one of authoritarian control and the media was subjected
to a battery of laws inconsistent with traditions of a vigorous and free press. Under the
authoritarian concept, diversity of views is wasteful and irresponsible, dissent is an annoying
nuisance and often subversive, and consensus and standardisation are logical and sensible
goals for mass communication.40
This was the objective of the Nationalist government. It was an ideology that the
English press did not subscribe to, yet it is wrong to suggest that the Argus company operated
under the Western libertarian model of a free press. Hachten concedes the Western press
concept is “comparatively rare in today’s world, although many authoritarian governments
give it lip service”.41
Whether or not the South African print media in general, and the former Argus
company in particular, managed to maintain Western standards of a free press in the face of
extreme pressure is largely dependent on political perspectives.
Patten summarises this as the difference between the liberationist black journalists’
view of what role the media should perform or should have performed, and the more
traditional liberal view maintained by the editors stressing maximum objectivity and balanced
reporting whatever the circumstances:
I believe it is of key significance in considering this report to take note of
the two main vantage points from which the issue of human rights abuses
under apartheid is being viewed from within Independent Newspapers and
in press circles. So fundamental is the division of opinion based on these
separate agendas that it can colour the whole field of assessing arguments
presented from both sides in this report. Unfortunately, there is little
common ground between them in handling the apartheid issues (though
the liberals’ view may be quite widely accepted by black journalists under

118

a full democracy), resulting in a so-far unbridged chasm between the two
schools of thought when looking back at many of the fraught issues of
those times.42
Patten concluded that the difference could be summarised briefly as the liberals’ view
versus the liberationists’ view. The liberals’ view was held generally by white editors and
many of their white staff. The liberationists’ view was held generally by black journalists, so
it had the added disadvantage of representing a racial divide in the company.
It would be seriously defective, though, to suggest that this split along racial lines
within the largest media group in South Africa was simply the result of clashing media
ideologies, and a company policy that was more in keeping with British and American
traditions of the press. The split was more primal. No Argus company journalist could argue
convincingly that traditional freedom and liberty were also extended to journalists who were
not white. Whether as crude and petty apartheid policies in the workplace, such as barring
“non-white” staff from the company canteen, separate toilets for different racial groups or
simply not extending invitations to black journalists to the office Christmas party, to the more
esoteric arguments that black journalists were not sufficiently educated for senior editorial
positions, the divide was clear and pervasive.
Former Saturday Star columnist Jon Qwelane argued that South Africa’s media owners
and operators should be made to explain their “naked collusion with apartheid” to the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission. He argued that “it is not only the manner in which our
bosses failed us as journalists which must be investigated and exposed but also the hopelessly
indefensible treatment which they gave the news”.43 However, in defence of the Argus
company from 1960 to 1993, Patten argued:
Argus company newspapers supported increased political rights for
disfranchised groups of colour. It is probable, if individual editors had
been asked during much of that period for their view on what political
rights blacks should have, that a variety of answers would have been
given. It is also probable that most would not have expressed support for a
simple transfer of power from whites to blacks. But the question would
have been somewhat academic, in that their editorial policies were
determined by practical issues of the day.44
Inequity and discrimination
Certainly, a wide range of discriminatory practices within the Argus group extended
nationally from Cape Town to Johannesburg and Durban where the major publications were
found. Patten found numerous examples of discriminatory practice during the course of his
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inquiry. Police raids investigated new staff appointments at the Daily News in Durban.
Editorial intervention at the World and Ilanga in Johannesburg, the two biggest black
newspapers in the country, meant that black editors submitted to the editorial whims of white
directors. The Cape Herald was designed as a coloured newspaper, staffed by coloureds and
aimed at the coloured market in Port Elizabeth and Cape Town. There was a separate
journalists’ cadet course for black journalists because it was felt they could not cope with the
demands of the Argus cadet school.
Concluding, Patten listed 24 points marking the history of the Argus company during
the most troubled years in both South Africa’s history and the history of its press.
Considerations of the commercial viability of the company the need to make profits, to relate
especially to core market readers and to attract advertisers placed limitations on how far the
Argus Company could go in being a tool against apartheid. It remained first and foremost a
newspaper chain and did not see its role as primarily political. This may have blunted its
cutting edge in exposing all the wrongs of apartheid, including human rights violations.
Apartheid, security and media laws and regulations proscribed or restricted free news
coverage of newsworthy, but politically sensitive, subjects. This interfered with the function
of a newspaper as a watchdog of the people in an ostensibly open democracy.
Laws enforcing separation of different racial groups in many spheres of life made free
access to a full range of news sources more difficult.45 The laws as such were an interference
with human rights, making the company a victim, but the company also made insufficient
effort particularly in the earlier years of the period under review − to overcome this obstacle.
It was discriminatory in the staff selection process, particularly as the company did not try to
make the target market for its newspapers the white community exclusively in spite of its
historical roots. Laws prevented black reporters from practising freely in large areas of public
life and this was a disincentive to newspapers employing them.46 In this respect, both the
company and black journalists were victims of government-generated human rights abuses.
Besides apartheid, security and media laws, Patten highlights other legislation on
politically-sensitive subjects seriously inhibited the company’s newspapers in generating
relevant news. The laws included nuclear matters, fuel supplies and transportation, defence
matters, police matters, prisons, and even the publication of trade figures with certain
countries. These obstacles amounted to a human rights abuse affecting the general public and
the newspapers that served them. Journalists were harassed and intimidated, arrested, detained
and sometimes prosecuted by police and other agents acting for the government.
Harassment and intimidation were also applied by agents of the liberation struggle, to a
degree where property damage, physical injury and even lives were threatened. These actions
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by participants in the political struggle for the control of power in South Africa were a gross
human rights violation on journalists. The violations even overflowed into harassment and
threats from individuals in the general public.
Though objectivity was the aim of most of the company’s newspapers, proper balance
to coverage in the political events was not achieved. Imbalance in the racial complements of
editorial staffs, judgments made on white perceptions in news identification and news
gathering, and a white monopoly of news selection in most sub-editors’ rooms, caused
distortion.
In the company’s black newspapers, a reverse situation applied, made more obvious by
the open commitment of staffs to the liberation cause. Political developments polarised
emotions in society, and some of this rubbed off on journalists, even though they tried to be
objective. Black journalists were affected by the many acts of oppression and brutality applied
to their black communities.
White journalists were affected by the effects of liberation struggle strategies which
included bombs in streets, shops, parking areas and restaurants, land mines on country roads,
sport and commercial boycotts, economic sanctions and disinvestment campaigns. All these
factors led to human rights abuses on such a scale that journalists themselves were victims of
those abuses.
The inherited political situation of enforced racial separation and separate communities
led to black and white journalists becoming isolated from, and disinterested in, communities
other than their own. With most of the company’s papers mainly white,

news coverage

concentrated on white political rivalries. Issues affecting blacks were at the heart of many of
these rivalries, causing them to be covered, but from the angle of white decision-making. It
was only late in the day that the imbalance in this respect was rectified, as liberation
movements became centre-stage players in the political drama. To the extent that the
newspapers cultivated attention to white political rivalries and overlooked full coverage of
black political aspirations and activities, Patten concluded that the company should regret the
imbalance that occurred.
There was a lack of commercial incentive to pursue certain black-interest subjects.
Advertising support was more evident where white interests were involved. Black readerships
generally lagged behind white readership, giving blacks a minority status in the company’s
main newspapers. While this reflected market conditions, it was a distortion of the overall
national picture, and the newspapers perpetuated that distortion. Though a Press Council had
been established to prevent government control of the press, it was set up under duress in the
face of government threats. It was often viewed as doing the government’s dirty work for it,

121

making the industry partly responsible for its own endangered plight, compromised by
association with the oppressive government. Not only was it disliked for this role, but it was
not representative of the whole South African population.
When editors eventually sought to avoid the restrictions embodied in laws and
regulations, many loopholes were found enabling the press to do its job better. Such efforts
were only made on any scale during the emergency regulations applied during the latter
1980s. This meant the press languished under laws it could possibly have evaded if efforts
had been made earlier. Some editors of smaller newspapers such as The Daily News, in
Durban, The Eastern Province Herald, in Port Elizabeth, and the Diamond Fields Advertiser,
in Kimberley were less willing than others to test the limits of legal restrictions the
government imposed on the media. This situation meant some human rights abuses were not
addressed when they might have been.
A major problem in assessing culpability on human rights abuses arose from the
different agendas of liberal journalists as opposed to liberationists. There was friction over
what were considered realistic political rights for disenfranchised groups. Argus company
newspapers, while steadfastly opposing apartheid, pursued gradualist goals within white
politics for many years before opting for constitutional settlement through negotiation with all
representative groups. This led to accusations that it kowtowed to apartheid.
The alternative press showed the Argus Company had to some extent lost touch with
the oppressed masses. Participation in government news conferences, briefings, and
conducted tours subjected the company’s news gatherers to naked propaganda.
Though this was identified and countered to some extent, it was not always possible to
counter-balance such propaganda equally, because of lack of sufficient access and contacts
with liberation movements. The company applied the government’s petty apartheid laws on
its premises, and this was broken down in some cases only by black disobedience action in
the face of abuse from other company employees.
For many years the company’s newspapers followed the practice of publishing the
names only of white accident victims, while mentioning black accident victims as statistics.
This was discriminatory.
Argus management appeared not to trust black editors with full editorial responsibility
for their newspapers. While this was probably done to protect the business from threat of
government closure (and some closures did occur), it was a paternalistic practice that caused
bitterness among black journalists. Although not dismissive of the problems of white
companies and white journalists under an invidious system, Patten’s report in total portrayed a
system skewed ruthlessly against black and coloured journalists.
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Voices of dissent
The response to John Patten’s report was as quick as it was bitter. More interesting in many
ways was the difference between emergent black editors and the recollections of the “Old
Guard” white editors from the apartheid years. Even before the report was made public,
Harvey Tyson, a prominent Argus editor, rejected accusations of complicity and any need for
a public apology. In a public outburst, Tyson asked what gross violations of human rights did
South Africa’s English language press commit between 1960 and 1993, then proceeded to
answer:
Speaking for myself, I worried throughout all the years of legalised racism
about not doing enough as a professional, trying to be a balanced
journalist, or enough to help save the oppressed from violations of their
rights.47
In deflecting the pointing finger of guilt, Tyson argued that journalists had perhaps
themselves to blame. Their petty squabbles within the mainly-white English language press
were partly the cause of the huge divide between the liberals and the former liberationists. For
his part, he did not believe he owed any apologies:
I shall never apologise for a single thing I did as a journalist. I feel no
guilt, only pride in the record of the Star, with which I was associated for
more than 20 years.48
Three former editors of the Argus company John O’Malley, Ian Wyllie, and Michael
Green rejected the apology by Independent Newspapers in a statement entitled We Stand By
Our Record:
Independent Newspapers, which is based in Ireland, played no role in
public affairs in South Africa before 1993, when it bought control of the
Argus company and changed the name to Independent Newspapers. It is
therefore, in our view, inappropriate that the directors and chief executive
of Independent Newspapers should apologise for actions for which they
were not responsible.49
The triumvirate denied that the conduct of their newspapers was cause for apology to
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.50 The English press was the strongest visible and
legal critic of government excesses during the period of review.
Shortcomings were perceived as the result of oppressive and restrictive laws
introduced by the government “with the express intention of muzzling the press, laws which
were opposed and circumvented by our newspapers wherever possible”.51 And they pointed to
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four decades of constantly opposing, criticising and challenging National Party apartheid
policies, exposing injustices, cruelties and wrongdoing:
Our newspapers were by no means specifically white-orientated. For the
past 40 years they have had a very large number of readers from other
sections of the community. This was one of the reasons why we did all we
could to employ and advance black editorial staff, though this was often
difficult because of the lamentable education policies of the National Party
government.52
There were few black journalists who could accept this proposition. More importantly,
the claim that these newspapers were not white-oriented because they had large numbers of
readers from other sections of the community hardly strengthened the argument.
Rafiq Rohan, political editor at the Sowetan, seriously challenged this claim with some
personal recollections of his experience as a rising star within the Argus group in the 1980s.
Then, he was convicted and jailed as a member of the ANC’s military wing uMkhonto
weSizwe [Spear of the Nation]. Rohan was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment on Robben
Island and says he did not receive a single message of support from his employer, Post, a
division of Natal Newspapers:
My golden boy status came crumbling down in the eyes of my white
overlord at Natal Newspapers. From star status, I became a source of huge
embarrassment to the bosses. During my time in prison, while awaiting
trial, my colleagues at Post-Natal were forbidden by the editor to visit me.
I was allowed visitors only on Mondays and Thursdays and staff were
warned not to visit me during working hours. Working hours were the
only time I was allowed visitors. Staff were not amused. Only after they
had written a stinging letter to my editor, did he shamefacedly put in an
appearance at the prison.53
Rohan said his release from prison in 1991 further tested the good faith of the Argus
Group and gave clear indications why most black journalists regarded it as supine during the
apartheid years. He did not get his job back. As Rohan told the TRC: “The irony of it all was
that my avowed enemy at the time, the apartheid state, had seen fit to pardon me yet my own
company had seen fit to put me back on trial!”54
The deputy editor of The Star, Rex Gibson, wrote a leader page article stating that if it
were up to him to decide, he would banish Rohan to a back room “where he would not be able
to tamper with the news”. Rohan’s attack on the Argus Group’s record and the way it
operated during the apartheid years was not unique. As far as black journalists were
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concerned it was always a “white” employer and the market was clearly white-orientated,
even if it sometimes provoked the more extreme elements of the Government.
The aftermath of TRC
In the late 1990s, the Government was apprehensive that the very fabric of society in the
emerging democracy in South Africa would be threatened by a combination of extreme social,
economic and political problems. These genuine fears were underpinned by massive socioeconomic problems facing the Government of National Unity.
Such massive difficulties could ultimately undermine the fragile democracy if the
ruling African National Congress failed to deliver a better life for its millions of supporters.
The role of the national media was closely linked to how this problem could be resolved. This
was the sort of rationale used by Nelson Mandela, as when he established a commission of
inquiry in March, 1998, to investigate leaks. It was alleged that the government faced possible
revolt, and that unnamed sources plotted to destabilise and eventually overthrow it. This,
however, was later proved untrue.
At a news conference in July, 1997, Mbeki said it was “quite clear that if corruption in
the police, the judicial system, the prisons services, and the Department of Home Affairs is
not stopped, you could have a collapse of the entire democratic system”.55 He warned that
crime was halting investor confidence and damaging the economy. Pointing to evidence of
extensive corruption in the police and criminal justice systems, he contended that greed was
not the cause of the problem; rather, a lack of commitment to a democratic South Africa.
Major crime syndicates included security force members from the apartheid era. Mbeki
painted a chilling vision of a struggling democracy in crisis and almost on its knees. This was
a major problem not only for the Government, but it also has serious ramifications for the role
of the national media in a time of crisis. The media was independently owned, guarded its
independence jealously and pursued a vigorous watch on government.
For the new black government, it was too vigorous. Constant negative press was
unhelpful and undermined government initiatives to speed up social change. More than that,
the vigorous watchdog role of the press stirred accusations that it was a media campaign
designed to embarrass and undermine the black government by showing it was unable to
govern.
Under normal circumstances, there would have been nothing wrong with this approach.
It is traditional of the Western media in developed democracies. The response from the South
African press was that it was simply doing its job. The South African Government, though,
accused the national media of pursuing a hidden agenda of undermining the new government.
The plea was clearly for some sort of developmental media system but without the onerous
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burden of censorship or government restraint. There were as many problems, though, with
adopting a developmental media framework that aimed to work towards some loosely defined
national interest as there was pursuing a vigorous Western libertarian media approach.
Summary
Sharp differences between the national press and the new black Government of National
Unity escalated almost immediately with high-profile ANC leaders accusing the press of
maintaining a hidden agenda by working against the aims of the new government. Chapter
Four has revisited the simmering conflict between the ANC-led government and the whitedominated media. Attacks on the press by Nelson Mandela and his successor Thabo Mbeki
accused the national press of being bitter, conservative and out of touch with black society.
The ANC government was urging a more compliant and sympathetic national press,
which reflected its inability to cope with fiercely critical, sharp scrutiny.
Mandela angered both black and white journalists by accusing newspaper owners of
manipulating and using black journalists to give greater credibility to their attacks on the
government and to avoid charges of racism. The reaction was predictable with the South
African National Editors’ Forum rejecting the charges. But the government maintained its line
that the media remained in the hands of conservative whites who found it difficult to reconcile
themselves with the fact that a black democratic movement had destroyed white supremacy.
This chapter has also focused briefly on the Truth and Reconciliation’s inquiry into the
media and the submission from Independent Newspapers to the inquiry expressing regret for
any failures, shortcomings or omissions by the company during the apartheid years.
A group of former editors opposed and criticised the apology from Independent
Newspapers chief executive Jerry Featherstone and said they had nothing to apologise for
during their years as editors of the Argus publications.
This chapter highlights the sharp distinctions between the government, journalists and
media companies about the role of the press in an emerging democracy, the perceived racist
bias of the national press, and the difficulties in trying to transform the landscape to what
Mandela refers to as “more representative of the black majority, both in ownership and
staffing”. And as a consequence, Thabo Mbeki’s veiled threat to the media to change or be
changed.
In the following chapter, different media systems in operation around the world are
considered. The objective is to canvass lessons from the most workable systems and to
consider its effects as suitable for new directions in the South African press.
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CHAPTER FIVE
TOWARDS A FREE PRESS
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to consider a variety of media systems and ideologies in practice
and to consider whether there is a way to facilitate a workable solution to find new directions
for the press in post-apartheid South Africa. This chapter also reviews sharp criticism from
senior ANC-government members who accused the press of orchestrating a hidden agenda to
destabilise the fragile new government, and responses from sections of the print media
accusing the government of trying to nobble the press.
Authoritarian controls or developmental approach
The hallmark of the authoritarian concept of the press is that it is strictly controlled by the
government. The authoritarian model seems to be the preferred policy of Third World
countries and totalitarian regimes to control the flow of information and regulate the
operations of the national press for what is considered to be “in the national interest” − as was
the case with the National Party government that was in control in South Africa from 1948 to
1993.
Hachten [1994] found that the basic principle of authoritarianism was quite simple:
the press was always subject to the direct or implied control of the state or sovereign. A
printing press or a broadcasting facility cannot be used to challenge, criticise, or in any way
undermine the ruler. The press functions from the top down: the king or ruler decides what
shall be published because truth (and information) was essentially a monopoly of those in
authority.1
The authoritarian theory can be traced to the mid 15th Century and Johannes
Gutenberg’s invention of moveable type which made printing possible. The rulers had a
monopoly over the printing press virtually from inception, and press freedoms were won only
after centuries of struggle. It was a logical extension of the theory by which monarchs ruled
by divine right or absolute power.
Merrill [1991] considers the authoritarian model, first presented in 1956 by Siebert,
Peterson and Schramm in Four Theories of the Press, has not faded with the waning of
monarchies. Authoritarianism continues to exist in countries where strong rulers wield power.
And, unpalatable as it is to the Western model of the press, Hachten concedes that there is
much in Western political philosophy that stresses the central importance of authority in
political theory:
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From Plato’s Republic through Hobbes’s Leviathan to Hegel and Marx,
the all-powerful state is given both the right and duty to protect itself in
any way necessary for its survival.2
John Stuart Mill, a fierce defender of a libertarian press and an advocate of virtually
absolute freedom of thought and discussion in his essay On Liberty, first published in 1859,
also seems to suggest limited controls over the press:
The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number,
is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a
sufficient warrant.3
In the case of the South African press, with its history of media repression, it remains
an option in the new democratic South Africa to seek ways in which the national press can be
made to function in a way that is more supportive of national security and survival. If it is the
aim of the national press to charge ahead in an adversarial way, then perhaps the Government
can look at ways in which the national media can function responsibly without infringing the
provisions and guarantees of freedom of information nor threaten the slow process of nation
building, reconstruction and development.
There are options other than restrictive measures which can be pursued to sway the
press in a different direction without it having to be a sycophantic or a feeble mouthpiece of
the government. This could include improvements in the way that the government
communicates with the press, enabling free and easy access to government information,
policies and ambitions. It could also include measures whereby the press and government can
find some balance for working in the national interest without the need for censorship or a
compliant press. Among other options, the press can swiftly correct mistakes and work
towards reducing claims of bias, distortion, implementing more stringent quality control to
improve the standard of journalism generally and more specifically providing more training
and education for journalists.
The Western-libertarian model of the press is not without shortcomings and there is a
long history of basic criticisms against the near monopolisation of information by the major
Western news services. This criticism does not only come from developing nations where
governments try to fulfil national, social, political and economic goals and where differences
in ideology exist on the roles and functions of the media in society.4
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The criticism also comes from developed nations concerned with the imbalance in the
cross-flow of information and the hurdles faced by journalists reporting from developing
countries where they are impeded by a lack of access to government, censorship and
restrictions of various sorts. The pleas for a new world information order are not new.
However, it is a call that has since fallen from favour. The developmental journalism theory,
largely denounced by the West, which holds that the media has a role to play in national
development, stemmed from the New World Information Order debates of the 1960s. It is a
theory that failed to live up to its expectations and there is general disappointment especially
from Third World countries where development-orientated news has erroneously been
equated with government-controlled news. However, some aspects of the developmental
journalism theory could have a positive impact on the way journalism is practised in the new
South Africa will be considered in the final chapter.
Media theorists also have been challenged by the question of what constitutes the
ideal Press-State relationship. Siebert et al, in Four Theories of the Press, preferred what they
described as the Social Responsibility theory of the press although they concede that their
initial four theories are in fact just derivatives of two basic theories: the Authoritarian, and by
extension the Communist theory; and the Libertarian theory, and its extension, the theory of
Social Responsibility. Theodore Peterson [1953] says briefly the social responsibility theory
has as its major premise that “freedom carries concomitant obligations”. John Merrill [1983]
argues that uneasiness about the growing power of media owners and managers to control
information, much as the authoritarian rulers had done in Gutenberg’s day, led Siebert,
Peterson and Schramm to the social responsibility theory.
Social responsibility differs from its roots in that the function of the press is to
provide a medium for discussion of conflict, whereas under libertarianism the press was to
check on government. And whereas the libertarian theory provides that the media are
available to all who have the economic means to use them, social responsibility theory holds
that everyone with something to say has the right to use the media. A third distinction
between the two theories is that a socially responsible press will be controlled by community
opinion, consumer action, and professional ethics, whereas libertarianism relies on the free
marketplace of ideas for its correction.5
The social responsibility theory implies recognition by the media that it must perform
a public service to warrant its existence. It is a theory that draws much of its roots from a
report published in the United States by the Commission on Freedom of the Press under the
chairmanship of Robert Hutchins, of the University of Chicago. The Hutchins Commission as
it became known in 1947, studied the American press and assessed articles for sensationalism
and the extent of unfair reporting.
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The Hutchins Commission found that because of the pervasive impact of the media, it
had gone beyond such libertarian concepts as the search for truth and the right to access to
information so the Commission determined that “the importance of the press in modern
society makes it absolutely necessary that an obligation of social responsibility be imposed on
the Communications media”.7 The Commission demanded that the press not only present the
facts in a meaningful context but that it should also disclose the “truth behind the facts”.
Objective facts were not enough, the Commission found. Reporters also had to find out what
lay behind them and to present the truth of what they had discovered by closer scrutiny and
analysis.
The Hutchins Commission’s plea in 1947 is the plea of the new South African
government – that reporters not take cheap shots at a number of serious socio-economic
problems facing the government and which they have little hope of rectifying over many
years and the plea is that the media present these problems in a meaningful context rather than
in a sensationalist, muckraking way or in a way that threatens the national interest.
Merrill says in recent years many Third World countries have gravitated towards “a
kind of press responsibility concept which would increasingly make journalism a co-operating
partner with the governments for the sake of national progress and development”. It is a
concept which most Western journalists view with caution and suspicion and which they
reject as threatening the free flow of communication and information.

Since its first

publication in 1956, Four Theories of the Press has been an influential yardstick in assessing
media models. It is now quite dated and has been revised by other media theorists. Among
them, Ralph Loewenstein [1979] who finds the Siebert, Peterson and Schramm typology
inflexible. Loewenstein revised the social responsibility theory to become the sociallibertarian theory “to be rid of the ambiguity in the original term and to reflect more readily
the roots of this theory in libertarianism. The new term retains the sense that some regulation
of the media may be required to ensure public benefit”.6
While Ralph Loewenstein and John Merrill tinkered with the four-theory typology
and offered refinements of the original model, it was Hachten [1981] who offered the first
significant changes to the four theories of the press.7 Hachten proposed a five-concept
typology ie. Authoritarian concept, Western concept, Communist concept, Revolutionary
concept and the Developmental concept. Hachten holds that “the differing perceptions about
the nature and role of journalism and mass communication are rooted in divergent political
systems and historical traditions” and they are broadly reflected in these five categories.8 He
combined libertarianism and social responsibility into what he called the Western concept and
he added two more concepts viz. the Developmental and the Revolutionary (see below).
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In the context of future options for the South African media in an emerging
democracy, Hachten’s Western concept and also his Developmental concept offer some
directions. In the Western concept, Hachten combines the theory of social responsibility with
libertarianism and he concedes that only a handful of Western nations meet the criteria
although many pay lip service to the concept. The Western concept, Hachten said, holds most
strongly that a government – any government – should not interfere in the process of
collecting and disseminating news.
The press, in theory, must be independent of authority, and of course, exist outside of
government and be well protected by law and custom from arbitrary government interference.
And so an independent press usually means one situated in a free enterprise capitalist
economy, enjoying the same amount of autonomy as other private business enterprises.9
Hachten concedes the Western news media are not without their shortcomings –
commercialism, sensationalism, concentration of ownership, triviality, and entertainment
orientation and he admits that the Western media is not immune from pressure within its own
governments. He sees some modification of the Western concepts falling under the umbrella
of social responsibility and a view that the media have clear obligations of public service that
transcends profits.10
Hachten’s Western concept of the press is a distinct deviation from the traditional
authoritarian controls that developed and evolved during the rise of democracies in Europe
and North America. An important facet of the Western model is the right to talk politics, the
right to criticise the government without fear of retribution, censorship or harassment. It
subscribes to the self-righting principle, the free marketplace of ideas first championed by
John Milton and others and Hachten lists five characteristics of a free and independent press
that is found in countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New
Zealand, Canada, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Norway, Denmark,
Austria, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Switzerland and Japan. They are:
1.

A system of law that provides meaningful protection to individual civil liberties and
property rights;

2.

High levels of per capita income, education and literacy;

3.

Governance by constitutional parliamentary democracy or at least with legitimate
political oppositions;

4.

Sufficient capital or private enterprise to support media of news communication;

5.

An established tradition of independent journalism.
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By this definition, the press in South Africa meets all the criteria of the Western
concept of the press. But it is argued that perhaps with the societal complexities and the
diversity of socio-economic and political problems facing the emerging nation, it is definitely
the desirable goal but in the interim it can hardly be the preferred option. Is it fair, for
example, for an ANC government to allow the Afrikaner press to continue as it did before,
and in doing so undermine and destabilise the efforts of the government or would the
preferred option be for the government to step in and be decisive by setting temporary
parameters?
In answering this question on the future direction of the South African press, it would
be prudent to consider the merits or otherwise of press freedom as it operates in democratic
countries such as England, Canada, Australia and the United States where there is a long
history of freedom of the press. And by focusing on the peculiarities of the pancasila model
of Indonesia, there are lessons to be learned from a national media that is controlled and
operates within strict government guidelines.
Liberty of the press
Under the Western or libertarian system, even with its guarantees of non-intervention by
government in the free flow of information, it is not unusual to find serious infringements on
the liberty of the press in some highly democratised countries. We should view the theories of
the press along a continuous line with authoritarian controls at one end and the free
expression libertarian model at the other extreme with various shades in between.
For instance, Canada is a highly democratised country with a Western model that
guarantees freedom of the press. Eaman [1987] pointed out that despite constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press, there are in fact many constraints on freedom of speech in
Canada. He points out that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the new Canadian
Constitution states that the fundamental rights of all Canadians include “Freedom of thought,
belief, opinion, and expression, including the freedom of the press and other media of
communications” (Canada Act, 1982). This ostensibly gives Canadians the same written
guarantee that the Americans acquired in 1791 by the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which declared that ... “Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press.” He says:
But it is not enough, of course, simply to have such words on paper. We
need to look beyond the letter of the law to the legal and political reality.
After all, Section 25 of the Constitution of the [former] Soviet Union
states that “the citizens of the USSR are guaranteed by law (a). freedom of
speech and (b). freedom of the press”. The reality in Canada is that
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freedom of speech and of the press is subject to a number of constraints.
This does not entail that such freedoms do not exist, but it does mean that
that they are not regarded as absolute.11
In Australia also, freedom of the press operates by convention rather than
constitutional guarantees. Australia has a highly developed Western-style libertarian media
where there is robust investigation and criticism of the government.
Freedom of the press is cherished as a symbol of a free and open democratic society
yet in recent years even the Australian government has intervened, for example, to refuse
entry to persons whose views it finds offensive or contrary. Among those who were refused
entry to Australia were the Palestine Liberation Organisation chairman Yasser Arafat (June
23, 1997), the controversial British historian David Irving (November 8, 1996), Sinn Fein
leader Gerry Adams (November 8, 1996) and former Black Panther Lorenzo Kom’Boa Ervin
(July 8, 1997).
We turn to Britain, with a history and tradition of fearless journalism and a
commitment to freedom of communication. The noted media commentator and the former
editor of The Sunday Times, Harold Evans, challenges the existence of a free press in Britain
– and by implication, in other democracies.12
Evans concedes there are certain freedoms in the UK which are guaranteed by
convention in what he terms “the half-free press” and he makes a stand for almost unfettered
freedom of publication and he opposes the impediments of prior restraint, based mainly on the
situation in the United States where freedom of the press is guaranteed under the First
Amendment of the American constitution. In Britain, as in Australia, freedom of the press is
not guaranteed by a Bill of Rights or the constitution but operates with some success by
convention. Evans seems almost jealous of US press freedoms by comparison.
But constitutional guarantees of press freedom do not necessarily mean that freedom
actually exists and, conversely, that there may be freedom of the press without constitutional
guarantees. Even under first amendment guarantees, the American press remains subject to a
variety of State and Federal laws.13 Constraints on freedom of the press in Britain which sit
uneasily with Evans include the rules of contempt of court, the cry of sub judice:
There are certainly exaggerated ideas about our powers … we must keep
within the laws of libel, the law of trespass, of slander, of confidence of
copyright, of contempt of court, of Parliamentary privilege and the
bureaucrats of the all-purpose chastity belt, the Official Secrets Act.14
Evans makes a case for the Washington Post’s investigations that subsequently led to
the Watergate scandal. Under the constraints of British law, Evans would have been unable to
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put the scandal on the national agenda and he makes a case for the abolition of civil contempt
laws and relaxing the straitjacket of sub judice.
In Britain, at the point of litigation, fair comment ceases at the risk of prejudicing fair
trial: “Once a writ is issued there must be no reporting of fact, according to the Law Lords,
because it might prejudice the issues.” Evans indicates the wide gap in but two legal areas
between the freedom of the press in the US and the half-free press in Britain.
John Keane traces the historical basis for the freedom of the press in Britain.15 The
landmarks of the British struggle for press freedom commenced with the English Revolution
running through to the works of Milton, Locke and Mill, Erskine’s defence of Tom Paine,
charged with seditious libel, and continued with the collapse of the licensing system, cheap
and portable printing presses and the expiry of the Regulation of Printing Act in 1694, which
led to the publication of the Daily Courant in 1702 as the first daily newspaper.
Keane identifies four basic justifications for press freedom in Britain:
1.

the theological approach expounded most eloquently by John Milton’s Areopagitica;

2.

the idea that the conduct of the press should be guided by the rights of individuals as
outlined by John Locke;

3.

the theory of utilitarianism viewed state censorship of public opinion as a licence for
despotism and as contrary to the principle of maximising the happiness of the governed
as espoused in the writings of William Godwin and James Mill;

4.

a fourth defence of liberty of the press is guided by attaining truth through unrestricted
public discussion among citizens.16 Some of this concept is contained in the writings of
J.B. Priestley and Leonard Busher.
Evans embraces the objectives of the British model of press freedom but goes a step

further than the legacy bequeathed by Milton, Locke and Mill in defence of “the public’s right
to know”. Evans agrees free expression is a natural right for human dignity and happiness but
argues it is not enough. The ethic is too much centred on the rights of free speech which was
alright in the historical context but it is too much concerned with the individual’s opinion.
Evans describes it as “more invective than investigative”.17 Lord Windlesham,
however, suggests “there are evident similarities between people who work in the media and
people who work in politics”. He argues that the political role and the journalists’ role are
interdependent, with the balance between them being a matter of fundamental concern to all
practitioners in the communications environment.
He believes the state of the press in the UK is maintained in freedom and although
there is at times conflict between the media and government, it is not “by adherence to any
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ideological standard but by a shifting balance of conflicting interests”.18 All have equal access
to the media and are regularly briefed by party headquarters and the Parliamentary lobby.
While discussion must take place and public debate must be allowed to develop in a
democracy as we understand it, Windlesham suggests ultimately journalists and politicians
are on the approach that fits in snugly with Evans’ description of the “half-free” press.
The press and politics may feed off each other in the public’s interest but the role of
the press in a democracy is to inform, interrogate and keep the government clean, not to
pander to government ideology. Windlesham suggests a vigorous exchange between the
media is necessary and desirable Keane’s fourth justification for freedom of the press ie. that
the press is guided by the idea of attaining truth through unrestricted public debate but he
appears “soft” on the idea that state censorship of public opinion is license for despotism and
contrary to the principle of maximising the happiness of the governed.19
He raises the question of media impartiality and agenda setting in the context of
private ownership and the suggestion hangs that in criticism of the government, freedom of
the press could reflect freedom of the publishing owner to publish or pursue individual
interests. And he poses the question: Does the press, I wonder, have any responsibilities
towards Government as distinct from the community? The inference here seems that an
unfettered press as guaranteed by the constitution of the United States would not sit very well
with Lord Windlesham, who appears willing to concede the public has a right to know. It’s
just a case of how much they should be allowed to know and in whose interest.20
Graham, the publisher of The Washington Post, champions the cause of a free press
as it exists in the United States but in the Guildhall Lectures on freedom of speech she makes
the important distinction that the British parliament has several mechanisms in place whereby
the government can be called to account, even ultimately be dismissed − there is Question
Time in Parliament, and there is a history of official inquiries.21 The contrast between the
British and the American idea of freedom of the press is grounded in two very different
concepts of democratic government. The British system has quick and conclusive ways to
expose and deal with the sins and errors of Ministers. The burden of inquiry does not fall too
heavily on the press. Under the US system this is not the case. Power is entrusted to officials
for fixed terms.
Graham defends British claims that the American press should be much more discreet
and tractable because “... unbridled freedom which we assert can easily become a licence to
distort events, destroy reputations, and inflame public opinion recklessly”.22
The former United States president, Richard Nixon would never have been
impeached if this was the case. The Washington Post publisher describes the essential
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function of the American press as “to probe, to ask inconvenient questions, to report fully and
fairly what is going on, and thus to keep the government accountable. It is an adversary
system ... less efficient than it ought to be But it is a necessary job and one which could not
be performed if the press in America were subject to the constraints which our colleagues (in
the UK) must operate”.23
The role of the press under the British system aims at exactly the same virtues espoused
by Graham. It is what the media in the UK and Australia, for that matter, have always aimed
at. Whether they do it more or less successfully because the Americans have constitutional
guarantees on the right to publish, is another matter. The liberty of communication is but one
of a great diversity of liberties.
While the Americans can be accused of conducting trials by publicity in the media and
prejudicing an accused’s right to a fair trial (consider here the O. J. Simpson case as an
example), under the British constraints of sub judice and contempt of court lurks Harold
Evans’ gripe of a “half-free British press”. But the problem of a free press versus a fair trial
has, as Graham describes, “the ring of a genuine constitutional dilemma, a head-on collision
between two fundamental tenets of our free society”. Without the free and probing press, the
events and import of Watergate would, in all probability, never have been revealed.
If any lesson has emerged from the turmoil and tragedy so far, it is that the press in
America should be more free, not less. More vigorous and more probing. More alert to its
larger responsibilities − and less easily satisfied with its own performance, says Graham. Of
course, there is no way of telling but there is more chance than not that corruption on the scale
of Watergate would sooner or later have been discovered had it occurred in Britain, whatever
the model of press freedom because things have a habit of coming out − especially when
loyalties are strained.
Freedom of the press revisited
Freedom of the press at its most basic level is the right to gather and publish details,
information or comment without fear of punishment and restrictions or government controls.
It can apply to the print media as well as television and radio, magazines, books,
pamphlets and a range of information materials. The issue of censorship is closely related to
matters affecting freedom of the press. Governments can [and often do] restrict publication or
dissemination of information by censorship. It usually works in two ways, (a) by prior
restraint, whereby the press is restrained from publishing specific material and (b) by
punishing those who publish material considered to be libellous, seditious or obscene.
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In the United States, and in most democratic countries, prior restraint is rare. and any
restraints on the freedom of the press are vigorously challenged. Freedom of the press is
guaranteed and protected under the First Amendment of the Constitution. It states that
“Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech or of the press”. It is a
restraint on the federal Government that was made binding on the state governments by a
Supreme Court interpretation of the 14th Amendment. Even with press freedom guaranteed
under the US Constitution, the right to publish is not absolute in the United States.
There are restrictions on matters that affect national security, obscenity and
indecency, school textbooks and libraries and restraints on the mass media of
communications. The US Congress has passed many laws over the years deemed to be “in the
public interest” that infringed or restricted freedom of the press despite the provisions of the
First Amendment that was first ratified as part of a Bill of Rights in 1791. Academics remain
challenged by aspects of the First Amendment and articulate a vision for the future where the
First Amendment remains important, but no more important than other rights. And political
leaders regularly put forward proposals that seek to amend the First Amendment or would, for
example, censor the Internet, or decide what television programs should be watched. Among
ordinary citizens too, there is unease about speech that is too free.
Donna Demac [1998] finds two centuries after its ratification, the First Amendment is
under threat. Huge libel awards and other forms of litigation, Demac finds, are weakening the
inclination of the press to carry out its watchdog function. Demac says:
Courts often consider press coverage to be inimical to the goal of fair
trials. The federal Government and the Pentagon want to control what
journalists report during military conflicts. The country’s youngest
journalists − that still in school − are often denied the very rights they are
taught about in civics classes. To make matters worse, the American
public seems to have developed a suspicion of the press that breeds
tolerance of disturbing developments.24
Demac says the American press certainly bears some responsibility for these attitudes
that show an erosion of public support of the First Amendment that has reached “alarming
levels”. She blames a tendency towards sensationalism, a rush to report unsubstantiated
statements and other forms of sloppy reporting that continue to weaken the relationship
between the press and the public.
The media should be − and routinely are − taken to task for their shortcomings and
lack of accountability. Yet it should be kept in mind that freedom of the press does not require
the press to carry out its duties flawlessly. Intimidating reporters and editors with lawsuits and
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government restrictions will not improve the quality of journalism. Such actions, she says,
would only serve to make the press more timid, which in the end will work to the detriment of
everyone in a democratic society. Freedom of the press is one of the grand themes of
American liberty. The ability to report on government behaviour and contemporary events
without fear of official censorship or retribution is indispensable to democratic selfgovernment.25
However, levels of intervention, or censorship, differ across countries and remain
essentially a political decision dependent on the level of political freedom of the citizens.
There is no denying that there are instances where public debate can lead to conflict, national
instability, or security issues that place the national interest at risk that could require some
intervention in the dissemination of information to the public.
The levels of intervention are what matters and gives cause for concern in some
countries. What works in one society is not necessarily beneficial in all societies. So, it is not
only the claim of Asian nations such as Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia who proclaim that
the Western model of the press is not a suitable model for them, it is also the claim of African
nations where the imperative is to reduce poverty and hunger before freedom of the press. The
Western model has its faults. The Asian approach of control and censorship also has its faults.
For the South African media, there is a unique window of opportunity to reshape the way in
which the press can operate by using as a yardstick the prevailing media systems in other
countries.
A developmental approach
Gordon Jackson [1993] offers a detailed and comprehensive analysis which he describes as
rewriting the map for the new South African press and in deciding what kind of approach the
post-apartheid press would have to contend with and he suggests newspapers will be called
upon “to draw maps that differ as their land continues to change” and this must also be seen
against the background of the ground rules by which the authorities will allow them to
operate.26
Jackson looks to the major press theories, authoritarian, libertarian, social
responsibility, and Soviet Communist styles as well as developmental journalism. In assessing
the future of the South African media, of the five systems, Jackson immediately rules out as
unsuitable the libertarian system and the Soviet Communist style “because each has minimal
prospects of being embraced”, the authoritarian, social responsibility and the developmental
modes appear to have more prospects of being embraced.27
Jackson suggests one of the three models may be accepted yet it may even be a
combination of the three that is preferred. This is much in accordance with the views of Guy
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Berger who also suggested a combination of media systems can be the answer to the future
directions of the South African media. Jackson maintains that the system that will actually
emerge will correlate very closely with the kind of political changes that occur. He says:
A black government might also promote developmental journalism,
seeking to use the press with some level of compulsion to advance
government policies, especially on economic, racial, or ethnic issues.
Because of South Africa’s apartheid history, a black government might
well forbid the media from carrying racist material, however that might be
defined. Proactively, the government might implement subsidies to benefit
some financially weaker newspapers.28
He feels that the developmental approach will have little chance of success although
it may be the plan of the government to seek to use the press with some sort of compulsion to
advance government policies, especially on racial and ethnic issues or economic matters. This
is quite tangible because the new government does not own its own newspapers nor does it
have a sympathetic media such as benefited the National Party.
However, there is a strong and well established tradition in the mainstream press of
independent journalism and a developmental approach will militate against the aspirations of
the press as well as interfering in the process of freedom of speech. The press is likely to cling
to the social responsibility approach for as long as possible and Jackson maintains this is the
correct approach. But he concedes it is not to suggest that the social responsibility model has
served South Africa flawlessly in the past and should continue unchanged in the future.
The point here, however, is that despite the South African press’s evident
and ample shortcomings, whether in the mainstream or alternative
segments, developmental journalism as a whole offers little to redress
these weaknesses. Elements of developmental journalism are indeed likely
to be incorporated into tomorrow’s press and ought to be welcomed. But
any future government that decreed this approach to be the marching
orders for the press would not only be misguided but also meet intense
resistance.29
Jackson points out that only the most naive would expect South Africa to move
rapidly and smoothly towards a markedly more open and democratic society. He says:
Not only is that unlikely to occur soon, but the press is equally unlikely in
the near future to enjoy the freedoms typically marking most Western
societies. The press is thus likely to function under a hybrid model,
largely, influenced by the tenets of the social responsibility approach but
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adapted to South Africa’s realities. For the country is itself a strange
hybrid, with a mix of First World and Third World components.
Accordingly, its press system reflects the tensions of many papers aspiring
to follow the social responsibility system while operating in a clearly predemocratic society. [This was written in 1993]... One crucial factor
underlies how the exact mix of these three models will take shape. Will the
press be regarded − by the government, the public, and perhaps the press
its self − as primarily a First World or a Third World institution.30
The question is then how can one expect to operate the media by First World
standards in a Third World society? Jackson answers by saying:
When it comes to the press, however, it seems the editors and journalists
desperately hope that they can maintain what has primarily been a First
World model, knowing that newspapers might increasingly operate as if
they were running according to Third World standards ... If those in the
press conceded that it was indeed changing into a Third World institution,
it would be virtually impossible to adhere to its previous standards. Worst
still, if editors openly acknowledged that their papers could be evaluated to
Third World standards, that would open the way to, and even legitimise, a
wide range of government anti-press actions, Government officials could
say: ‘We always said you people in the press had unrealistic expectations,
now that you’ve admitted our country’s Third World needs and special
circumstances, these are the ways we all need to work together for the
national good.31
Jackson admits such a development is not only a logical step but it would seriously
curtail independent journalism in South Africa. This was a valid observation before the
historic political transformation in 1994, but with the benefit of hindsight and ten years later it
is clear that the press in South Africa did not slip into the mould of a Third World media
operating in a Third World environment. Despite its many failures and shortcomings in the
post-apartheid era, the national press has struggled yet continued to maintain its role as a
public watchdog. And in answer to Jackson’s question, the post-apartheid press is regarded
primarily as a First World institution that struggles with a government that views its actions
with suspicion. The mainstream press, bolstered by the provisions of the Constitution,
operates independently without direct government intervention. At times the relationship
between the government and the press has been fragile and strained but there is no threat of
censorship or intervention by a dissatisfied government.
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The Indonesian press model of a developmental media system during the Soeharto era
may hold some lessons for the press in the emerging “new South Africa”. The noble
aspirations of a press that was forced to operate under strict government guidelines
determined by the national interest was a system flawed in its execution. However, it evolved
from a developmental into an authoritarian model that served to hide government excesses
and was forced to cover up graft and corruption under the rule of President Soeharto.
Backed by the powerful military, Soeharto established his New Order regime through
which he tolerated little dissent in the pursuit of political stability and economic growth.
Among the significant changes included were changes to the national press system and the
introduction of the philosophy-driven pancasila press. 32
The five tenets of pancasila are:
1.

Belief in the one and only God: this principle of Pancasila confirms the Indonesian
people’s belief that God does exist and it is embodied in Article 29, section 1 of
the 1945 Constitution.

2.

Just and civilised humanity: This principle requires that human beings be treated
with due regard to their dignity as God’s creatures.

3.

The unity of Indonesia: This principle embodies the concept of nationalism, of
love for one’s nation and motherland.

4.

Democracy guided by inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations
amongst representatives: This principle embodies decision making through
consensus and with a deep sense of responsibility.

5.

Social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia: This principle calls for the
equitable spread of welfare to the entire population.

The role of the national press is central to the aims of pancasila. The principle of
pancasila democracy is the ideology of the State and the life philosophy of the Indonesian
people. This was a shift towards a unique and radically different press system. It was also a
major element in the process of nation building. Soeharto described the role of the press as an
important institution since the beginning of independence and he viewed the press as having
an integral role to play in developing Indonesian society, the nation and State. At a National
Day address in 1988, Soeharto explained:
The press has an important role to assist in managing this nation in all its
complexity through the dissemination of news, opinions, ideas, grievances,
and hopes to the masses. In other words, without the national press we will
be living in a restricted, ignorant environment, knowing only about
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ourselves. It is in this respect that the press has a role to play in helping
build and preserve our unity and cohesion as a nation.33
Soeharto warned that a successful press would accelerate efforts to achieve national
targets while a press which did not achieve its role would “no doubt delay the attainment of
identified targets” and he urged the national press to adhere to and to support the slogan
“positive interaction between the press, the government and the people”.34
Explaining the role of the media in Indonesia, Soeharto commented just before the
elections of March 1997 that there was no room for political dissent in Indonesia. He said that
critics of his government did not understand the country’s political system and he warned that
the globalisation of information and economic activity was in some ways posing a
tremendous threat to the nation’s unity.
The free flow of global information has brought people in all countries
closer to those in others. This enables people to receive foreign values that
can erode their sense of nationalism. So extreme is the impact of foreign
influence in some people they no longer care about maintaining their
nation’s unity.35
The role of the media in Soeharto’s New Order Indonesia had a determined role to play
in maintaining national unity and stability under the principle of pancasila.
However, during the Soeharto era legislation and government intervention kept the
Indonesian media under strict control with demands for the press to act only in the national
interest under the broad political umbrella of pancasila. Soeharto did not hesitate to shut
down newspapers or magazines, or use the censor’s pen to restrict the free flow of
information when he considered the boundaries of tolerance were exceeded and the national
interest was being undermined or threatened.
But, what exactly was determined as being in the national interest was often unclear.
The effects of such repressive measures were much clearer. Journalists were

arrested,

harassed and threatened by the military and many journalists were driven into hiding as the
Soeharto government ran roughshod over the media to prevent open and independent
coverage of business and politics.
Newspapers and magazines that once dared to challenge the establishment by reporting
on the Soeharto family’s business deals have been shut and reporters remain in fear of their
lives if they dig too deeply into the country’s financial troubles, rampant cronyism in business
and corruption in high office. This repressive media policy has been blamed for exacerbating
Indonesia’s economic and social problems. It has also provided the impetus for widespread
political unrest and upheaval and for sending the Indonesian currency into an uncontrollable
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free fall that led to widespread changes and political instability and national unrest. The
argument here is not whether the media had any influence or impact on the turbulent events in
post-Soeharto Indonesia, but rather whether aspects of the pancasila press such as its focus on
nation building and issues of national interest holds any worth for the press in South Africa.
The Indonesian, and by association, much of the Asian doctrine of journalism
challenges the fundamental Western theory of journalism that incorporates among other
things a free flow of ideas , the public’s right to know, reporting fully and fairly about what is
going on in government and in so doing keeping government’s honest and accountable and
the population suitably informed. By contrast, this theory sits uneasily in the developing
nations of Asia and elsewhere where the attitude towards the media is developmental in
theory. Unfortunately, in practice it remains more authoritarian.
Hemant Shah [1996] suggests because of the negative connotations associated with
the term developmental journalism it is preferable to replace it with the term emancipatory
journalism to facilitate recognising “a role for journalists as participants in a process of
progressive social change”.36 Shelton Gunaratne [1996] expands Shah’s point in the context
that “communication can contribute to participatory democracy, security, peace, and other
humanistic principles that are at the core of the discourse on modernity.”
Emancipatory journalism requires not only provision of socially relevant information
but also journalistic activism in challenging and changing oppressive structures; gives
individuals in communities marginalized by modernization “a means of voicing critique and
articulating alternative visions of society”, and encourages “journalists to abandon the role of
neutral observer while reporting in a manner that is thorough, deeply researched, and
historically and culturally grounded, and that promotes social change in favor of the
dispossessed”.37
Public journalism model
Spawned in the United States from 1993 to 1997, the concept of public or civic journalism
developed as a controversial experiment in a push to reshape the way news is presented. At
the heart of public journalism is the aim to connect newspapers with the community in a
mutually beneficial way.
A core element is the belief that journalism has an obligation to public life and that it
is an obligation that goes well beyond simply telling the news or unloading the facts.
Developed out of a perceived need to reshape American political reporting, Jay Rosen
[1998] singles out Washington Post political commentator David Broder as among the first to
argue it was time to rethink a fundamental assumption of political journalism. It was Broder’s
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belief that “the [political] campaign and its contents are the property of the candidate” and
newspapers should show new leadership in the way politics was reported.
What can I do? My answer is tentative and expressed without any great
confidence. But if we are going to change the pattern, we in the press have
to try deliberately to reposition ourselves in the process. We have to try
and distance ourselves from the people we write about the politicians and
their political consultants and move ourselves closer to the people that we
write for the voters and potential voters.38
According to Rosen, it was Broder’s leadership and foresight “that had some tangible
effects, most notably in the experiment that has come to be known as civic or public
journalism. Driven by media research foundations – mainly the Pew Centre for Civic
Journalism in Washington, the Kettering Foundation, and the Knight Foundation who
between them provided funding for research, conferences and experiments in the field, Rosen
finds much was accomplished in the years 1993 to 1997 when “public journalism” or civic
journalism came to the attention of the American press. Rosen states:
The profession had some trouble coping with this development because
public journalism was not a single phenomena, but a broad pattern of
activity that moved in many directions and relied on a multiple sources of
support.39
Public journalism attracted a great deal of criticism, in particular the elite press which
attempted to dismiss the experiment as a gimmick or fraud but as one of its main advocates
Rosen finds that “even the most shallow critiques revealed where the critic stood on some
key questions: What does civic purpose mean in journalism? What should the power of the
press be used for? What’s the best way for this profession to serve democracy? What is the
role of a journalist?”40
Another major advocate of public journalism, newspaper editor Davis Merritt [1994]
says public journalism is “about fundamental, cultural change in journalism; about attitudes
and traditional concepts that no longer serve either us or our communities well” and that
journalists must move beyond simply telling the news, journalism can improve public life,
and news organisations can become more than reporters and recorders of events.41
Skjerdal [2001] suggests that although public journalism was a reaction to a particular
American struggle with democracy, this kind of journalism can be exported to other parts of
the world as well since the fundamentals are assumed to be universal.42 As a vehicle for
change in the South African press, Skjerdal finds some use for public journalism especially
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where the press faces growing antagonism for the way it reports politics. (This aspect will be
revisited in the concluding chapter.)
Washington Post executive editor Leonard Downie is among the many critics of public
journalism and he challenges both the methods and the motives of public journalism: Downie
says:
Too much of what is called public journalism appears to be what our
promotions department does, only with a different kind of name and a
fancy evangelistic fervour.43
And the ombudsman at the Washington Post, Joann Byrd agrees:
The goals of civic journalism can be accomplished without compromising
journalism’s important principles. It does not help the community or the
paper to have the paper acting as a booster or as champion of its own
agenda. Communities always need a paper that can stand back, take

the long, broad view of the conflicts and the possibilities and avoid,
in service to the whole community, taking sides.44
The aims and objectives of public or civic journalism correspond in some
ways to the objectives of developmental journalism with its focus on agenda setting
and community upliftment but there are serious divergent principles. Developmental
journalism focuses on nation building and the role of the media in developing countries. It has
its origins in the New World Information and Communications Order movement driven by
UNESCO in the 1970s and its central theme was that the national media could be used by
developing countries to build themselves. The media has a role in nation building. But in most
cases, the objectives were overlooked by developing countries who preferred to interpret it as
a way of controlling the national press and this was where the developmental theory and the
developmental practice was on a collision course. Civic journalism is a return to the aims of
developmental journalism, but instead of the media being used to push the government’s
agenda, it is used to push the people’s agenda. Civic or public journalism can be described as
an experiment to “democratise the media” and making the media responsive to the needs of
the community.45
A broad spectrum of media theories and models have been canvassed here with a view
to providing options for the press in South Africa to be distinctly different to the authoritarian
controls imposed elsewhere in Africa. The history and tradition of freedom of the press in
Africa has for the most part been a legacy of oppression and censorship marked by
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authoritarian government controls. Journalism is a hazardous occupation in most African
countries and the environment is hostile.
In 1980, about 90 per cent of black Africa’s daily newspapers were either government
owned or controlled by the government or a government corporation in at least half of the
nations of Africa, as of 1980, no privately-owned or commercial press of any kind exists. This
is either through the actions of government or a lack of investor capital and finance.
Wilcox points out that most of the newspapers in Africa are directly under the control
of the information ministries of the various countries and of the 38 independent sub-Saharan
nations, 14 nations have only one daily newspaper while five nations − Chad, Gambia,
Lesotho, Swaziland and Rwanda − have no daily newspapers.46 Nigeria has a law under which
journalists can be prosecuted if they publish anything that could bring public officials into
disrepute, notwithstanding that the reports which they write may be true.
Uganda considers itself to have a relatively free press by African standards. It has in
place a constitutional guarantee of the right of access to government information. But in
practice, freedom of the press is a myth. The national press is government controlled and
stringent limitations are imposed in an effort to muzzle the press. Journalists are also routinely
arrested on flimsy charges as a way of intimidating and stifling a vigorous press. And in
Ghana, the national constitution protects freedom of expression, which theoretically affords
some guarantee of press freedom yet the country’s libel laws are flexible to the point where
the state is allowed to arrest and punish journalists for criticising the government.
Kenya, Zimbabwe and Zambia all protect freedom of speech in the constitution but in
all three countries, journalists have been jailed for sedition, libel and defamation. Military
rulers in Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the Gambia have rejected court rulings and suppressed
press coverage by executive decree.
In Botswana, the government keeps the state-controlled media in place with onerous
censorship legislation similar to the Section 205 legislation that was so viciously used by the
National Party during the apartheid years in South Africa.
And, any attempt to emulate the Indonesian pancasila model of the press is fraught with
dangers for the transformation of the print media in South Africa. Despite the dubious appeal
of some aspects of commitment to the upliftment of national ideology, it is a restrictive and
oppressive system in which cronyism and corruption flourishes with impunity.
The unrealistic demands of government and the influence of the military and Soeharto
placed an onerous burden on the investigative role of the national press. For all its lofty
intentions of working in the national good, the Indonesian press was hobbled and allowed
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much of what was bad and corrupt in government to flourish because the role of the media
was not that of keeping the public informed and keeping government honest.
Constitutional directions
At the heart of South Africa’s transformation to a new democracy is the country’s new
Constitution and Bill of Rights. Freedom of expression and freedom of the press is guaranteed
under the provisions of the Constitution. For this reason it is timely to consider the rights to
free speech and a free press.
Section 16 of the South African constitution provides for freedom of expression:
Section 16. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which
includes: (a) freedom of the press and other media; (b) freedom to receive
and impart information and ideas; (c) freedom of artistic creativity; and (d)
academic freedom and freedom of scientific research.
And it further states:
(2) The right in subsection (1) does not extend to: (a) propaganda for war;
(b) incitement of imminent violence; or (c) advocacy of hatred that is
based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement
to cause harm.47
Constitutional Court directions
A suggestion that some sort of limitations upon the freedom of the press would not be out of
place was raised by the president of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, Justice Arthur
Chaskalson. In an address to the Commonwealth Press Union’s biennial conference in Cape
Town in 1996. Justice Chaskalson pointed out that South Africa was engaged in a brave
struggle to establish democracy.
He warned that the difficulties in the way of obtaining that goal were very real and
should not be underestimated in a country with a history of denial, deprivation and
oppression.48
He argued that there was in place a framework for democracy in a constitution that
guarantees open government and fundamental rights but added “we must breathe life into that
framework, give substance to the rights that are guaranteed, and establish a culture of
democracy”.49 The press will be intimately involved in that process, Justice Chaskalson says,
and so too will the courts. And, he warns that the two will sometimes clash. What do we mean
when we talk of the freedom of the press, he asks and then proceeds to answer:
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Do we mean that the governments ought not to interfere with the press
through legislation or other means designed to curb its activities and
secure a compliant press? Or do we mean more than that; that the law
should also recognise the special role of the press in a democratic society
and allow it the space and freedom that it needs to fulfil that role?50
Justice Chaskalson concedes a free press is an indispensable pillar of democracy and
he says there can be no doubt that the law should be sensitive to the importance of a free and
independent press, and in particular, to the needs to protect it against government actions that
threaten such independence. But he queries whether the press should be privileged by the law
and, if so, in which respects he asks, because it is a complex and much more difficult
question.
By illustration, Justice Chaskalson points out those journalists who are particularly
concerned to protect their sources almost at all costs, and rightly so. But what is to be done
where the information sought from a journalist is needed for the investigation of a serious
crime? Justice Chaskalson says:
This is a frequent bone of contention in South Africa where journalists
invariably refuse to provide such information to the police. When that
happens the media tends to portray the conduct of the police or the
prosecuting authority in attempting to obtain such information as being an
invasion of a universally recognised right, yet the converse is true, for
almost all countries have and enforce laws requiring such disclosures to be
made. 51
In the past the South African courts have adopted a fairly rigid and strict approach to
refusals by journalists to reveal their sources. Even during the social unrest, riots and protests
that swept the country in 1976, it was often unnecessary for the police to demand that
journalists reveal their sources. Many white South African journalists, reporters and
photographers rode shotgun with the police patrols into the riot-torn townships and in this
cosy relationship journalists would be provided safe haven and easy access to police accounts
of the unrest.
In exchange, photographers would hand over their photographs so that police could
more easily track down community leaders whom they described as agitators. This is an
aspect that would in all probability be denied by the liberal white English press. It is,
however, a situation that was not uncommon, whereby the press in many cases colluded with
the police.
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But there were times when some journalists refused to comply and refused to disclose
their sources. South African courts have always held that such material is not privileged and
that the press has no immunity against search warrants or subpoenas.
However, in post-apartheid years this has been somewhat relaxed because under the
present constitution it is not yet clear what the implications of the constitution will be on this
issue or whether, in fact, it will result in greater protection being given to the press against
subpoenas and search warrants than has been the case in the past.
Justice Chaskalson says information in the hands of journalists is not necessarily
confidential information and he says that confidential information is not necessarily
privileged information, pointing to other relationships in our society eg “priests, doctors,
psychologists and others who are often recipients of confidential information yet their
interests are subordinated to the overriding principle that the public interest requires the
prosecution of crime and the co-operation of all people to be able to give material evidence
needed for a successful prosecution”.52
It is in this direction that Justice Chaskalson raises the complexity of freedom of the
press − freedom which must be pointed out is still freedom within bondage, there is nowhere
to be found absolute press freedom − especially in the context of a struggling and developing
nation coming to terms with democracy:
There can be no doubt that attempts to procure information from
journalists in order to mount a criminal prosecution gives rise to sensitive
and difficult issues ... I raised the question, not to answer it, but to
illustrate the complexity of according special rights to the press. Press
freedom cannot be seen in isolation; it impacts on other rights and interests
and has to be balanced against them. The problem, as far as the law is
concerned is according to what principles, and how, should the balance be
achieved ... Rights are never absolute and press freedom is no exception to
this rule. Press freedom does not entitle journalists to trample upon the
dignity and privacy of others; a constraint that some journalists and
newspapers are reluctant to acknowledge.53
Despite constitutional guarantees on press freedom, the media in South Africa has
continued to face difficulties when reporting on matters of national importance. Assaults on
journalists have become common place, increased pressure from political parties intent on
influencing the media and repressive legal provisions have all contributed to the difficulties
confronting the media when attempting to report or comment on the news.

153

Hazards and limitations

Issues of confidentiality and the protection of sources remains a major hurdle with on-going
legal action setting the limits of confidentiality for the media and defining the role of
journalists. A case in point is the efforts of the Directorate of Special Operations who
subpoenaed editors of The Cape Times, Reuters news agency, Cape Argus, Associated Press
news agency, Die Burger, South African Press Association, and the South African
Broadcasting Corporation to hand over all photographs, video footage, notes and transcripts
pertaining to meetings, gatherings and demonstrations of an anti-crime and drugs vigilante
group, PAGAD, in Cape Town. Five senior members of the group People Against
Gangsterism and Drugs faced charges of murdering a leading gang boss involved in the drug
trade.
Cape Times photographer Benny Gool refused to testify for two reasons: first because
of his profession, it conflicted with constitutional guarantees on freedom of the press and
would compromise him as a journalist if he were to reveal his sources. Secondly, Gool feared
for his life.
He complained that witnesses in this particular case were “being killed left, right and
centre”, police were forcing him to testify under threat of prosecution while not even
affording him any security.
The South African National Editors Forum (SANEF) objected and argued that the
subpoenas were in breach of an agreement reached with the ministers of justice and safety and
security as well as the national director of public prosecutions. The undertaking recognised
the need, under appropriate circumstance, to protect media sources and information.
SANEF chairman Mathatha Tsedu described the dilemma:
We go into situations where we present ourselves as journalists and people
allow us into these situations because they know we will respect their
confidentiality. If we are called to testify, then we may as well be police
consultants.54
The simmering feud between the press and government dramatically raised the levels
of mistrust and animosity with the South African National Editors’ Forum expressing growing
concerns and fearing that the relationship had gone beyond a tolerable and accepted point and
fearing that it could damage South Africa’s young democracy. This led in 2001 to an historic
meeting of the editors forum and Mbeki and his Cabinet to try and resolve their differences.
Tsedu, as chairman of the group, put the case for SANEF:
We feel there’s a fundamental misunderstanding of the role and the current
state of the South African media, and its ability, for various reasons, to
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fully and accurately reflect the transformation process. This is a pity,
because the truth is, South African editors do not disagree with President
Thabo Mbeki’s definition of press freedom.55
Tsedu debunked government complaints of media bias and misrepresentations,
pointing out government inadequacies in communicating policies and programs and “an
inclination to resort too easily to media bashing when failures and mistakes are reported”.
And he called for a more transparent and open administration:
At the administrative level, the core problem is poor communication
between government and the media. There is a gap between our
expectations of each other and the reality. Journalists need but often don’t
get quick responses and access to the right people at the right time. The
problem is exacerbated by poor performance of government media liaison
officers as well as a lack of understanding by some of them of the basic
tenets of journalism and how the media works.56
And, in a provocative note, Tsedu chided the government:
In the end, the expectation of both ordinary members of the public and
government on what the media in South Africa can deliver, must take
cognisance of the economic environment in which we operate. It would
indeed be foolhardy for a government hell-bent on a capitalist market
system to expect the media that operate in that environment to deliver or
operate on the basis of an agenda that is essentially socialist.57
Promoting free expression
The Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI) is a South African-based non-governmental
organisation dedicated to opposing censorship, and promoting the rights to free expression
and access to information. It was formed in January 1994 following the merger of two
organisations involved in campaigning for freedom of expression during the apartheid years,
namely the Campaign for Open Media and the Anti-Censorship Action Group. The FXI also
established the Media Defence Fund to sponsor freedom-of-expression court cases on behalf
of media representatives who are not able to afford the legal costs. An analysis of the cases of
censorship handled by the FXI in 2001-2002, pointed to the following trends:
•

Censorship is on the increase: Censorship is definitely on the
increase, with more and more limitations on freedom of
expression becoming increasingly apparent.
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•

Public and private sector censorship on the increase: Not only
is censorship taking place at the level of the state; there is
increasing number of cases involving private sector censorship,
especially company censorship of employees.

•

Recourse

to

apartheid

legislation

becoming

more

commonplace: Public and private sector bodies are making
increasing use of the legislation and practices of the former
government, where apartheid legislation that is still on the statute
books is invoked to effect censorship against journalists and
ordinary citizens.
•

New censorship provisions being introduced in legislation:
Apart from invoking apartheid legislation more and more often,
there is also increasing evidence of the democratic government
introducing censorious provisions in new legislation.58 At the
World Conference Against Racism, held in Durban during
September 2001, concerns were raised that new legislation would
be used to suppress the media. A proposed Interception and
Monitoring Bill that would empower the police, the national
defence forces, the intelligence agency and the secret service to
“establish, equip, operate and maintain monitoring centres” aimed
at combating terrorism in the wake of the September 11, 2001
attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York, also raises
concerns for its impact on press freedom.

In April, 2002, the South African government announced plans to form an independent
Media Diversity and Development Agency (MDDA) to stimulate the development of
community media. The proposed Bill was attacked by the Print Media Association of South
Africa which feared it could lead to political interference in the media. [The Newspaper Press
Union (NPU), established in 1882, restructured itself on December 1, 1994 to become the Print
Media Association (PMA).] Brian Pottinger, as spokesman for the PMA, said:
The proposed mandate for the MDDA is broad, which then creates a legal
entity with much wider powers of investigation, lobbying, intervention and
advocacy in virtually every area of publishing The wider the powers for
MDDA, the more it sets itself up as a target for potential sectarian political
appropriation … there is a definite threat to press freedom if the draft
document is adopted as it is.59
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Shaun Johnson [1997], at the time editor of The Argus and later group managing
editor, also takes up the question of press freedom in his editorial column and asks:
Will the government and, more importantly, the people, accept and
endorse a definition of media freedom akin to that of the world’s
successful democracies in the late 20th century, a definition which is
predicated on a delicate but vital balance between true independence and
genuine responsibility. The question is not banal, as recent exchanges
between media and the government have shown. There remains a
philosophical chasm over what precisely constitutes “acceptable
criticism”, and what is subversion or treason.60
Johnson says two extreme positions have developed between the government and the
press and somewhere in between rests the case for a new relationship between press and state.
On the one side the government accuses the national press of disloyalty and antagonism on
the other side the media accuses the ANC government of showing signs reminiscent of the
previous government.
Simplistically, one side of the coin shows a situation whereby the corridors of the
fledgling state power (where portraits of apartheid’s architects still hang in less travelled
thoroughfares), many in government grow impatient with the demonstrably imperfect media
– but conclude that the failings are not the result of human frailty and the frustration of
gradually transforming inherited institutions, but of conspiracy “to undermine the
transformation”, in the angry words of President Mandela.
For their part, some in the media quickly equate signs of growing adversarialism
between media and their government with a return to the pre-1990 era: ‘The ANC is behaving
just like the Nats did’ school of thought. The conflict cocktail is potentially wicked, but both
positions are wrong.61
Johnson denies there is a widespread conspiracy plot against Mandela’s black
government although he concedes some individuals in different quarters of the media may be
pursuing such an agenda. And he rejects the notion that legitimate ANC government with its
commitment to freedom of the press and its guarantees under the constitution can be
compared to the illegitimate government of P.W. Botha with its many restrictive rules and
regulations. As for the future, Johnson accepts that there are at the present time crucial
philosophical differences between the government’s and the media’s definition of what
constitutes proper media freedom. He says:
We can predict that these questions, among others will form the nub of
the great debate (on the freedom of the press): Will it be accepted that as
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long as private sector media remain within the law, the appropriateness of
the content they choose to publish must be judged by consumers and
advertisers, not government?
•

Will it be accepted that criticism of government, even particularly
robust criticism, does not necessarily indicate disloyalty to the new
democratic society, but is part of the duty of a free media?

•

Will it be accepted that a view sincerely expressed, even if it is wrong,
has the right to be expressed?

•

Will it be accepted that while the private media should and do have a
role to play in nation-building, this should never be equated with blind
loyalty?

•

Will it be accepted that media groups are sincere about rectifying the
internal skewness of the apartheid era, and are doing so voluntarily?62

These are valid questions that need to be addressed and it forms the nub of the hard
decisions facing both the media and the ANC-led government and Johnson concedes there
could be endless permutations to the questions on this basic list and without offering
suggestions, he says his own view of the debate on the future role of the media is that it can
only proceed if a greater degree of trust is achieved on both sides – trust in the sense that the
integrity and bona fides of the protagonists are accepted.
This is a crucial issue and while it remains vitally important in the debate, it is far from
an easy option. Grudges and hatreds still run deep in the South African press and while it may
be disputed and denied in various quarters, there is still much distrust between black and
white staff journalists. In addition, attempts to implement an affirmative action program
generates further problems when black journalists are promoted ahead of better trained and
more qualified or more experienced white journalists. This adds yet another dimension of
animosity to the argument. But it is a situation that demands to be settled.
At a different level, we hear from the inquiries of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission’s hearings into the media [1997] that there is still much anger and antagonism
between white and black journalists in South Africa, there are complaints from black
journalists that the transformation process is moving too slowly, and that the agenda of the
metropolitan newspapers still remain by and large the same rather than adapting to the change
that has enveloped the country.
On the other hand, newspaper managements in the English press have reacted with
disappointment, claiming they were moving towards change at a faster pace than at any time
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in the history of South African newspapers. For the Afrikaans press, however, there seems
little movement and even less inclination to embrace editorial and managerial changes in
keeping with the changing face of South Africa. They remain an ethnic, Afrikaner press. It is
the reluctance of the Afrikaans press, more than any other group, that refuses to move with
the changing times and that could provide the impetus at some stage for the ANC government
to implement a media policy that despite the guarantees of free speech under the constitution,
will force the Afrikaans press, among others, to perform its role in society in a way which not
only discards the baggage of the past but also projects in a manner that is socially responsible.
While the Independent Newspapers group have made rapid and far reaching changes
in terms of staff development and training, reshuffling the senior managerial levels of the
group’s newspapers and the appointment of two black editors, Moegsien Williams at The
Argus and Ryland Fisher at The Cape Times and various other senior appointments around
the country, the Afrikaans press has stubbornly refused to budge − just as it also stubbornly
refused to testify before the Truth Commission hearings into the role of the media during the
apartheid years. Along this confrontational route signalled by the Afrikaans press, the future
can only be described as gloomy and it paves the way for action from a government that is
already totally disappointed with the role of the national media.
At an address to the Foreign Correspondents Association meeting in Cape Town on
November 19, 1996, President Nelson Mandela raised the issue of a (journalism) “profession
that is itself struggling to redefine its role in a changing society”. And he stresses that the
media debate, which will continue for many years, “will inform the actual practice, as the
Fourth Estate transforms itself to become part of the new South Africa both in word and
deed”.63
And he praised the foreign correspondents for bringing with them decades of
experience about the role of a free press in a democracy and the necessary tensions that exist
between government and its relationship with the media as well as the dangers that would
certainly befall government and media alike if such a free press were to cease to exist.
Mandela confirms the ANC’s commitments to a free press despite his confrontations,
especially with senior black journalists whom he accused of not doing their jobs properly. It is
an altercation with serious overtones which Mandela dismisses as “creative and healthy
tension between government and the media that is natural in a democracy”.
In light of this confrontation, Mandela restates the desire and commitment of the
government to a free press. He says:
Firstly, media freedom is not, has not been, and will never be under threat
in our country as long as the ANC is the majority party in government.
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This is not merely because of the provisions of the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights. It is in the selfish interest of the ANC that we should have
probing, robust and critical media. We cannot change society in a
fundamental way; we cannot change the state in a fundamental way, if we
do not have a questioning media to expose the weaknesses of our inherited
bureaucracy, security forces, judiciary, and indeed the new politicians
themselves who can easily be corrupted by power.
Secondly, freedom of speech is enshrined in our basic law of the land, as
elsewhere in the world, not as an exclusive right belonging to this or the
other sector or individual in society. Thus, to the extent that we should
have a robust and critical media, to that extent we should have a robust
exchange of views between the media and other role-players in society ...
What should be crucial though, is that such debate should be within the
normal bounds of decency; it should not be aimed, without justification, at
impugning the integrity of any of the role players. Thirdly, in terms of
distribution, wealth and power, ownership, management and senior
positions in the media are predominantly in white hands. And we would
not be talking about South Africa if this did not impact on the mindsets of
the actors in the media industry ... and our hope is that this (media) debate
will inform the actual practice, as the Fourth Estate transforms itself to
become part of the new South Africa.64
It should be remembered that Mandela is regarded as a moderate within the ANC and
whether this direction will stand the test of time after the ANC’s 50th national conference
held at Mafiking from December 16, 1997 where Deputy President Thabo Mbeki was
formally elected to replace Mandela as party leader when the 79-year-old president stepped
down. Mandela remained the elder statesman and President until the following general
election in 1999 when he was formally replaced as president by Mbeki.
It was a critical test for the media and it is a moot point whether the direction in
which Mandela steered the media debate will be eventually overtaken by a more sinister and
tougher hand on the role of the media. Consider for example the message from Mbeki to the
Cape Town Press Club in 1994:
The media could guarantee its own freedom by helping to ensure that
South Africa's fledgling democracy became a strong and stable society.65
The implication is clear that Mbeki does not support the way in which the national
media exercises its role within the bounds of press freedom and subsequent attacks on the
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press have made his views clear. It is a stance that does not find favour with a new
government struggling for a more sympathetic review of its efforts, aims and directions and
Mbeki is one of the main ANC leaders who has been constantly sniping at the print media. At
an address to the Organisation of African Unity, meeting at Sun City, in 1994, Mbeki also
criticised the South African media for not doing its job properly and peddling unfair stories
about the African National Congress, called for a change in the predominantly white
ownership of the media and then lashed out at the big four foreign news agencies for
maintaining a Western bias.
But the pledge towards freedom of the press and freedom of information runs deeply
in ANC statements. The then secretary-general of the ANC, Cyril Ramaphosa, was another
high-ranking party official to confirm this objective under any circumstances in a statement to
commemorate National Press Day on October 18, 1995 to mark the 18th anniversary of the
darkest day in the history of South Africa’s print media. On October 19, 1977 the apartheid
government forced the closure of the World and Weekend World, detained their editors,
banned 17 organisations including the Union of Black Journalists, and opened the way for
wide-scale harassment of journalists. It was also an appropriate opportunity for Ramaphosa to
echo party sentiment.
In a statement issued on behalf of the party, he said: “On the 18th anniversary of this
day, the ANC wishes to make a simple pledge: Never again. Never again can a government be
allowed to act in such a manner to silence dissent. Never again should the state be empowered
to flagrantly violate people's rights to information and alternative views. Never again can we
allow a government to suppress the freedom of the media. As long as the ANC is a leading
force in government – indeed, as long as the ANC exists – we will continue to resist any
attempts to undermine the independence and integrity of the media”.
If a week is a long time in politics, then the prudent question to ask is whether this
political ideology still holds true. The party rhetoric remains firm to the commitment, yet
there are signals that indicate that the ANC is committed to a free press but the free press
which it has inherited is perhaps not the monster that it envisaged and may be looking at ways
in which it could be “reformed”.
If there was ever any doubt that the media is facing a crisis of confidence, then
President Mandela made it absolutely clear in his opening address to the ANC conference at
Mafiking where he accused the media of peddling lies aimed at undermining the
achievements of his government. Mandela said:
We must refer to the issue of what has, in the general vocabulary, come to
be known as ‘deliver’. Our opponents make the false accusation, based on
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a refusal by the mass media to tell the truth, that since our election into
government in 1994, we have failed to deliver. The reality is that the
masses of our people’s experiences that: the formerly oppressed are now
governing themselves, the homeless are being housed, those without
access to modern power are now getting electricity, millions are no longer
condemned to travelling long distances to fetch unhealthy, unprocessed
water for personal and domestic use, the formerly oppressed are gaining
access to free and adequate medical services, many among the very poor,
including women and children and the elderly, who had formerly been
excluded now have access to welfare benefits, people who had been
forcibly removed from their land are regaining their land, and greater
numbers of people are gathering access to education at all levels.66
And it was President Mandela’s unusually harsh criticism of the national press that
made it unequivocal and clear there were serious problems ahead for the press. He said South
Africa had to confront the fact that the bulk of the mass media in our country has set itself up
as a force opposed to the ANC.
In a manner akin to what the National Party is doing in its sphere, this
media exploits the dominant positions it achieved as a result of the
apartheid system, to campaign against both real change and the real agents
of change, as represented by our movement, led by the ANC. In this
context, it also takes advantage of the fact that, thanks to decades of
repression and prohibition of a mass media genuinely representative of the
voice of the majority of the people of South Africa, this majority has no
choice but to rely for information and communication on a media
representing the privileged minority.
To protect its own privileged positions, which are a continuation of the
apartheid legacy, it does not hesitate to denounce all efforts to ensure its
own transformation, consistent with the objectives of a non-racial
democracy, as an attack on press freedom. When it speaks against us, this
represents freedom of thought, speech and the press – which the world
must applaud!
When we exercise our own right to freedom of thought and speech to
criticise it for its failings, this represents an attempt to suppress the
freedom of the press – for which the world must punish us! Thus the
media uses the democratic order, brought about by the enormous sacrifices
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of our own people, as an instrument to protect the legacy of racism,
graphically described by its own patterns of ownership, editorial control,
value system and advertiser influence.
At the same time, and in many respects, it has shown a stubborn refusal to
discharge its responsibility to inform the public. Consistent with the
political posture it has assumed, it has been most vigorous in
disseminating such information as it believes serves to discredit and
weaken our movement. By this means, despite its professions of support
for democracy, it limits the possibility to expand the frontiers of
democracy, which would derive from the empowerment of the citizen to
participate meaningfully in the process of governance through timeous
access to reliable information.
I know that these comments will be received with a tirade of denunciation,
with claims that what we are calling for is a media that acts as a “lapdog”
rather than a “watchdog”. We must reiterate the positions of our
movement that we ask for no favours from the media and we expect none.
We make no apology for making the demand that the media has a
responsibility to society to inform. Neither do we doubt the correctness of
our assessment of the role the media has played in the last three years. All
of us know too much about what happens in the newsrooms. In any case,
we have to confront the product of the posture of the media daily. This
daily product, reflected in all the media of communication, stands out too
stark in its substance to allow us to doubt the conclusions of our analysis.
Conference will have to consider what measures we have to take. In
addition to what we are doing already, to improve our communication with
our population at large.67
By dragging up the ugly ghosts of the apartheid past and comparing the role of the
national press with that of the National Party as the architects of black oppression, Mandela
highlighted growing impatience and dissatisfaction with the direction of the press from the
black government. He is signalling to the national conference a desire for change in the way
that news is handled. And he points to the privileged position of the white population in
general and the white-controlled press in particular as it represents a privileged minority.
It follows earlier calls from more radical elements within the African National
Congress for at least attitudinal change in the press. Mandela stresses that while there is a
need for change, the government is not seeking a compliant press, they are asking no favours
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and expecting none from the media. But it is his argument that the media’s “stubborn refusal
to discharge its responsibility to inform the public” and its “vigorous disseminating of
information to discredit and weaken” the efforts of the new government despite its
professions of support for democracy that needs to be addressed. Mandela appears to adopt a
threatening approach, stating “we have to confront the product” and he urges the conference
to “consider what measures [we] have to take”. Some measures have been outlined in this
chapter.
Despite Mandela’s sharp criticism of the South African press to the national conference
of the ANC, the vague nature of his demands for change should not be interpreted as a signal
for a crackdown on the free flow of information or censorship. Statutory guarantees are
already in place. Mandela’s attack on the press at worst indicates impatience and
disappointment over the role and direction that the press has taken in post-apartheid South
Africa. He sees need for a different approach to the way news is covered, especially as it
pertains to the government. Similarly, this thesis explores the need for change.
Summary
This chapter has considered a variety of media models that will go some way to facilitate a
workable solution and new directions for the press in post-apartheid South Africa. The
challenge is not so much to find the workable solution but to speed up structural and
attitudinal transformation in what is perceived to be a slow-to-change profession. Media
theories and directions or options for change abound with many offerings coming from
academic theorists, newspaper editors and journalists who fear for the future of the industry as
well as the major commissions of inquiry.
It is a desire for change both at the managerial and proprietorial levels that needs to
be established. For as long as there remains a perception at the upper levels of the industry
that change is unnecessary or undesirable, the implementation of any new media policy will
struggle for acceptance. It is unnecessary for media owners to offer direction and guidance to
the editors of their publications. All they need do is select like-minded personnel who need no
encouragement to maintain the status quo.
The choice then remains whether to proceed along the libertarian course that has not
been without its failings or to find some common ground in the developmental model with its
risk of a guided democracy, or in a combination of “public journalism” and aspects of the
developmental model. At issue is whether the emerging democratic South Africa, with its
economic, social and developmental problems akin to many Third World countries, can
continue to cope with what remains essentially a sophisticated and developed Western

164

libertarian press system or whether there is some justification to incorporate developmental
media options into a struggling media system.
The implementation of any new media system is not without risks and would require
cooperation from all the major participants, ie. media institutions, journalists and government.
The manner in which the system would impact on how information is treated and the
reactions of both the media and the political leaders would, by definition, be fraught with
dangers and difficulties. It is worthy of research as a topic on its own. This chapter has
canvassed some avenues that lend themselves as candidates for consideration.
Chapter Five also reviewed the strident criticism from senior members of the
government members who accused the national press of orchestrating a hidden agenda aimed
at destabilising the efforts of the government. While tension between government and press is
not unusual, in post-apartheid South Africa racial tension still run deep and the criticisms take
on an added dimension. With the press largely the preserve of whites, there is a perception
within the black government that all is not well with the way the press has coped with the
transformation. Old racial tensions and prejudices lurk just below the surface on both sides.
The next chapter will examine the significant difference between the ways black and
white journalists perceive the emerging post-apartheid press. It is seen in the context of the
South African Human Rights Commission's inquiry into racism in the media as well as two
commissioned reports that emerged from the inquiry, the MMP monitoring project’s
investigation into racial stereotyping in the media, The News In Black and White, and Claudia
Braude's report set against methodological concerns from several academics.
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CHAPTER SIX
RACISM AND THE MEDIA
Introduction
The South African political landscape is scarred with torrid examples of institutionalised
racism but it does not necessarily mean that the South African press has a mortgage on racism
in the national media. During the apartheid years, many white journalists supported the
system directly; others tolerated it as a normal way of life and benefited from the privileges
that it afforded. The worst of them spied on their newsroom colleagues and told lies about the
political situation. Many were willing volunteers who spread disinformation, government
propaganda and intolerance while others knowingly or even unwittingly sowed the seeds of
prejudice and practised selective censorship by remaining silent or refusing to report on police
brutality and government excesses. It was these sinister practices that attracted the attention of
the Truth and Reconciliation Council to consider the role of the press during the apartheid era,
and the South African Human Rights Commission to the commissioning of the Braude report.
Chapter Six reviews the Braude report and its recommendations as well as its shortcomings. It
also considers racism in the media and its impact on the South African press.
Opposing discrimination
Anywhere in the world where there is ethnic conflict, racial hostility, and terrorism linked to
extreme nationalism and where these issues feature strongly on the news agenda, there will be
some journalists who will perpetuate the political propaganda for racist groups so that the
media becomes a weapon of intolerance. The United States has failed to come to grips with
the problem since the early 1800s. Europe has battled the same problem for nearly as long and
in India, sections of the media are still accused of stirring racial intolerance and hatred that
has led to deadly riots in Gujarat.1 De Beer [2000] puts the South African struggle in context:
Racism is not a gestational condition; hatred is learned and reinforced by
example. The United States has struggled with the issue of racism for
centuries. In the last 50 years most specifically, the country has dealt with
a history similar to that of South Africa’s. If, in the course of over half a
century, racism has not been overcome in the US, how can it be expected
of a country whose own emancipation is barely six years old? The final
vote, the ultimate ballot, is the one that is cast when we observe other
people and act or react according to conscience. 2
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The International Federation of Journalists in 1996 launched the International Media
Working Group Against Racism and Xenophobia. It was a modest effort to foster better
understanding among journalists and other media professionals about intolerance and racism
issues and the aim was to raise awareness and promote changes to strengthen quality in
journalism. Aidan White [2002], the general secretary of the IFJ, warns that universal notions
of press freedom are compromised anytime journalism is subject to political manipulation.3
White points to the outbreak of conflict in 1992 in the Balkans, genocide in Rwanda in
1994, and simmering conflicts based on religious rivalry and ethnic differences in the Middle
East, Indonesia and the Indian subcontinent “as a reminder that human rights law, journalistic
codes and international goodwill appear to count for little when politicians make violence and
hatred the benchmark of community relations by fuelling public ignorance and insecurity
through compliant media”:
The problem of intolerance is a constant threat to good journalism
anywhere in the world. Racial violence in urban communities in North
America and Europe often characterised by incidents of terrorism the rise
in influence in the West of extremist right-wing political parties, the reemergence of anti-Semitism in many countries of Eastern and Central
Europe, widespread religious intolerance in parts of Africa, Asia and the
Middle East, and widespread prejudice and discrimination against national
minorities on the basis of language and social status, are all part of the
global landscape of daily news reporting. In this complex news
environment journalists are sometimes casual victims of prejudice and
political manipulation. Too often, ignorance and a lack of appreciation of
different cultures, traditions and beliefs lead to media stereotypes that
reinforce racist attitudes and strengthen the appeal of political extremists.4
During the mid-1980s, Teun van Dijk investigated how the British and Dutch media
portrayed minorities in the press and tried to explain exactly how the press was involved in
the continuity of the system of racism by analysing content in many thousands of newspaper
articles. Van Dijk [1991] draws on earlier research from the United States where racism in the
press mirrors the South African experiences and by association the European press which in
many instances resembles the press in North America. And from more than two decades of
research on the relations between the press and ethnic minority groups or immigrants, the
findings from earlier research are unambiguous. Van Dijk concludes:
Most blatantly in the past, and usually more subtly today, the press has
indeed been the “foe” of black and other minorities. As a representative of
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the white power structure, it has consistently limited the access, both to
hiring, promotion, or points of view, of ethnic minority groups. Until
today, its dominant definition of ethnic affairs has consistently been a
negative and stereotypical one; minorities or immigrants are seen as a
problem or a threat and are portrayed preferably in association with crime,
violence, conflict, unacceptable cultural differences, or other forms of
deviance.5
Decades later, these same criticisms remain largely unanswered by the South African
press. During the apartheid years, racism in the press was hardly unexpected but following the
transformation post-1994 complaints of racism continue to surface despite efforts by media
managements to slowly change the composition and structure of the newsrooms. Black and
coloured journalists face a difficult task convincing a sceptical audience that the negative way
in which black people are often portrayed by the media and the constant critical focus on
government failings and mistakes is not a sinister motive to undermine the efforts of black
people but simply the media doing its job of scrutinising and keeping the government honest.
Berger [1997] says one of the challenges in dealing with racism in South Africa
today, from a media point, “is to get beyond the all-too-obvious” and he warns that there are
important challenges to overcome as South Africa continues to wrestle with issues of
intolerance. This includes growing hostility to the influx of illegal migrants from other
African states coming in search of political asylum or economic survival and competing for
jobs in a decreasing market, the importance of free speech and the need to guard against hate
speech towards the unwelcome migrants:
We are still some way from sorting out our own racial tolerance and
reconciliation, and the role of journalists therein, and we now face this
new issue of a majority, as opposed to a minority, practising a kind of
racism against a group of “outsiders”. There are important challenges to
overcome. But there is reason for optimism: Racism exists in South Africa
but it no longer rules.6
Berger’s optimism holds well, and it was against this background that the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission in 1998 included the national media in its scrutiny of racism. (See
below.)
It is not only in the newsrooms of South Africa where black journalists face up to the
old demons of discrimination. In March, 2001, Tyrone Seale, a coloured reporter for the
Afrikaans newspaper Die Beeld was refused access to the congress of the extreme right-wing
Herstigte Nationale Party (HNP) because of the colour of his skin. The party secretary
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explained that “only Afrikaners are welcome […]. In our definition of Afrikaner you have to
be white”.7
Van Dijk’s research of racism in the UK and Dutch press in the mid-1980s that the
press has become “less blatantly racist, but that stereotypes and the definition of minorities as
a ‘problem’ or even as a ‘threat’ was still prevalent, in particular in the popular newspapers,
while minority journalists, especially in Europe, continue to be discriminated against in
hiring, promotions and news assignments.”8 Van Dijk cautions that from the conclusions and
interpretations reached, it became clear that the theoretical framework in which his results are
to be interpreted is vastly complex. It is this complexity in defining what constitutes racism
that led several South African academics to criticise the efforts of the TRC investigation and
Claudia Braude’s report dealing with racism in the South African press. (See below).
Defining racism
In discussing the concept of racism, Michael Banton [1970] turns to a useful definition by
Ruth Benedict, one of the earlier writers on the subject in her book Race and Racism (1940)
in which she concludes that “racism is the dogma that one ethnic group is condemned by
nature to congenital inferiority and another group is destined to congenital superiority”.9 It is a
definition that no longer suffices and remains a vastly complex issue that continues to intrigue
mass communication researchers as much as sociologists.
Earlier attempts by Pierre van den Berghe (1967) similarly struggled for a workable
theory and he points to conflicting research dating back several decades.10 Van Dijk [1991]
concedes that research of racism in the press is complex and difficult and in 2000, Arnold de
Beer raises the problems inherent in properly assessing the nature and content of racism in his
criticism of the Braude report (see below). Though, De Beer notes:
Racism in South Africa, as a social condition and reminder of apartheid, is
in the hearts and minds of many citizens. Whether race, sex, class, or
religion is the defining factor of hate-based relations, the ultimate
responsibility is in the hands of the citizens.11
This is a view widely echoed among South African media commentators and
academics. South African author and researcher H.C. Marais [2002] says the nature and
history of South Africa virtually guarantees that racism will remain a sensitive issue for many
decades to come and he sees a need for the term racism to be defined “in a way that would
make it clearly identifiable and thus offering means to combat it more readily”.12 As a means
towards a definition, Marais finds it necessary to revisit social scientific theories and research
on the origins and dynamics of racism:
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What exactly is meant by the term race (and racism) is, however, not very
clear. It seems to be used interchangeably with concepts such as prejudice,
discrimination, racialism, ethnocentrism, and xenophobia. Apart from its
signalling function, such an undifferentiated use blunts the concept and
makes its consequences potentially more harmful. Alternatively, the
meaning of the concept is primarily found in its political connotations and
functions, rather than in its interpersonal and social dynamics. In this way,
the term racism has become a powerful emotive weapon that can be used
against opponents − hardly any defence against it is possible.13
A similar search for answers in social anthropology theory comes from Jansen van
Rensburg who believes South Africans have been inundated with information on racism over
the years but are struggling to cope with a definition:
Since most participants to the racism discourse assume an understanding
of the concept of racism or are very vague when they refer to the concept
at all, some clarity is called for.14
The clamour for a definitive analysis of what constitutes racism and the argument that
a definitive analysis is needed before racism can properly be addressed comes mainly from
white middle-class South African academics. For black South African journalists making
allegations of racism and bias in the media, there are no calls for academic definitions of what
constitutes their grievances. They see it in their pay packets; it is evident from the lack of
career advancement, poor job opportunities and the way in which mainly white agenda setters
continue to determine the focus of what constitutes news. For black journalists, this need for a
definition of racism before the problem can be addressed can be compared to a poison victim
foaming at the mouth being denied any first aid until paramedics can decide what poison was
administered. The need is for immediate action against perceived wrongs and the details can
be worked out later.
For Steven Friedman, a South African author and white journalist on the Mail &
Guardian, the issue is clear and the aims of the Human Rights Commission (see below) to
discuss racism in the media with journalist is a step in the right direction:
That there is racism in the media is blindingly obvious. The task is to get
people to talk honestly about it so that we can find ways to end it. In this
and other fields, we need a discussion which can prompt willingness to
look inward and acknowledge both the problem and the need to address
it.15
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This thesis defines racism from the black South African perspective that Friedman
notes is blindingly obvious and not from the pedantic academic theorisation. The concept of
racism for black South Africans is a life experience and it is manifested in their pay packets,
lack of career opportunities, homes without electricity and running water, a policeman in blue
uniform with a vicious dog ejecting you from the beach because it is an area designated for
the use of white people only, even having to sit upstairs on a public bus because downstairs is
reserved for whites only.
The concept of racism for black people [and this term is used inclusively for all nonwhite people including coloureds, Asiatics and Malays] is manifested in being refused entry
to schools or universities exclusively on the basis of skin colour and being forced to live in
poverty, fear, and degradation – not in the subtle nuances of academic sociological definitions
A Human Rights perspective
The South African Human Rights Commission in November 1998 announced a major inquiry
to investigate allegations of racism in the South African media and called for submissions.
The inquiry was initiated after the Black Lawyers’ Association and the Association of Black
Accountants requested an investigation in terms of the Human Rights Commission Act. The
two organisations claimed two newspapers – the Mail & Guardian and The Sunday Times –
had violated the fundamental rights of black people.
As a precursor to the inquiry, media industry representatives were asked to comment
and an independent consultant, Claudia Braude, was appointed to compile a report. A nongovernment organisation, The Media Monitoring Project, was also mandated to analyse
language, idiom, and images portrayed in the media.
A selection of media was monitored for a six-week period from Monday, July 12,
1999 to Friday, August 20, 1999. Overall 1430 items were monitored during the period.
Overall results analysed and major trends that emerged in the analysis were discussed.
The monitors were all post-graduate students and first-language speakers monitored
all the languages of the publications. The conclusions were published in its final document
The News in Black and White: an investigation into racial stereotyping in the media. The
findings were that racial stereotyping was still common in the media.
The monitoring and analysis have suggested that the conventional notion
of news of Africa and the legacy of the apartheid era ideologies and
discourses all functioned to produce harmful portrayals of both black and
white people.16
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In general, the MMP found that there was a tendency for racism and racial
stereotypes to occur as “bad” news stories and that crime was the most reported item. Of 14
categories monitored, MMP found seven categories supported racial stereotypes. These
included: blacks are criminals; blacks are irrational; people act according to their ethnic
identity; black lives are unimportant; all whites are racist; black foreigners threaten South
African society; blacks are incompetent and incapable. The MMP also found that the dignity
of black people was not always respected in news stories. Also, the use of graphic images of
violence and dead bodies was more common in cases that involved black people.
Reports of coloured people were characterised by gangsterism, rape and violent
crime. In its findings, MMP said:
It is doubtful whether any of the major media are intent on any form of
racist brainwashing. However, the values and attitudes common in our
society are no stranger to those who staff the news media and it is often
only when stereotyping and prejudicial reporting is pointed out that the
media become aware of the patterns which they have established. The
media need to recognize their power, their freedom, and their
responsibility and to explore ways in which they can challenge the
damaging effects of racism and fight against the narrow perceptions which
are an unfortunate inheritance of colonialism and apartheid.17
However, media attention on the rampant crime rate was not an unrealistic
expectation. Close scrutiny of such a sensitive post-apartheid issue, however, was
uncomfortable for the government of national unity. The diversion of opinion was sharp.
Newspapers argued they were simply doing their job. The government view of the press
simply doing its job differed. It was a “hatchet” job aimed at destabilising the efforts of the
black government, giving the impression of incompetence. However, excerpts from official
police crime statistics for the period dating from 1994−200 show an alarming trend (see table
next page).
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Crime category

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

Murder

19672

19131

18639

17709

17878

17371

15456

15054

Attempted

20100

19257

20906

20516

21380

20671

20134

21207

62877

60354

50414

50406

63432

70810

79561

87610

Other robbery

23380

27367

38088

37841

44001

50878

61468

65766

Rape and

29399

33139

36137

37905

35105

36022

37556

37711

murder
Robbery with
aggravated
circumstances

attempted rape
Grievous assault

147551 155576 162758 166775 164510 177162 192750 188961

Common assault

137303 147500 149126 146174 142763 155410 181056 182110

Malicious

89314

92602

95379

93088

92375

96307 100681 103495

47308

46482

47346

48402

46442

48845

51828

46600

No data

No data

9790

9869

11181

11609

11191

11186

damage to
property
All fraud,
forgeries
Carjacking

Source: Crime Information Analysis Centre SA Police Service

While the statistics for serious crimes such as murder, rape, robbery with aggravating
circumstance and carjacking show serious social problems and a police force under pressure,
the figures are not further reduced under racial categories but it is an issue that is hardly
defended. Gangsterism and crime is rife in the black and coloured townships. In mitigation,
however, that was always the case during apartheid as well as post-apartheid.
The national media’s intense scrutiny of crime post-apartheid was bringing the reality
of the criminality out of the townships and on to the agenda of middle-class white South
Africa that was previously insulated from these excesses by among other things a resolute
police force and the effects of the Group Areas Act. The reporting of township crime was
largely neglected and ignored by the mainstream press and was taken up selectively by
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newspapers such as The Cape Herald, Post, Sunday Times Extra, Rapport Extra, World and
Sunday World the township papers aimed at blacks and coloureds.
Braude’s report, Cultural Bloodstains also criticised sections of the media for racial
intolerance, bias, publishing stories which depersonalises black lives, promoting the
stereotype that Africa was about violence, disaster and poverty. In doing so, Braude elicited
scathing criticism from both media and academic interests. The findings of both reports were
pilloried and widely disputed. The Star described the Braude report as a load of psychobabble.18
Arrie De Beer [2000] head of the communications school at Potchefstroom
University, Pretoria, says Braude’s report reads “more like an essay than an objective report”,
its findings are narrow and difficult to follow, not because of its contents, but its lack of
coherence.19 Further, De Beer argues that racism in the new South Africa, as elsewhere in the
world, cannot sufficiently and functionally be addressed (let alone eradicated) without
objective, scientific definitions, analyses, distinctions and approaches.
Serious credibility issues arise, on the part of both Claudia Braude and the
SAHRC itself, as to whether the question of racism in the South African
media has been addressed at all.20
Guy Berger, Lynette Steeneveldt, and Keyan Tomaselli advanced academic argument
that criticised the South African Human Rights Commission’s terms of reference and
methodology. Tomaselli found the terms of reference vague and “resulting in research
approaches which failed to entirely understand the nature of the media, how news is made or
how theory is applied”.21 Berger argued similarly that the reports by Media Monitors and
Claudia Braude were fundamentally flawed and failed to understand fully the operations of
the media. Berger was critical of the methodology used in both reports and raised the issue of
lack of audience involvement and the subjectivity of the reports although he conceded the
core finding of both would have been the same even with different methods.
The methodological criticism of Tomaselli and Berger questions the way in which the
SAHRC arrives at its findings that the media is racist. But they concede that even if the
methodology were different the results would be the same. Berger described both the Braude
report and the MMP report as deeply flawed and very weak on the conceptual understanding
of what constituted racism, what racism-free media was and what was required to get there.
This is not, of course, to say there is no racism in the SA media only to say
that the SAHRC studies cannot be trusted to have found it.22
Berger presented a critique of both the Braude report and the MMP report to SAHRC
commissioner Jodie Kollapen in Johannesburg and described the Braude report as over-
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zealous and subjective. Berger saw the MMP report as too selective and found it ignored
genres such as advertising and sport. He also criticised the propositions and manner in which
a particular article was used to support or negate a proposition, saying it would impact on the
conclusions ultimately drawn. Berger saw as the way forward the need to develop a paradigm
where race was not the single or the most important defining factor. He mentioned the
philosophy of the Black Consciousness Movement in arguing for the creation of a new South
African identity.23
In a separate paper titled Seeing past race. The politics of the Human Rights
Commission into racial representation in post-apartheid South Africa, Berger reinforces his
argument of “seeing past race”. Berger states:
Yet, despite heightened racial divisions… the [South African] society
retains the avowed aim of becoming non-racial. What is needed is some
sense of its progress towards the objective, and indeed what is meant by
this objective whether it is a race-free goal, or one that remains but
without the racialism. In post-apartheid South Africa, a study of race and
the media serves as a barometer to assess these issues, and to try and
understand the complexity of moving from racism to “mere” racial
differentiation, and to race-free status. The “seeing past race” reference in
the title of this paper is intended to highlight whether contemporary South
Africa continues to be visited by the ghosts of its past, or whether the
current players can see their way past and beyond race issues towards
achieving a non-racial society.24
Berger follows up his argument with a critical analysis of the conceptual assumptions
in the final report of the SAHRC inquiry into racism in the media. In the abstract, he states:
The flawed conceptualisations plus the generalised character of the
findings are of little help in assisting the momentum of eradicating racism
in South African media, and for linking race transformation to issues of
class, gender, sexual orientation, and xenophobia. This article identifies
the problems as a race essentialism and a racism relativism, and argues
instead that journalists need the concept of racialisation in order to change
their reporting. The argument upholds the desired role of the South
African media as one that contributes to a non-racial, as opposed to a
multi-racial society.25
Berger introduces admirable arguments for a non-racial society and for a media that
looks past race; however, it is a pedantic argument. Ten years after the collapse of apartheid
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there still remains serious divisions in South African society and the ghosts of the past are still
haunting many of the previously disadvantaged. Many journalists would argue the same
problems still exist in the nation’s news rooms.
For black journalists, the argument does not revolve around methodology. It does not
hinge on the findings of racism in the media. The complaints from the black journalists
encompass more than racism. It is about job satisfaction, career paths, education and training
facilities and it is about equitable wages as much as it is about opening up the national media
to reflect a more diversified agenda from a different set of information gatekeepers.26
It includes reservations that despite changes to almost every fabric of post-apartheid
South African society, change in the face of the national press has been too slow and too
limited in its scope. Black journalists are demanding a bigger slice of the media action. This is
also largely the view favoured in the joint submission from the five black editors:
We believe that the fundamental problem with the media in our country is
that they are largely controlled by white people. For instance, the majority
of top editors are white, which results in a predominance, by sheer force of
numbers, of the white viewpoint in our national public debate. This in turn
leads to the anomaly where the views of the white minority predominate
over those of a black majority. It is no secret that even in the corridors of
political power, the views of white editors do tend to receive inordinate
attention.27
Notwithstanding, the Human Rights Commission used these two reports as a basis for
issuing an interim report, and issued 36 newspaper and broadcast editors and reporters with
subpoenas requiring them to testify in response to the findings of the Braude report. It was an
action that was fiercely opposed and it sent shockwaves through national newsrooms where
freedom of the press had only recently been enshrined in the Constitution. It raised fears of
government interference, with the editor of the Mail & Guardian Phil van Niekerk contesting
the subpoenas as a violation of the press’s right to operate free of government intervention.
After some negotiations the subpoenas were eventually dropped and several
journalists agreed to assist the commission by giving evidence at the hearings.
It was against this background that the SAHRC moved to instigate a formal inquiry
into racism in the South African media. Since its inception, the SAHRC investigation was
embroiled in controversy, hampered by reluctant participants and became bogged down in
criticism from both white and black journalists, editors and foreign correspondents who had
been summonsed to give evidence. Noble in intent, the mandate of the SAHRC was to
consider aspects of the South African media, to investigate and report on the observance of
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human rights, and to take steps to secure appropriate redress where human rights have been
violated.28
The Commission’s interest in the media was not new. Earlier efforts, in 1996,
involved hosting seminars and workshops for journalists on the role of the media in human
rights. Workshops were held in Durban, Johannesburg and Cape Town with limited success.
Plans were also under way to sponsor an annual award for the most enterprising journalist in
human rights. The chairman of the SAHRC explained the interest in the media:
We have consistently recognised that the media were an important ally in
the execution of our mandate.29
In explaining its objectives, Human Rights Commission chief Barney Pityana said the
commission was mindful of the implications of this exercise for press freedoms but the
SAHRC was hopeful that a study of racism in the media “would heighten the sensitivity of all
South Africans to the issue of racism and will ensure a greater respect for freedom of
expression”.
The commission hoped to achieve five basic aims with this inquiry: (a) to generate
debate and dialogue among South Africans about the meaning and incidence of racism in
South Africa; (b) South Africans need to be informed about racism if they are to be able to
address it; (c) that the media will benefit from closer scrutiny so that they can understand
how their work is viewed by South Africans so they can sharpen their capacity to be
responsive to the needs of the people and reflect the true nature of South African society; (d)
that through dialogue, South Africans will learn, understand and have the facility to use race
theory and analysis; (e) the nature of the inquiry will engage all South Africans in seeking
common solutions to racism and to constructing a society free of racism.
Interest in the inquiry was high and five media institutions responded after the draft
terms of reference for the inquiry was published. The Institute for Media Studies in South
Africa, Print Media South Africa, Daily Dispatch, Times Media Ltd and Naspers responded
with concerns over the terms of reference.
Submissions to the inquiry
A wide spectrum of views across South Africa’s troubled racial divide were entertained at the
inquiry which heard from 80 people – journalists, academics, human rights groups, and media
watch groups – over eight days of testimony that touched on various concerns about
mainstream news coverage of black people, Jews, Muslims, and Indians, as well as the way in
which major media corporations have moved to integrate and diversify their newsrooms. The
testimony from black journalists and white journalists was often contradictory and dissimilar,

181

reflecting largely the historical racial divide between whites and blacks dating back to the
apartheid era. In short, black journalists maintained that the pace of change was slow or
almost non-existent.
It would be useful to compare some of the concerns to the submissions from black
journalists and white journalists to show the wide gulf in the way racism or the lack of it in
the South African media is perceived. It would also be helpful here to review some of the
submissions to the inquiry, especially to compare this major disparity between how black
journalists and white journalists assessed what is a major national problem.
Submissions from black journalists
A significant response came from a group of five black editors who submitted a joint
statement that highlighted three basic areas where they determined a need for action within
the media industry affirmative action, media diversity and training. The group included Mike
Siluma, editor of the Sowetan, Charles Mogale, editor of the Sowetan Sunday World, Phil
Molefe, editor-in-chief of SABC News, Kaizer Nyatsumba, then editor of the Daily News,
and Cyril Madladla, editor of the Independent on Saturday. The group was also concerned at
the slow pace of change within the media industry and complained that the power structures
remained largely unchanged from the days of apartheid. White editors continued to have most
of the control and it led the group to the opinion that there remained a predominance of a
white viewpoint in the national debate.
The group expressed “deep concern about the generally slow pace of transformation
in the media” and complained that six years after the country’s inaugural democratic
elections, the media have remained largely unchanged” with black Africans constituting a
minority in key decision making positions.
At the heart of that transformation agenda, which we presume every
reasonable and fair-minded South African supports, was the need to level
the playing fields so that none of us could, on the basis of skin colour, our
gender or station in life, have the exclusive power to dictate the fortunes of
others. Specifically, the establishment of a new, non-racial South Africa
implied the dismantling of the exclusive control of our white compatriots
over the levers of power at every level of society, including the media.30
And breaking from their white counterparts, the joint submission of the black editors
supported the work of the inquiry, opposed the submissions from a number of white editors
who suggested that while there were shortcomings in the transition from an apartheid era
media to full participation much was being done to eradicate this disparity. It was a view
rejected by the black editors.
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Yes, there is racism in the media, much of that racism is in a subliminal
nature, which would explain why some of those who have protested too
much have been so bold as to say they do not believe it is an issue
deserving of this public scrutiny which will result from the HRC hearings.
Quite often one has to be black and African with all the hurt and indignity
of the past uppermost in one’s mind to recognise racism.31
In a separate submission Nyatsumba and Mdladla covered similar ground and
highlighted shortcomings and difficulties they experienced as newly appointed black editors
trying to broaden the target of a newspaper that was catering only to a specific audience. Both
expressed a desire to use their newspapers “as vehicles for freedom of expression”
particularly in the Letters to the Editor pages, tackle staff changes and to make changes in the
news content of the Daily News and the Independent on Saturday. Khulu Sibiya, editor of
City Press, also aligned himself with the statement of the five black editors and argued for
more “black run newspapers to tell the black story”.32
In a radical departure from the mainly negative comments from black journalists,
Cyril Ramaphosa, the chairman of Times Media Ltd, focused mainly on their flagship
newspaper the Sunday Times. Explaining that in the few years since the demise of apartheid,
the Sunday Times increased circulation by one third and the bulk of its readers were now
black Africans and there was a growing trend of attracting black readers. Ramaphosa
concluded that the Sunday Times would not be attracting such a growing number of new black
readers if it was propagating racism. Not only were sales up, the Sunday Times had also
increased its coverage of black people and has recruited senior black staff from whom it
would be inconceivable to see the advancement of racist material. Ramaphosa said:
For our part, we are quite content to stand by our record of exposing
corruption and criminality in all sectors of the society; of assisting with the
growth of a culture of tolerance and debate; of respect for the constitution;
of investment in literacy and education … of portrayal of role models in
our society. We are particularly proud of not being beholden to any
political or social party but only to the interests of our readers, the citizens
and the constitution.33
Nomavenda Mathiane, of Business Day, and Lakela Kaunda, editor of the Evening
Post, drew attention to the hardships experienced by black women in the media, the
difficulties of initiating change in the newsroom that was not at all democratic. Mathiane
states that the newsroom remains a lonely place for a black woman. Kaunda urged newspapers
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to develop a more patriotic journalism while combating racism at every level in the
newsroom, saying of the Evening Post:
We are a paper that sees itself not only as a watchdog but also as an
instrument of social development.34
Phil Molefe, executive editor at the SABC, said the national broadcaster was
conscious of its role of reflecting South African society in all its complexities and was
meeting the challenges by introducing training programs for staff and establishing a database
of black commentators with skills in political and economic commentary.
There is a similarity of views expressed by the black journalists that reflects similar
concerns tabled to the Truth Commission. Dennis Cruywagen and Willie De Klerk accused
senior executives of the Argus of shaping the news agenda to appease the government
struggling to contain growing anti-apartheid protests and rioting on the Cape Flats.35 In a
particular episode of violence where these two “coloured” journalists were at the scene where
police shot dead three children in an incident later to become infamous as the Trojan Horse
Affair, and the newspaper preferred to publish the sanitised police version of events rather
than the graphic photographs of Willie de Klerk and the report of escalating police brutality
and detentions without trial written by staffer Dennis Cruywagen.
We thought too that our newspapers would not doubt our integrity and
publish our accounts of what was really happening in our country. After
all, or so we thought, the English newspapers with their liberal traditions
and opposition to the National Party and apartheid, would be just as
shocked as we were and even pained and angered. We thought, too, that
these newspapers would support us. I am afraid to say we were terribly
wrong.36
Submissions from white journalists
Arrie Roussouw, editor of Die Beeld, told the commission he could understand the concerns
expressed by the group of black editors but stressed that despite its history as an Afrikaner
newspaper there was now a firm policy on racism which was reflected in their editorial
comment. Roussouw said Die Beeld had welcomed the historic political changes of the 90s
and was no longer aligned to any political party or ideology.
We only associate ourselves with the truth and the interests of our readers
and we would endeavour to ensure freedom of the press, a multi-party
democracy and human rights as well as economic freedom and a peaceful
and prosperous South Africa.37
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Roussouw's comments were echoed by other executives of the Afrikaans publishing
giant Naspers including Johann de Wet, of Rapport who said the Afrikaans newspaper was
mindful of its racial mindset and sensitive to the pain and hurt caused by racial insensitivity.
For this reason, De Wet said Rapport welcomed scrutiny and was striving to present the news
“comprehensively, objectively, accurately, and reliably”. Editorial comment and opinions
were expressed in a “fair and balanced way”.
Eben Domisse, editor of Die Burger, cautioned against political control of the press
and warned of the pitfalls of "the tyranny of the majority". Domisse said Die Burger was
committed to “the values of a multiparty democracy; a market orientated economy with social
conscience, press freedom, and the advancement of Afrikaans and minority rights".38
From representatives of the English press, John Scott, editor of the Cape Times, said
the newspaper was undertaking a number of initiatives to highlight the political and social
changes in South Africa. Scott said the Cape Times had “only recently” become more
conscious of racism and has had to deal with racial tension within its own newsroom. Scott
said the Cape Times “had for many years considered itself anti-apartheid and a bastion for
liberal values but for many years the Cape Times never had a policy of employing black
journalists in any great numbers until the 1990s.39
Tim du Plessis, of the Citizen, told the commission that the newspaper which was
established to prop up the apartheid system was now also committed to change. Peter Davies,
of the Sunday Tribune, said his newspaper was made aware that it was not catering to its
African readers in its news coverage. The newspaper devised a five-year plan to remedy the
problems as well as developing policies to improve the content of the newspaper so that it
reaches its target.
In a corporate submission, the Independent Group told the commission its editors are
all issued with a Mission Statement on appointment. It requires them to “further the cause of
racial cooperation and to pursue a balanced policy calculated to enhance the progress and
welfare of all sections of the population in your region”. The Independent Group has an
affirmative action policy and has developed an employment equity plan as required by law.40
Human rights inquiry: findings and recommendations
The South African press was not immune to the climate of racism that enveloped South
Africa as a result of apartheid and to this end, the SAHRC report into racism in the media
found that the media reflected a persistent pattern of racist expressions and concluded that the
South African media “can be characterised as racist institutions”.
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As a means to overcome this, the commission suggested that the Institute for the
Advancement of Journalism and the South African National Editors’ Forum develop and offer
racism awareness training course for journalists at all levels of the industry and media schools
and technikons offering journalism courses were urged to include course modules on racism
in the media. Both the IAJ and SANEF took up the challenge and since publication of the
report have introduced several training courses at various levels to improve the quality of
journalism.
As an added incentive to quality journalism, a number of national awards and
scholarships were introduced. Independent Newspapers and Johnnic also introduced training
courses and internships for young black sub-editors. The lack of black sub-editors and the
controlling role of sub-editors as important gatekeepers of information in national newsrooms
was a major cause for concern.
Independent Newspapers went a step further and appointed executive journalist
Elizabeth Mary Barrat, as group editorial trainer. Barrat’s brief was to train a new generation
of young people as sub-editors. In March 2004, 22 trainee sub-editors started the 12-month
course. They were selected from a total of 900 applicants.
In all, the report made 11 findings with corresponding recommendations. As agreed at
the commencement of the hearings, there were no findings in respect of individual journalists,
publications or titles.
Sloppy and bad journalism, it found, should not be confused with racist reporting. It
found that self-regulating mechanisms in the media industry were not effective and that the
press ombudsman did not believe racism was a concern in the press and suggested that the
Code of Conduct of the press ombudsman needed to be tightened.
For those who expressed fears that the outcome of the inquiry posed a threat to press
freedom, the commission moved to allay those fears by encouraging ongoing public debate
about the role and responsibility of the media in a democracy.
We believe that all who have interest in human rights would recognise that
a totally unregulated system, with weak self-regulation, would ultimately
undermine the integrity of the media. Public scrutiny is good for the health
of the media in a democracy.41
Among others, the commission urged more diverse media, called for a review of
current codes of conduct in various news organisations, focused on language diversity in the
print media and expressed concern about the small number of black sub-editors and women in
senior management positions.
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It recommended both formal and non-formal training institutions and called on media
management to address the issue of training and recruitment of black staff, especially the
training of black sub-editors.
The media should strive to ensure greater representivity in the newsrooms
through recruitment and training in accordance with the letter and spirit of
the Employment Equity Act. The South African Human Rights
Commission will monitor this by examining the equity plans of the media
industry.42
From the start, the SAHRC stressed that the objective of its report was to raise
awareness among media professionals and the public as a whole about the role and
responsibility of the media to develop a non-racial human rights culture.43
The report is not intended to label the media or portions of it as racist and
thereby to discredit it, but rather to challenge it to be aware both of their
power and their responsibility. The aims of this report, however, is to
provide an opportunity for the media to evaluate itself … The media
should, both individually and through their collective bodies, actively seek
ways of ridding their pages, bulletins, and programs of harmful racist
stereotypes.44
Summary
The focus of this chapter was on racism in the South African press, the need for a definitive
analysis and efforts towards eliminating discrimination and prejudice in the national
newsrooms despite the complexities of finding common ground. Against this background of
racism, the South African Human Rights Commission turned its attention to the press. A
chronology of the main developments leading up to the hearings conducted by the
Commission shows it was a lengthy exercise in opening up the media to scrutiny and public
debate. Some historic milestones include:
1997: SAHRC chairman Barney Pityana co-writes opinion piece in South Africa's largest
selling daily newspaper, accusing the media of practising “subliminal racism by creating a
negative image of Africans”.
1998: Black Lawyers Association and Association of Black Accountants of South Africa
requests SAHRC to investigate the Mail and Guardian and the Sunday Times newspapers “for
alleged violations of fundamental rights of black people”. SAHRC later formally resolves to
“conduct an investigation into racism in the media in general”.
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1999: July-August: Researchers hired by SAHRC monitor more than 1,430 news articles
over a six-week period and concludes that there are incidents of racism and stereotypical
reporting. Braude says research “sought to go deeper than the manifest, literal message and
the content to consider the overall symbolic coded meaning at play”.
November: SAHRC, using research work, issues its interim report. Pityana says that media
has been known to play a “negative role in race relations by being used as a vehicle for hate
speech … and for hostile and racist messages”.
2000: January: SAHRC writes to editors on specific allegations made in the interim report.
SAHRC says the response from the media by January 10 was not satisfactory.
February 11: SAHRC issues the first of its subpoenas, compelling news organisations and
institutions to attend hearings into allegations of racism in the media. More than 30 subpoenas
were issued in following days. Subpoenas demanded attendance at hearings and “to testify on
your product's policies and guidelines on the reporting of, and commenting on, national and
international events, which impact on racism and possible incidents of racism”.
February 14: The ruling African National Congress government supports the SAHRC
decision to issue the subpoenas. Opposition parties criticise the decision, saying South
Africa's international image was under threat.
February 18: The editor of Business Day says subpoenas “could be interpreted abroad as
South Africa's version of the McCarthy-era witch hunt in the United States” and could
threaten foreign investment.
February 21: SAHRC meets South African National Editors Forum to reconsider the
subpoenas and other issues relating to the commission’s inquiry.
February 23: The Financial Times, in London, reports that the SAHRC has withdrawn a
subpoena against the newspaper for its 1996 article headlined “South Africa moves on
Moslem militants”.
February 25: SAHRC meets group of influential national newspaper proprietors.
February 28: SAHRC announces it will withdraw subpoenas but reserves right to reissue
them during hearings if warranted.
March 6: SAHRC hearings begin.
Chapter Six highlighted from an analysis of the submissions to the South African
Human Rights Commission inquiry and responses to the reports and findings, how sharply
divergent views are challenging the redevelopment of the South African press. The questions
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at stake remain: Where is the starting point for change? Are the criticisms of continued white
control and domination of the press valid?
However flawed the Braude report, it makes fundamental and valid observations
about the discrepancies that continue in the South African press and the need for new
directions. Braude also offers a number of useful options to implement the process of change.
De Beer also makes useful contributions to the argument and is joined by Berger and
others who are of the opinion that the question has moved on from whether racism really
exists in the newsrooms to what can be done to assess and address it. As De Beer [2000]
points out, nowhere in the Braude report is there a definition of racism or an underlying
standard by which racism is determined. Braude found that the South African media
“reflected a persistent pattern of racist expressions and content of writing that could have been
avoided” although the report made clear it found “no evidence of the mainstream media
indulging in blatant advocacy of racial hatred or incitement to racial violence”. De Beer, for
his part insists that reparations, if needed, in the national press, can only be concluded with a
proper definition of what constitutes racism and how best to limit its influence.
The SAHRC inquiry was useful in that it exposed the national press to painful
scrutiny and afforded the widest spectrum of views on the press to be put. Black editors told
about subtle forms of racism; news reports and editorials that subconsciously portray blacks
as corrupt and incompetent, a general suspicion by whites of black incompetence, and an
unwillingness to listen to their opinions.
The editors also questioned whether previous affirmative action efforts had relegated
blacks to the role of mere tokens and they urged stronger efforts to advance the careers of
blacks in the industry. Several white editors acknowledged at the SAHRC hearings the
existence of these racial stereotypes in the national press.
In outlining the aims of the Human Rights Commission, chairman Barney Pityana
outlines five basic aims that can provide the framework for change in the press in postapartheid South Africa. But, there is no shortage of theories, plans or conceptual frameworks
for the future of the South African media. Chapter Seven will focus on new directions and
options for change from the political, media and academic spheres.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
NEW DIRECTIONS AND OPTIONS FOR CHANGE
Introduction
This chapter considers a new role for the press in the democratic new South Africa by
evaluating contributions towards the transformation of the press from a variety of sources
including the Reconstruction and Development Program, journalists, academics and political
enterprises.
A role for the press
In the Western world, the role of the press is not only to inform the public and represent the
public interest but also to scrutinise government policies and to act as public watchdog. The
press takes on an adversarial role with an emphasis on discussing matters of controversy
rather than fulfilling the goals or wishes of the government.
A Third World approach to the role of the press however, takes a different tack. It is
directed towards issues of national development, nation building and public education. Some
would argue that this developmental journalism concept is fraught with danger and a short
step away from an authoritarian system of media control despite its good intentions. Chief
among the complaints against a developmental media policy is that it can continue
indefinitely as long as the government is assured of control of the levels of political
discussion. Sussman describes this aspect of developmental journalism as “concentration by
objective journalists on the news, the newness of developments in education, agriculture,
industry, communications, and applied science, developments that leaders hope will
eventually produce economic success and secure a sense of national unity”.1
Media use for developmental purposes may not yield the expected results and
depends to a large extent on Third World journalists who are sympathetic to the concept of
developmental journalism. Lent expands on the concept with further inter-related concepts
and the growing swing in most of Asia to a “guided press” and developmental support
communication.2 Asian governments continually state that because most of their societies are
emerging democracies, they need time to develop their institutions. During this initial period
of growth, stability and unity must be sought, criticism must be minimised and the public
faith in governmental institutions and policies must be encouraged. Media must cooperate,
according to the guided press notion, by stressing positive, development-inspired news, by
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ignoring negative societal or oppositionist characteristics and by supporting governmental
ideologies and plans.3
What constitutes news in the Third World can be radically different from what
constitutes news in the libertarian Western model. In the developing nations, there is a need
for the national media to operate within stipulated state laws. The national press cannot be
allowed to be the “enemy” of the state. In the developing nations there are nation-building or
slanted news values and concepts that guide the gatekeepers of information in their selection
and evaluation of news. Nasser suggests that to understand how Third World news concepts
differ from or are similar to those in the West, it is advisable to first consider the Western
news model, which he describes as “the concepts of objectivity and speedy dissemination in a
free marketplace of ideas where journalists act as ‘watchdogs’ over the government and are
essential to an open and democratic society in the West”.4
The theoretical foundation of developmental journalism is traced to the United
Nations’ efforts to facilitate a New World Information and Communications Order (NWICO)
and was enthusiastically embraced by Third World and notably south-east Asian countries
(see Chapter Five).
Eric Loo, who heads the Graduate School of Journalism at the University of
Wollongong, agrees that in recent times development journalism has been used to muzzle the
press:
The principles guiding journalistic practice is national unity and social
cohesion, nation building. I mean to outsiders these terms are just glib
terms but in the context of Malaysian society those are real issues. So, to
observers these principles have been abused by the state. So it is not the
question of whether development journalism is supportive of government
policies or whether it is another form of uncritical journalism. I think the
question is whether that concept has been abused, misunderstood and used
to intimidate the press to compel the press to write according to what
government leaders or the state will define to be the proper way to report
on national issues. 5
Loo’s comments mirror the writings of Merril [1970], Gunaratne [1980], Hachten
[1987] and expand on earlier pioneering work by Siebert [1953]. The function then of
development journalism was not merely to keep watch on government actions but to promote
the development of the country. See Appendix E for the philosophy of ASEAN national press
systems.

195

Hemant Shah [1996] suggests that because of the negative connotations suggested by
the term developmental journalism, a preferable descriptive term could be emancipatory
journalism to facilitate recognising a role for journalists as participants in a process of
progressive social change. Emancipatory journalism then “encourages journalists to abandon
the role of neutral observer while reporting in a manner that is thorough, deeply researched
and historically and culturally grounded, and that promotes social change in favour of the
dispossessed”.6
Johan Galtung and Richard Vincent7 [1992] offer a 10-point proposal for a
development-orientated news media:
1.

Whenever there is a reference to development, try to make it concrete in
terms of concrete human beings. Thus they urge journalists to relate
development to people they should report people as subjects, rather than
objects or victims of need (pages 151-152).

2.

A development-oriented mass media should focus not only on the
economics of development but also on military political and cultural
aspects. The reasoning is that developmental journalism has to focus on
more than economics because all these factors − military power, political
power, cultural power etc. − have to do with development in one way or
another and journalists should try to get people to reveal their inner
agendas. (pages 154-155).

3.

Mere economic growth data will never do without accompanying dispersion
data. Journalists must look at the income of the bottom 50 per cent or 10 per
cent as well as the top 10 per cent or one per cent when making analysis
(page 156).

4.

Focus on relations, not only difference; and do so not only within countries
but between countries (page 156).

5.

A development-oriented press would do well to focus on the totality of
concrete life situations (page 159).

6.

A development-oriented press would never forget the dimension of
democracy. Democracy can only function when there is a free flow of
information between people, the system and the media (page 162).

7.

There is always the possibility of reporting about development, not critically
in terms of problems, but constructively in terms of positive programs.
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Success stories may contribute to a general sense of optimism that can
generate more momentum for democracy and development (page 162).
8.

Allow the “people” to talk. To some extent community cable channels in
the United States allows this to happen. It means giving a voice to the
people to generate “an enormous amount of visions”. Thus people get a
voice as experts in line with the seven preceding ideas (page2 163-164).

9.

Go one step further and let the people, to some extent, run the media. It
means giving people some media control. Letters to the editor and op-ed
pieces have space constraints. The next stage is to let people write and
produce much of the material of the newspaper, thus enabling them to
provide their own knowledge, experience and expertise. The extent to
which this happens can become a criterion of mass media quality in a
country (page 164).

10.

Let people run more of society, and then report on what happens.
Developmental media should report more on what popular movements are
doing not only their successes but their failures too (pages 164-165).

Gunaratne finds it hard to disagree with Galtung and Vincent’s 10-point proposal and
together with Shah’s thinking on emancipatory journalism, agrees it “provides a reasonable
framework to understand the essentials of the concept of developmental journalism”.8 It is
also a framework, according to Gunaratne, “that will enable us to compare developmental
journalism with its new-born cousin that calls itself broadly public journalism”.
Somewhere between the developmental media theory and the concept of a socially
responsible media lies the future direction of the South African print media as it emerges from
the apartheid era. The emphasis firstly should be to reorganise the editorial structure of the
national newsrooms. This incorporates managerial structures that include the widest spectrum
of society and more importantly, the agenda setters − copy tasters, sub-editors, and sectional
heads from news editors to fashion editors, literary editors, foreign editors and others who
have the role of copy selection that remains still mainly in white hands − need to
accommodate a wider spectrum and a diversity of views. And it is likely the government will
have to offer directions in the national interest that will allow a meaningful editorial reshuffle
of the gatekeepers of information if the national press is reluctant to speed up the
transformation process.
In what previously was marked by a curious mix of libertarian approach to the print
media, especially by the English language press, there is now a need for an overhaul as the
focus of the news is directed to a growing new audience. But it is a complex dilemma.
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Managerial and editorial direction must incorporate the needs of this new and rapidly
expanding middle class as well as shifting the balance of editorial content that appeals to a
much broader market in a non-racial society.
Mainstream newspapers are trapped in a vicious cycle of balancing the needs of
advertisers who target the financially secure readership of old and the need to provide
editorial content that appeals to the broader non-racial audience the bulk of which is not so
well off. This shift in editorial content runs the risk of alienating both advertisers and old
readers, adversely affecting circulation and loss of revenue in a tight newspaper market where
profit margins are already slim and falling. In the beginning, this shift in editorial policy could
prove to be a financially costly exercise for newspapers. But it comes with the promise of
long-term benefits as the press becomes more inclusive as opposed to the legacy of the past
where the focus of the newspapers was slanted towards white readership.
The previous traditional conservative British approach to news content and form is
not the direction for the future. The role and future directions of the press, both the English
and Afrikaans language press, remains firmly on the national agenda since the historic all-race
elections of 1994, and a wide variety of different views have emerged.
Some are examined here in terms of the guarantees under the new South African
Constitution and in light of the aspirations of the Government of National Unity’s
Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP).
Directions under the RDP
Some of the lofty and sometimes vague and loosely defined aspirations for the media under
the initiatives of the RDP in the new dispensation are:9
•

An information policy that guarantees active exchange of information and
opinion among members of society, a new information policy that aims to
facilitate exchange of information within and among communities, and
between Government and society as a two-way process.

•

New voices at national, regional and local levels and genuine competition
rather than a monopoly of ideas must be encouraged.

The RDP is a government initiative to level the playing field and improve social and
economic conditions for the millions of underprivileged and disadvantaged people in South
Africa. Without the free flow of accurate and comprehensive information, the RDP concedes
it will lack the mass input necessary for success. There are 11 official languages in South
Africa, including English, Afrikaans, Ndebele, Sotho, Tswana, Zulu, Xhosa, Venda, Tsonga,
Swazi, and Pedi. The problem is further exacerbated by high rates of illiteracy. In 2003, South
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Africa estimated its literacy rate (those aged 15 and over who can read and write) at 87 per
cent for males and 86.4 per cent for females. The figures appear to be high and many would
dispute its accuracy and argue that it is unrealistically high.
Open debate and transparency in government and society are seen as crucial elements
of the Reconstruction and Development Program and for this to occur, the government needs
an information policy that guarantees active exchange of information and opinion among all
members of society.
The RDP wants the government to “encourage and develop all three tiers of the media
– public, community and private. New voices at national, regional and local levels, and
genuine competition rather than a monopoly of ideas must be encouraged”.10 However, the
infrastructure to facilitate these plans can best be described as at the planning stages at
this time of writing.
Measures must also be introduced to curb monopoly control of the South African
media, cross-media ownership of print and broadcast media must be reviewed and must be
subject to strict limitations “determined in a public and transparent manner”. Unbundling of
existing media monopolies must be encouraged both in the areas of publishing and
distribution and for the implementation of these wide-ranging measures.
The RDP suggests the implementation of an affirmative action program to “empower
communities and individuals from previously disadvantaged sectors of South African
society”. Among the initiatives suggested are mechanisms to make available resources needed
to set up broadcasting and printing enterprises at a range of levels; training and upgrading,
and education to ensure that communities and individuals recognise and exercise their media
rights. The RDP suggests government funds should be set aside for the training and education
of journalists and community-based media and further, that media institutions should be
encouraged to do the same. To ensure the free flow of information, the RDP seeks that the
Freedom of Information Act be broadened within the parameters of the new Constitution.
The RDP also states that the South African Communication Service (SACS) must be
restructured in order to undertake two important tasks; the provision of objective information
about the activities of the State and other role players, and the facilitation of the new
information policy. Towards this aim, the information arms of various ministries also have to
be strengthened, especially those dealing with reconstruction and development.
As part of a democratic information program, the RDP also sees a role for various
institutional mechanisms, among them the establishment of an Information Development
Trust made up of a variety of representatives including government, journalists, media
owners, and political parties to work out detailed criteria and methods for aiding relevant
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media enterprises. The important plank of the RDP’s new information policy: the effective
two-way communication process between Government and citizens is in need of repair
because it is ineffective and understaffed.
The national government is having difficulty getting its message out, and there is a
belief in certain quarters that the national media is if not unsympathetic to the new
government then certainly adversarial and critical to the point of causing damage to the needs
and aspirations of the African National Congress and majority leaders in the new Government
of National Unity. Much has been done to improve government communications since the
RDP was first launched in 1994, and by 2000, the SACS has developed into a comprehensive
government information agency with offices in Pretoria and Cape Town, online links,
international and national staff as well as offering media support to government missions
abroad.
At a Conference of Communicators at Arniston, Western Cape, Allister Sparks
[1995] suggested that effective two-way communication in South Africa does not exist.
Citizens must be informed, he says, if they are to make rational choices. And citizens must be
informed if they are to hold their public representatives accountable.
For Sparks, these two factors constitute democracy’s bottom line and he says that the
government, for its part, must also be aware of and responsive to public opinion if it is to
govern effectively and in accordance with the will of the people. He says:
At the moment that effective two-way communication does not exist, at
least not adequately. I believe the will to have it is there. Hence the clause
guaranteeing freedom of speech, including freedom of the media that is
entrenched in our Interim Constitution. Hence, too, the government’s
commitment to the Open Democracy Bill, which if enacted, will make
South Africa one of only 14 countries in the world with such legislation
empowering the ordinary citizen to access information about

the

functioning of all governmental bodies.11
Sparks was directing his comments in response to suggestions by the Deputy
President, Thabo Mbeki, to introduce a “Government Hour” on national television as a means
of getting the government’s message across to the nation. Sparks says it highlights a
deficiency in the state of communications between the government and the citizens of South
Africa and this in turn “has serious implications for the new democracy we are trying to build,
for an effective flow of information about the activities of government is an organic necessity
for the proper functioning of a modern democracy”.12
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He blames deteriorating journalistic standards, understaffed newsrooms, inexperience
and a downturn in economic viability of the print industry as prime factors contributing to the
inability of the government to get its message across.
This is compounded by the fact that the government does not have a media
mouthpiece of its own and must communicate through existing media channels, and this
means that the messages are “filtered through privately-owned newspapers and independent
broadcasting stations over which it has no control − and which may ignore those messages, or
get them wrong, or put their own spin on them to suit their own agendas”.13
Sparks offers no suggestion that the black government may be facing a hostile and
unresponsive media that is adopting a critical and damaging approach and that this
unwelcome direction is coming from media gatekeepers that are still a legacy of the apartheid
era. However, the question of understaffed and inexperienced newsrooms is not without
foundation. Mathatha Tsedu [1995] the political editor of the Sowetan, conceded at a Freedom
of Information seminar in Grahamstown that reporters in his newsroom were “a greenhorn
squad” and that 70 per cent of them had less than two years’ experience, two staffers in
Parliament had to cover six Constitutional Assembly theme committees, one of which had six
sub-committees every day and furthermore, the media was being used as a recruiting ground
for communications experts for the new civil service.14
Sparks offers two options available to the Government short of developing its own
newspapers to improve or facilitate two-way communication between the citizens and the
Government: (a.) Develop a highly organised, highly skilled government media liaison
structure and (b.) develop a dedicated public affairs television channel that can convey
information of national importance directly from the source to the public, along the lines of
the United States model C-Span or Cable Satellite Public Affairs network.
It is a television network that operates two 24-hour channels of coverage in the US
House of Representatives and all its congressional committee hearings and the Senate. It also
provides interviews with key political figures involved in the debates, political analysts and
visiting or overseas experts, authors of books on national and international affairs as well as
reporting major speeches both inside and outside of government.
Guy Berger, professor of journalism and media studies at Rhodes University, finds
common ground with Sparks in a need for improved government communications by
improving the Government’s press liaison capacity. For Berger, though, the government
should aim for “interactive communication with (and between) citizens rather than a purely
‘push’ model of communication”.
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This requires, firstly, that the government does not “mess with the mass media (public
or private), but rather boosts its public liaison capacity; secondly, that it improves direct
communications with citizens via existing public servants and activities. (Both these strategies
necessitate improved internal communications within government and state). Thirdly, and
most importantly, government should create an enabling environment for many more citizens
to become communicators in their own right. This entails limited media subsidies for
community-based communication, as well as the rapid development of telecommunications”.15
Berger says that in developing a national communications policy, there is no need to
reinvent the wheel because suitable proven models exist internationally and can be adapted to
suit the particular needs of the South African situation. He says:
To assess what exactly we draw from overseas has to be firmly grounded
in our knowledge of what is happening here (in South Africa), what we
want to do about it, and why. The starting point in the here and now is –
crudely – that the government is trying to upgrade the quality of life of
black South Africans, that it believes communication has an important role
to play in this, and that it has serious problems with the country’s present
communication set up.16
Against a background of cultural, education and economic diversity, Berger suggests
it would be “a mistake to see communications simply as a means to changing South Africa”
and he points out there are limits to what the government can achieve in working towards a
Reconstruction and Development Program as he puts it “that is both by communications and
for communications”. While drawing on the Libertarian theory for the development of the
media, as well as the theory of social responsibility, Berger finds favour in the model
developed in Sweden where the philosophy is that there is a governmental responsibility to
help realise the right to communicate, suggesting some type of subsidy to promote the
expansion and development of communication at different levels of society.
In South Africa this would entail the Government going further than simply using
communication (inter alia) to champion the existing Bill of Rights; to facilitating the growth
of citizens as communicators ... it moves into a different dimension, and indeed one that
squares with the Reconstruction and Development Program’s philosophy of democratisation
and civil empowerment.17 But Berger points out the difficulties for the South African
Government are many.
Firstly, he says, there is a coalition Cabinet and a commitment to national
reconciliation, which restricts government ability to effect a radical reorientation of public or
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private media. Secondly, the regulation of broadcasting is independent of government, even if
the power of the purse is still there to be wielded.
Thirdly, there is the government’s commitment to a mixed economy, which limits the
extent of government involvement in private sector communications. Fourth, there is a Bill of
Rights which also prohibits the government from interfering in freedom of expression in that
sphere.
So, the government could not, even if it wanted to, simply take over the existing
communications apparatuses and point them in different directions. Nor, fifthly, can the
government seriously set up a rival parallel system: there are scarce resources, and with the
maxim of maximum impact at minimum cost, there is no way the government can (or should)
afford to take on the challenge of getting into the mass media business.
Berger concedes the South African media is vulnerable to criticism of the quality of
its coverage, there are frustrations with the media and this has increased as frustrations with
the slow pace of transformation in post-apartheid South Africa has increased as well as the
slow pace of implementing major planks of the RDP. Government complaints about the mass
media that government affairs are ignored, downplayed or inadequately reported has some
validity and substance. Sparks takes this aspect even further by claiming that reporting
standards on South African newspapers were at the lowest he had seen in his 44 years of
journalism. South Africa’s press was demanding access to information it did not have the
resources or skills to deal with.
Sparks blamed low standards, understaffed newsrooms and an exodus of senior
journalistic talent to more lucrative jobs for what he perceives as a demise in South African
journalism and warns there are vast areas of the country, especially the former homelands that
are not even covered by the press. As an example, he said, court reporting had fallen out of
favour in newsrooms.18 And he warned that reporting that was inadequate, superficial or
simply wrong would test the patience of the regime and its commitment to press freedom. The
press, said Sparks, was the custodian of its own freedom. He warns:
If the Government moves against the press and the public applauds, we’re
done for, is the ominous warning.19
The criticism of the exodus of skilled journalists for higher paid jobs and improved
prospects overseas was echoed by the editor of the Sunday Times, Ken Owen, who said that
people who had not worked on South African newspapers in the past decade [1985-1995]
could not realise how difficult, brutal, and bruising an environment it had been. He recalled
that when he was appointed editor of Business Day, he started out with a staff of 73
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journalists and within days there were 14 resignations on his desk, all lost to Australian media
organisations.20
It is against this background then that Berger proposed several developments to
improve both the role of the media and the supply of information by the government so that
the media can operate more efficiently in keeping the public informed. In the short term, for
the media to play its role properly requires an investment in training to improve the standard
of reporting generally and more attractive staff conditions, criteria which he says the media
have been slow to recognise.
The government, for its part, can improve inefficient and slow press liaison to get its
message across quickly, accurately and in this way secure better coverage.
Government and state can also gain better coverage in the media by
increasing access to officials. Government communication needs a policy
definition about the level at which information can be released....
Maximum access may be the more advantage policy for the interests of
both the government and the media.21
And as an option for future direction, although on a modest scale, Berger points the
South African Government in the direction of the Swedish model while conceding that money
in the form of grants and loans, and management training would be crucial for this strategy to
succeed.22
The observations of Berger and Sparks highlighting understaffed newsrooms, a lack
of skilled journalists and poor editorial standards are not in dispute. These problems have
been similarly acknowledged by the South African National Editors Forum (SANEF), at the
Truth Commission hearings, and editors of major national newspapers. Efforts to improve
editorial standards with increased training facilities have been implemented by Independent
Newspapers as well as all the other major newspaper groups.
The effects of these training facilities have been negligible in the 10 years since the
fall of apartheid and the focus is usually at the junior or introductory level of journalism.
Training needs to be offered across the board, more importantly at the senior levels where
changes are seldom seen and is urgently required.
The focus needs to shift to middle management where the national press is dominated
by white journalists from the apartheid era. This is not to say that every white journalist
operating at the mid-managerial level has tendencies towards racism, however it does block
the career options of promising black and coloured journalists who then turn to newly created
public service communications jobs. This exodus of black and coloured talent from an already
shallow pool further erodes the efforts to restructure the national press.
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What is needed is an honest commitment towards change by the national publishers.
It must include opportunities for black and coloured journalists to rise above the junior levels
where most of them languish. It requires further commitment from publishers to eliminate the
difficulties faced by black and coloured journalists who feel undermined by the incumbents
when they accept management offers. In practical terms, a black or coloured journalist who is
offered a middle management or managerial position usually replaces a senior white journalist
with many years’ experience. The displaced white executive is shunted sideways in the
editorial reshuffle and resents this. The result is an unpleasant and hostile work environment
that places unreasonable expectations on the replacement.
Coupled with a lack of managerial training and experience, black and coloured
journalists who have been selected for such positions have faltered because they fall victim to
an editorial office culture that resents change at the senior levels. Retrenchment of displaced
senior white executives might be the solution to achieve the sort of non-racial mix in senior
editorial ranks that is desirable. This could be a costly as well as a reluctant exercise but as
matters now stand, black and coloured journalists drawn into the inner sanctum of national
papers face a hostile reception when disgruntled, displaced white executives remain on staff
to snipe from the sidelines. Inevitably, some of the newly anointed fail in their calling while
others give up and quit for more lucrative jobs. And when that happens, publishers will be
reluctant to introduce changes and it reinforces current practices to maintain the status quo.
Berger’s suggestion that the South African Government look in the direction of the
Swedish model of media subsidies holds little promise. In a country where the focus is on
improving basic human necessities like running water, electricity and community health
services there is very little chance that the government could be persuaded to move in that
direction. Instead, the government has opted to establish the Government Communication and
Information System (GCIS) to foster a more positive communication environment mainly via
its daily online news service Bua News.
The GCIS is headed by Joel Netshitenzhe with the aim of ensuring that the
government’s voice is heard. As a communications platform, the GCIS provides support and
advice to the government, the media, the public and the international community. As a news
agency delivering government spin to the media, its services are viewed with suspicion at
worst and as unobjective at best with the result that the GCIS struggles to get the
government’s message across to newspapers that are independently owned and operated. This
in itself does not augur well for a developmental style of journalism in South Africa.
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Winds of change
In an effort to meet the challenges facing the media in post-apartheid South Africa, The Cape
Times was one of the first major metropolitan newspapers to appoint a “coloured” person as
editor. Moegsien Williams saw his role as redefining the news for a newspaper that was
considered primarily a “white newspaper” but the majority of its readers were coloureds and
only 38 per cent of its readers were white.
Williams suggested The Cape Times was now a newspaper for all South Africans but
there were serious misgivings about the direction of the newspaper. Further, some serious
hurdles needed to be overcome before this claim could be justified because the staff
composition did not reflect this change in direction and there were fears that significant
editorial changes could alienate the 38 per cent of white readers.
For Williams, this was the challenge of the emerging role of the print media:
There are two challenges really. The one is internal because the reality is
that our staff do not also reflect the readership. I have a situation here
where I am only the sixth or seventh person of colour on the staff and we
have, genetically speaking, a 62 per cent black readership so it is totally
out of kilter, we need to begin to reflect the demographic realities on our
staff. The other problem we are dealing with internally is our approach to
news. I’m speaking of drawing up an entirely new news agenda to move
away from the pre-apartheid news coverage to a post-apartheid news
coverage and it requires a re-education in your staff. Externally we are
thinking of beginning to engage our different communities, I call it
redefining the news, you know, asking people to help us to shape a
newspaper that will serve them best.23
The program is in its infancy and indications are it could work. The circulation of The
Cape Times has shown slight improvement to May 1996, over a nine-month period since the
start of the new direction and Williams conceded that while change was needed, newspapers
as well as South African society generally, were still in a state of transition. While there were
many changes taking place there were also many things that have remained the same. As for
an assessment of the current role of the print media in South Africa, Williams remained
optimistic.
But the changing face of South African society, politics and the new dispensation has
been slow in filtering down the media, which is still regarded as an oppositionist press.
Williams admits:
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We are not doing a great job. As print media specifically ... we have
woken up very late to the changes that have taken place and I am speaking
of the initial reforms announced by (former President F.W.) De Klerk six
years ago. We are pretty much grappling with issues which the politicians
dealt with four, five years ago when they wrote the interim constitution, so
we are way behind in a way the rest of society in transforming ourselves
and that is really the challenge. I must say the fact that in my company
there has been a change of ownership. It has resulted in a new ethos in the
company. A new kind of mission statement has emerged and right at the
top of this mission statement is the need for us to transform our
newspapers to fit in with the new society and form an integral part of this
new democracy ... My editorship of The Cape Times is an indication of the
changes that are taking place. It would have been unheard of for a
coloured person to become editor of The Cape Times or a major
metropolitan daily. So changes are taking place and I’m pretty hopeful.24
[Williams was later to take up the editorship of Independent Newspapers’ afternoon
daily in Cape Town, The Argus. The Cape Times is the morning daily. Ryland Fisher replaced
Williams as editor at The Cape Times. Fisher’s appointment was part of the transformation
process within Independent Newspapers.]
At the Sowetan, South Africa’s largest circulation daily newspaper [around 218,000 a
day] which serves a predominantly black readership in the Johannesburg-Soweto region, the
editor Mike Siluma defines the role of his newspaper as primarily to inform people and to
educate them about the transformation that is occurring in South Africa. “I think the big thing
that has changed,” Siluma says, “is that where previously the (main role) of black journalists
was to oppose government. That was what we lived for because that was the reality then.
Apartheid was a life and death issue and that put us in opposition to the government by
definition. Now there is not that situation where black people are opposed and the government
is not oppressing anybody, society is freer and therefore there is no reason for us to take an
oppositionist position to government. Our rule is to inform people and to educate them about
the transformation that is happening in the country.”25
As for the current position of the print media in South Africa, Siluma believes it is
still torn between old loyalties on both sides of politics. He felt that there was much confusion
about the role of the press with some people believing that the media should be oppositionist.
Siluma said there were, for example, many black journalists who held strong political views
and who did not agree with the ANC for instance and who felt “that the whole transformation
thing is a sell-out basically”. Siluma says:
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Then you have the white editors who are still rooted in the old system,
who want to take the view that the media have to distrust everything and
anything the government does. And then you have other people who
believe you have to support the ANC in the interest of the transformation.
There is no universal position that the media has taken.26

Old foes show their hands
In the lead up to the first multiracial elections in South Africa, national attention focused on
the need for a revised media policy. Political parties jostling for a piece of history joined a
wide forum of opinion-makers and agenda-setters in offering diverse options on the role and
direction of the media to guide the emerging new South Africa along the democratic path.
While the African National Congress started work in Lusaka, Zambia, in 1988 on
constitutional guidelines and a blueprint for the transition to a post-apartheid South Africa, the
focus was mainly on politics and economic matters including the more high profile policies
on housing, education social reforms and welfare, a coherent media policy was not afforded a
high priority. It was not until 1991 that the Department of Information and Publicity of the
African National Congress convened a meeting of more than 300 delegates to draft a media
policy.27
The National Party steered clear of launching a media policy statement but responded
with a series of answers outlining future directions to ensure freedom of the press within free
market parameters, and indicated opposition to state intervention or “sponsorship” of sections
of the media to provide a more equitable degree of access to the media by all sections of the
community. In March, 1992, the Pan African Congress of Azania released its media policy
statement. After the South African political reforms announced in February 1991, the
Democratic Party was the first to formulate and present its media policy, which their media
spokesman Peter Soal developed further at a seminar at the Centre for Cultural and Media
Studies on July 30, 1991.

The ANC media policy
The need for a Media Charter which sets out the principles of press freedom and one based on
the free flow of information that promotes a culture of open debate was one of the ideals of
the African National Congress defined in a policy statement in 1992, ahead of the historic allparty elections in 1994.
The ANC viewed as important the need to transform the national media − which by
and large is a commercial media except for the national radio and television broadcaster − so
that it may perform its necessary role in the democratic process of an emerging new nation. In
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a preface to its proposed Media Charter, the ANC expressed the view that “elements of such a
Charter would find expression in a Constitution and Bill of Rights; while others would be
realised through relevant legislation. Yet others would serve as social guidelines”.28
By way of explaining a Media Charter, the ANC regarded it as “erroneous to
advocate the setting up of bodies which determine what society should or should not read,
hear or watch. Rather judicial procedures should be effected if and when otherwise ordinary
laws of the land are violated. On the other hand media freedoms should be understood in the
context of other citizens’ rights such as the right to privacy”.29

ANC draft media charter
At the heart of the ANC’s media charter is the fundamental belief that democracy cannot
emerge and flourish without a democratic media. But there are some qualifications to this
broad-brush approach and an admission that freedom of the press on its own is not enough.
There is a need for affirmative action to redress the imbalance and injustices of the
apartheid years. There is a need for an equitable distribution of media resources, development
programs and “a deliberate effort to engender the culture of open debate”.
The proposed charter considers it the right of all citizens to participate in the decisionmaking process and to be able to do so adequately, the citizens need to be properly informed
by a responsible media and must have access to different options so that an informed choice
can be made. The legacy of apartheid and South Africa’s formerly closed society and
restrictions on the free flow of information under the National Party government plus the
structure and ownership of the national media resources, the skills, language policy and social
deprivation has meant that access to information for the bulk of South Africa’s citizens has
been undermined and in its preamble to the Draft Media Charter, the ANC indicates a new
direction to overcome these difficulties.
The draft media charter is comprised of six categories including democratisation of
the media; public media, media-workers and society, education and training, promotional
mechanisms. The thrust of the Charter is contained in the first category which deals with basic
rights and freedoms. It states:
1.

All the people shall have the right to freely publish, broadcast and
otherwise disseminate information and opinion, and shall have the
right of free access to information and opinion.

2.

All institutional and legislative measures which restrict the free
flow of information or which impose censorship over the media and
other information agencies shall be restricted.
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3.

All people shall have the right of access to information held or
collected by the State or other social institutions subject to any
limitations provided for in the Constitution or the Bill of Rights.

In addition, the Draft Charter makes the following provisions:
•

diversity of media ownership and publishing and distribution facilities,

•

affirmative action programs,

•

guarantees of media access to all communities and at all levels of society,

•

state media resources to be used to promote and strengthen democracy,

•

provisions for a state broadcasting service independent of the ruling party and
serving all sectors of society,

•

guarantees on the right of reply and a guarantee of a citizen’s right to privacy,

•

media workers to be protected from threats of intimidation and other forms of
pressure that may inhibit their work,

•

journalists to be protected by the law from revealing their sources,

•

journalists will be free to form and join trade unions political parties and other
organisations of their choice,

•

a promise to provide facilities for the training and upgrading of media workers,

•

training programs for disadvantaged sectors of the community to foster,
develop and implement broadcasting and print media facilities and as part of a
civic education program,

•

the state and media institutions shall strive to inform citizens about their media
rights and those of media workers.

The ANC’s draft media charter is an ambitious document that encompasses a vast
range of issues that affect the functions of a dynamic and free press and it sets impressive
goals which in practice would be difficult, if not impossible to implement. Thus, the Charter
runs the risk of being described as little more than an idealistic wish list. In conclusion, the
ANC resolved to amend and review government information services formerly used and
controlled as party political information services by the previous National Party government
and included, amongst others, the state information services such as the South African
Communications Service, the Human Sciences Research Council, the police and defence
force media liaison services.30
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The ANC also sees a need for a national daily newspaper “published from a
democratic perspective” and the establishment of a media development program to “increase
the party’s ability to use the media to inform, educate, mobilise, and organise”, as well as
conceding a need to “restructure and democratise the broadcast, film and print media and to
develop these areas through a democratic process”.31

PAC and the media
In a short statement released in March 1992, the Pan African Congress questioned the role
and independence of the mainstream South African print media, declaring that with the media
in control of white monopolies, freedom of expression did not exist in South Africa because
no debate was free of the control of “white capital” and the picture was one of absolute
control over the right of free speech, freedom of the press, and guaranteed free debate.
The run-up to the first multiracial general elections in South Africa in 1994 appeared
to find the Pan African Congress without a considered media policy. In a policy statement
released in March, 1992, the PAC offers what appears no more than an ad hoc media policy
which reflects the party’s rhetoric on a variety of matters.
Among its objectives, it pledges a guarantee of freedom of the press and the
electronic media and commits itself to a Bill of Rights to enshrine freedom of expression.
It finds fault with the concentration of media ownership currently under white
control, and states that this gross imbalance in ownership must first be changed before
democratic debate can flourish. Democratic debate, the PAC states, “can only flourish where
the gross imbalance that presently exists in the media is drastically altered in favour of the
ordinary Azanian (the PAC’s name for South Africa is Azania) − the worker, the unemployed,
youth and students, the rural peasant and the landless labourer”.
It states that informed debate and consequent informed political action is the essence
of democracy and it cannot flourish “with false propaganda to serve class interest”. In an
effort to reshape the media, the PAC offered the following suggestions to guarantee freedom
of the press and electronic media:
•

Freedom of expression must be enshrined in a Bill of Rights;

•

The control of the media must be wrested from the absolute control
of the “big four” (the four major national press groups). The PAC
believes that there should be a limit on the number of newspapers
owned by a single company;

•

The Constitution must make provision for the right of minority
(alternative) newspapers to exist and to ensure its right, the State
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must afford these newspapers subsidies to ensure its survival.
These subsidies should be awarded as a right and with agreed
audited circulation figures. The political party in power would not
be allowed to interfere with such subsidies and it would ensure the
right of dissent;
•

A Press Council must be established to ensure proper standards are
maintained in the dissemination of the news; it would also
safeguard the privacy of individuals against unwarranted
interference, the council should also have the right to take action
against any person responsible for inciting the harassment of
journalists performing their duties.

Press subsidies to foster diversity
The Pan African Congress’ notion of government subsidies for certain types of newspapers as
a means of ensuring diversity of opinion is not new. It has been tried with a degree of success
by some developed nations of Europe and elsewhere.
The democratic socialist media system option proposed by Louw [1994] included a
media subsidy system that he suggested could be designed “to overcome the skewing that a
capitalist media system creates”. It would work with a view to ensuring that all constituencies
were guaranteed access to the media of their choice and it would be administered by a
statutory Media Council.32
Louw’s subsidy option had its foundations in similar subsidy systems that have been
tried in Sweden, Holland and Belgium. While this theory has operated with some success in
Europe, it is fraught with danger in South Africa where proper administration and misuse
cannot be excluded. That is before the difficulties of sorting out the ratios of editorial material
that will be published, the tone and content of the messages, and the practical administration
of the project. Louw suggested the State should create a fund to pay for this media diversity
and that the fund be created from taxes on the commercial media and advertising sectors.
If insufficient funds are raised from these two industries, the state should make up the
shortfall to ensure the success of the project. Louw describes this as his Democratic Socialist
Media System, it is an option consistent with the aims of the African National Congress’
Freedom Charter. Louw argues further that the incoming black government, serving as it has
to “the present have-nots’ (the working class, peasants and unemployed) the government will
be under considerable pressure from its constituency to change the present media system
because the present network only articulates the position of a white middle-class) minority.33
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Louw offered this theory in 1993, before the Government of National Unity took over
from the National Party and his assessment of the role and direction of the media cannot be
argued with. He is correct in his projection that the “have nots” − meaning largely the former
oppressed blacks − will put pressure on the ANC-led government to change the present media
system. However, six years later, it has become clear that the national media, both the English
and Afrikaans press, do not share the confidence of the larger section of the community.
This is both true in terms of content and agenda setting in the national press. It is also
true as far as the revelations at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission show a national
media that are reluctant to accept blame for their role during the apartheid years and seeking
rather to grab praise for its role in the demise of apartheid. In the twisted dynamics of South
African politics and media, it is true that the press at some stages pursued a defiant and
critical role against government excesses and intolerance but certainly, from the perspective
of the oppressed and from the perspective of black journalists, it was quite different and the
efforts amounted to doing too little and usually too late.
This dichotomy still exists. It is found in the complaints of government officials and
leaders who still argue that the national press was continuing to operate in a way that was
harmful and detrimental to the aspirations of the government − or even further, that the
national press was actively working to the detriment of the new government by focusing on
government inefficiencies and failures in a country that was struggling with economic and
social reforms and hampered by a police force that was losing the fight against crime and
violence. The underlying suggestion being that the white-dominated press still cannot come to
terms with the overwhelming changes that resulted in the fall of apartheid and the installation
a black majority government.
And to further complicate matters, the South African President, Nelson Mandela,
sounded the warning bells in his opening address at the ANC national conference in Mafiking
on December 16, 1997 when he warned that there were still a large number of whites in South
Africa who were dissatisfied with the changes from white rule and in a blistering attack
Mandela accused white South Africans of still wanting to profit from the apartheid era.
He accused sections of the white community of actively fomenting counterrevolutionary measures to overthrow the black government. Mandela warned the party
delegates that there was a Third Force operating to destabilise the country. The rising crime
rate was just one of their methods to make the country ungovernable and chaotic.
The national press has on many occasions been accused of constant criticism of these
problems and the president’s blistering speech was yet another indication that the national
press and the government were on a collision course.
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The ingredients are certainly there and so are the signals from a number of speeches
and statements on the media in the past four years of post-apartheid South Africa. Despite the
provisions of freedom of speech in the Bill of Rights, an ANC led Government under the
leadership of Thabo Mbeki, the national press faces serious challenges.
Louw argues that instead of nationalising the commercial media, the government
might be better off creating a parallel system for the purpose of its constituency. This parallel
system would consist of a media subsidy system.34 In theory, Louw’s suggestion makes good
sense but the provisions of the subsidy system would, in a practical sense, be difficult to
implement. There would be too many interest groups, too little finance, as well as the
potential for mismanagement.
On a practical level, any subsidy system has potential for abuse and fraud. Besides,
the difficulty of collating and dividing the financial incentives and the editorial ratios, it is the
financial management of such a scheme that can place it at risk. A lack of properly trained
journalists is an added problem. The establishment of proper, functional newsrooms would be
costly and outweigh the benefits in a country where subsidies may be better spent in more
practical ways such as improving public health schemes, alleviating extreme poverty,
extending electricity supplies or improving community housing. The need for a subsidised
media lags far behind some extremely rugged social problems.
A Media Council could be established by statute to monitor and control the subsidy
system, in addition the Media Council would be composed of persons with a diversity of
opinion. Louw argues:
The Media Council could also assist the State in ascertaining levels of
taxation on the commercial media infrastructures (newspapers, magazines,
radio, TV, advertising and PR agencies, film and video distributors,
cinema industry etc.) Taxation of these media is one way of redistributing
wealth away from, say the liberal commercial press sector towards other
constituencies. Such a subsidy system would enable an ANC government,
for example, to serve its own constituency’s needs. However, it would
simultaneously guarantee other constituencies their own independent
media. Under such a media system there would be no need to nationalise
the existing English-liberal or Afrikaner-nationalist press in order to
redress the skewing of information resources.35
The rationale behind Louw’s democratic socialist media system is his argument that
the South African media needs “a position that attempts to marry the positive aspects of both
the libertarian and the Marxist approaches, and yet one that attempts to avoid the pitfalls of
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both ie. a position between the options of (1) nationalising the media, and (2) leaving the
current structures unchanged”.
Jackson also considers the prospects of a media subsidy system as he grapples with
what he describes as the single most compelling question about the future of the South
African press: What are its prospects for operating freely in post-apartheid South Africa? In
1993, the quick and simple consensus among academics, journalists and editors was that
freedom of the press would go as well as the fortunes of the country. A more considered view,
Jackson suggests, is that “the press in South Africa is likely to end the 1990s with more
freedom than it began the decade.”36 However, he warns that under a new political order, it is
harder to project. Considering what happened in Rhodesia under Ian Smith and with the
transition to Zimbabwe and the incoming government of Robert Mugabe, the Argus Group
has had first-hand experience of a liberation black government nationalising the press.
It is an argument that has sparked much debate especially among editors of the Argus
Group (now Independent Newspapers) but after three years, the ANC-led government has
pledged a commitment to free speech and backed this up with legislation, despite some
serious clashes with the press. According to Jackson:
The worst case, from the perspective of the mainstream press’s
management, would be nationalisation of the media. All papers would then
serve as government voices. However, there is little indication that the
ANC and other groups that may be part of the future government would
choose this course − or find it politically wise to do even if they wanted to.
Far more likely is some kind of affirmative action program to address the
economic imbalance reflected in the present ownership patterns.37
His suggestion is pertinent and particularly accurate and there has been no talk or
suggestion of nationalising the press. However, black ownership, as in the case of the Times
Media Group acquisitions, is accelerating. Yet, undoubtedly, those who were once in
opposition and who had serious doubts about the neutrality and other aspects of the press are
now in power. The monopolistic nature of the South African press remains a major issue, the
editorial staff ratios and the controlling hands of mainly white editors causes further concern.
And the ANC has repeatedly suggested there must be a mechanism for change in the media.
The mechanism could still be nationalisation of the press, although it is an unlikely prospect
at this stage of the transition to a full democracy. A more likely option would be the firm hand
of government shaping the role of the press – a policy of freedom with commitment. Jackson
says:

215

In reality, the option of nationalisation seems slim. Actions against the
mainstream press would draw a firestorm of criticism, both at home from
many whites and internationally. A politically safer and generally more
defensible option would be to exercise the ‘affirmative action’ approach.
The most likely way of doing this would be to devise some formula for
arranging subsidies to papers that were less secure financially. In a
concerted effort to increase press diversity, the government might follow
the example of Sweden, whose subsidy system has generated considerable
interest in South Africa. With good reason, the ANC argues that because
blacks have for generations been deprived of credible media outlets, a
compelling need exists for the state to help level the playing field in
tomorrow’s press environment.38
It is a scenario that horrifies the traditional white editors and causes ripples of
discontent especially in the Afrikaans press. The role of the media has constantly been on the
national agenda in the “transitional” post-apartheid period and while there have always been
absolute guarantees of freedom of the press from the ANC, there has also been constant and
harsh criticism of the way in which the media is going about its business.
It is not too hard to read into this constant battle between press and state that the
ingredients for some sort of action on the part of the government do not seem far away.

Market mechanisms, monopoly control
Louw warns that the libertarian (or free press) model in South Africa has had severe
limitations and that this free market place of ideas was not borne out by the facts. In fact,
Louw suggests it does not work:
Those in the mainstream press have traditionally blamed government
censorship for their failure to fully cover events. It is true that the state has
placed enormous restrictions upon the media. However, a significant part
of the problem lies in the market mechanism itself when applied to the
media organisation.39
Louw points to the failure of the largely anti-government Rand Daily Mail that
became a victim of its own success as it opposed the authoritarian controls of the National
Party. In the complexities of the South African politics, whites regarded the Mail as radical
and to the left while to the majority of the oppressed people, even that which the Mail offered
was not enough. But it is in the commercially-orientated media where the advertisers play
such a pivotal role. For many of the white papers, their failure was not so much government
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censorship as advertising censorship. Using the demise of the Rand Daily Mail as an example,
Louw puts it this way:
It means a media de facto controlled by advertisers, and the middle-class
interests to which they pander. Advertisers are interested to win those with
disposable incomes; and that means the middle class. And if advertisers
are interested in the middle class, then it is this middle class that editors of
the commercially-driven media must attract if they are to survive. Non
middle-class audiences are not profitable, and hence the media serving, for
example, working-class opinion in a capitalist society will face enormous
financial difficulties because they will have comparatively less success in
attracting advertisers.40
Louw’s fears for monopoly control of the South African media and he proposes an
alternate media subsidy system based on the “Western” Dutch model. He argues that in the
transition to a democratic South Africa there is need for a diversity of print media voices
because South Africa’s market-driven commercial press does not provide for such diversity.
It attracted serious dissent from senior executives of both the Argus Group and Times
Media Ltd in the form of Peter Sullivan, at the time the editor of The Star, and Steve
Mulholland, at the time the chief executive at TML. Sullivan challenged Louw’s assumption
of a monopolistic media as a superficial argument that was easy to refute.
Sullivan pointed to the four major press groups operating in South Africa as well as
the diversity of newspapers in the Johannesburg region where there are six major
metropolitan daily newspapers to choose from every day. They are The Star, Business Day,
Sowetan, Beeld, Transvaler, and The Citizen and on Fridays Johannesburg also produces Vrye
Weekblad, Weekly Mail and City Press. In addition, Johannesburg citizens can also buy New
Nation, and the Lenasia Indicator, Die Afrikaner becomes available sporadically as well as
Die Patriot. On Sundays, Johannesburg citizens have a further choice of three newspapers,
the Sunday Times, Rapport and the Sunday Star. In addition there are also more than 15
community newspapers operating in the suburbs surrounding Johannesburg.41
Compared to the rest of the world, Sullivan says, Johannesburg has a huge luxury of
diversity in its newspapers and he rejects outright the suggestion of Louw and questions the
suggestion “that newspapers were editorially exclusively in favour of capitalism”. The
assertion by Louw that the Argus opposed apartheid, primarily because of the negative
economic implications for capitalism, rather than due to its racism, is also rejected by
Sullivan. As a loyal Argus company executive Sullivan defended the role of the group:
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Throughout the history of Argus newspapers, Argus editors have
challenged capitalism, have challenged mining interests, and have clashed
with capitalists on a huge range of issues, including apartheid, corruption,
exploitation, workers’ interests, mining rights, conservation, and virtually
every subject affecting their readers.42
And in defence of the company’s policy on racial discrimination, Sullivan offers this
assessment of the Argus Group:
It may have had some validity in the early 1950s, but from 1960 until the
present day, any reader of The Star, The Argus or any other Argus-owned
daily would have read, almost ad nauseum, of the evils of apartheid, the
evils of all forms of racism, and often the evils of the labour practices of
the mining houses. Apartheid was vigorously opposed through conviction
by editors and journalists within the Argus Group far more effectively than
through any other medium.43
If Sullivan’s observations, written in 1991, can be interpreted even vaguely as a fair
reflection of Argus Company policy during the 1960s, 70s and 80s, then it does far more to
indicate the curious dynamics and complexities of the South African press. Comparing
Sullivan’s description of Argus company policy against the submissions to the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission and the apology from Independent Newspapers (the new owners
of the Argus group) for omissions during the apartheid years, then Sullivan’s observations are
seriously at odds with the versions of those who felt the brunt of the company’s
discriminatory practices, the black journalists.
It would, in fact, be fair to suggest that Sullivan’s view of Argus company policy is
the white man’s view while those at the other end of the colour spectrum working on Argus
company publications have a seriously different opinion. It is this difference that leads to the
theory that serious and far-reaching changes are undoubtedly needed in the South African
media for it to function effectively.
While Sullivan offers little in the way of constructive change for new direction in the
South African print media, he suggests that it is “the integrity of Argus newspapers and their
commitment to absolute standards of ethics in journalism is what made them great. Seeking
conspiracy is futile. Seeking to emulate them would be a far more profitable exercise − not in
capitalist terms but in an intellectual profit to all people who value truth, and the attempts of
journalists to provide that truth to readers”.
These are noble sentiments with little to complain about but when considered in
perspective it is nonsense to suggest that the Argus Group did not actively practise racial
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discrimination. Black and coloured journalists were only employed on the newspapers
directly pitched at blacks and coloureds – newspapers including the World, Sunday World,
Post, and Cape Herald. The Argus, one of the major newspapers in the group, only employed
two coloured journalists out of a staff of more than 100 during the 1970s and mid-1980s and
this was also the case at the company’s flagship newspaper, the Star in Johannesburg. These
issues were comprehensively dealt with during the TRC inquiry into the media as well as the
South African Human Rights Commission’s inquiry into the media and John Patten’s
submission on behalf of Independent Newspapers.
In reply to Sullivan’s attack, Louw defends his view of an economic-driven media,
discounting Sullivan’s view of a conspiracy theory. Louw suggests:
Further, ‘editorial independence’ within a market media system is
prescribed because the market automatically imposes limitations upon the
editors. No conspiracy is implied. In simple terms no editor running a
profit-driven medium can afford to alienate those with disposable income
... To alienate this minority would be to lose the advertising life-line. This
inherently skews the world-view presented by the market-driven media.
The bottom line is profit, and the ‘integrity and truth’ Peter Sullivan talks
of (I am tempted to ask whose truth?) has to fit this mould.44
Louw defends the allegation of media monopoly as a pedantic argument over the
definition of “monopoly” but stresses the fact that “we no longer have a free-market
libertarian press in South Africa. Further, our press industry has clearly not escaped the
impact of expanding monopoly capitalistic relations of production ... what is clear to me are
that we have an unhealthy concentration of ownership of the country’s important newspaper
titles, and especially in the newspaper distribution centre.”
Louw further rejects Sullivan’s example of healthy media diversity and proof of a
healthy press by pointing to six major metropolitan daily newspapers operating in the
Johannesburg region as a spurious argument, the level of diversity which resembles the
operations of the South African Parliament − a place where the like-minded get together to
thrash out similarities. Louw says:
Just as our existing Parliament has not served democracy well, neither has
the Argus ... In both cases the full range of interests in our society has not
been represented ... Similarly, the argument that we have a free press
because there is competition between the Argus and Times Media Ltd is
ludicrous. This is a competition over who gets the profits, not over
editorial content. Both the Argus and Times Media Ltd represent the same
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narrow sectional interests in society Furthermore, the news practices of
both these organisations reduce information to profit and both promote the
liberal free-enterprise which so neatly services the needs of miningfinance capital. Consequently, from the point of view of news content, it is
irrelevant who wins this battle. Whoever wins, we as readers will get much
more of the same. If we are to reform our press (or media) system so that it
caters for all interests in our society then let us start by abandoning the
absurd assumption that a liberal press can speak for everyone in society.45

Options from the National Party
Following a long and close association with the Afrikaans press, the National Party in 1990
offered an overview of future media policy in South Africa but also maintained that, strictly,
the Party did not have a specific media policy.
Media affairs were left to government decisions. However, the National Party’s
director of information, Sheila Camerer, offered some insights into National Party thinking in
an interview with Professor Arrie de Beer in January, 1992 at the Free, Fair and Open Media
conference at the University of the Western Cape in Cape Town.
Insisting that the National Party does not have a media policy but rather a basic
approach to the media, Ms Camerer says the National Party was committed to ensuring the
free flow of information, a free press and also a free, independent and impartial national
broadcaster. She concedes that previously the National Party had been in a position where it
could leave it to the government to have a policy on the media and over the years that has
been reflected in various laws and statements on the media. In the “new South Africa”, the
National Party’s view is clear:
We would ideally like to see the media, like the elections, free, fair and
open. And we are prepared to admit that our attitude has changed from a
more restrictive approach to a much more open attitude.46
On the question of equal access to the media, the National Party feels that the print
media should be left to its own free-enterprise devices and that market forces should operate.
While agreeing that the media should be open and accessible to all South Africans, the
National Party baulks at state intervention and clearly opposes any plans which the
government may have to subsidise various publications to facilitate a more open access.
Camerer states:
People should be free to invest in a newspaper because they feel they want
to be a part of that newspaper and that they would reach a certain
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readership or constituency for whatever reason. In the end that would be
the best leveller. Put in a different way − the state should not supply
centralised access to the media with state funded newspapers. Newspapers
should be sold for what they are worth on the open market, and people will
buy them and read them if they are viable. It is up to the market forces to
determine that.47
Roelf Meyer, the National Party’s Minister of Constitutional Development and
Communications in 1992 had the job of advising the government on its relationship with the
media. Meyer says: “We must ensure that in the new South Africa more than lip service is
paid to the freedom of the media. This might sound ironic coming from a representative of a
government which does not have the happiest of records in this regard. I believe, however,
that this places us in a particularly strong position to warn of the dangers − and counterproductivity − of any media restrictions.48 He warns that the maintenance of a vigorous and
unrestricted media will be a key success factor for the “new” South Africa and suggests that
in the years ahead the media in South Africa will have to play a particularly important role in
the following areas:
(a)

They must inform the public openly and effectively on the issues of the
day. They must present their audiences with information on the
constitutional processes which are underway and on the constitutional
and economic options that are available to them.

(b)

They must continue to act as a watchdog. They must expose
unacceptable behaviour, whatever the source from which it emanates.

(c)

They must encourage open and vigorous debate.49

Under this set of guidelines, Roelf Meyer believes it is unreasonable to expect
newspapers to be objective and his reasoning is that “certain newspapers should forthrightly
espouse differing positions and set up their respective stalls in the marketplace of ideas. The
important thing is that the marketplace should be open to the purveyors of all ideas and that
the public should have the right to browse and buy as they please”.
There is a proviso, though, that while newspapers need not conform to basic rules of
objectivity, Meyer argues that it should be demanded of newspapers that they apply their own
codes of journalistic ethics strictly. In the end, Meyer states that the freedom of the press
depends on whether or not the media has the support of the public. In order to retain that
support, Meyer says newspapers have to be worthy of it and he concludes media is a
protection, not a panacea to security because without it no truly democratic dispensation is
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possible.50 Meyer concludes that the best guarantee of media freedom in South Africa may be
to ensure that the media are as decentralised as possible.
Group political editor for Independent Newspapers, Zubeida Jaffer made a different
appeal for change in the media when she delivered the World Press Freedom Day public
lecture at Rhodes University’s journalism and media studies department in May 1997. Jaffer
paid tribute the small number of women who made inroads in to the South African media and
urged a transformation in the media “which for so long has been a male preserve”. Jaffer says:
Our newspapers and media institutions have been shaped during a dark
period of authoritarianism. Now that we have won the constitutional
guarantees of a free press, the challenge is how to make the institution
representative of the entire South African population so that the
sensitivities of different perspectives can be captured. Women constitute
more than half the population. The press is less than free if their voices are
not heard.51
But she adds that “as journalists we have to find a way to look and listen beyond
colour and political party. Only then will we be serving the public as we should be”.52
While the political institutions have been transformed to represent all South Africans,
Jaffer says the press as an institution lags far behind and there are no simple solutions to this
problem.
The difficulty facing the profession is how to move beyond bombarding the public
with just short snippets of spicy negative news. We are great at raising people’s anxieties but
we do not leave them with much sense of hope or remedy ... There has to be a return to high
standards of journalism which could provide the public with all the information needed to
make educated decisions. The public must know that the journalists will ensure that society is
open and not shrouded in secrecy.53
As for future options for the media, Jaffer points out that the time has now come
when journalists can be journalists with a proper role to play in order to make the country a
better place.
We in the media have now to build our profession as a vibrant and
meaningful part of the young democracy we struggled for. To do this we
must acknowledge that we as professionals in the industry at this point
come from completely different backgrounds with the most diverse life
experiences. The media was polarised as the country was. And if we begin
to talk about freedom of the press, we need first to understand where we
come from, to acknowledge the divide so that an appropriate bridge can be
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constructed. Let us not sweep differences under the table and pretend they
do not exist. If we are honest with one another, we will be able to heal the
wounds of the past.54
Summary
The legacy of discrimination in the South African press parallels the legacy of apartheid in
South African politics. Discrimination was a part of South African life even before the
separate development legislations were passed after the National Party came to power in
1949. This legacy of discrimination left its mark on the press. Later authoritarian controls,
banning orders and censorship further complicated the role of the press. So it comes as no real
surprise that the transformation to a democratic new South Africa signalled the opportunity to
reshape the role and future directions of the press. Reshaping the national press remains the
focus of constant speculation and debate. Chapter Seven has reviewed some of the postapartheid proposed models.
This chapter shows that there are no shortage of opinions, with many observers
offering extremely insightful and workable models about the way the South African media
should transform to play a meaningful role in the country’s future − whether that be a
combative effort that scrutinises and criticises government or whether it will be a media that
pursues a socially responsible role in nation building or even whether the government will
adopt a benevolent authoritarian approach.
But one thing is clear. There remains universal agreement that the national media
needs serious overhaul and that the national press can adapt to the consequences. It is clear
that if newspapers do not respond quickly enough to the challenges set by the government, it
becomes increasingly more obvious that the government could feel obliged to step in and
force a speedy transformation of the press. But there lies the danger not only for the press but
also for the government. It is an option not ignored by senior government members and with a
Constitution in place that guarantees a free press, the chances of an authoritarian clampdown
on the media is remote but there is a troubled road ahead.
Chapter Eight will conclude with signposts on a troubled road for the South African
press. Already, the need for integration in the newsroom has been recognised and guidelines
for the national press have been resisted.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CHANGING OF THE GUARD
Main findings
My examination of the South African press finds that transformation in the post-apartheid era
has undergone dramatic positive developments but remains hindered by deep mistrust as
documented in earlier observations and media representative submissions to the South
African Human Rights Commission, the Independent Newspapers submission, and the Braude
Report. The legacy of apartheid and discrimination still cuts deep in South African media
culture despite several black and coloured journalists being appointed as editors on major
metropolitan newspapers. It is at the middle to senior levels where transformation has become
bogged down by hollow promises.
My examination, which includes interviews with working journalists and editors,
indicates that journalism remains a difficult career option for blacks and coloureds with the
majority of senior decision-making and gate-keeping roles still in the hands of whites who
held the reins during the apartheid years. This remains a destabilising, unresolved aspect that
gives rise to public perceptions of bias, control, and covert racism in the media.
The race card still cuts deep into South African journalism. It remains a black and
white, us-and-them issue. However, to relegate this dilemma simply to a legacy of the
apartheid era would be incorrect. South African journalism is struggling for credibility and
respect. Its image is further eroded by the lack of career prospects and low wages. Senior
journalists earning from R90,000-150,000 a year are being lured by the private sector and
government to work as public relations or media spokespersons for double this amount. By
way of example, a ministerial media spokesperson with journalism training and experience
can expect up to R475,000 a year plus a housing subsidy.
Unattractive work conditions fail to attract the brightest candidates who are drawn to
more lucrative career options in commerce, law or medicine and in government and industry
after receiving their initial training and experience from the major publishers.
The friction between the government and the press that developed shortly after the
transition to a new South Africa and intensified in the ensuing years to the point where fears
were held for press freedom have dissipated.
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The English-language press has moved cautiously to promote black people to senior
staff positions and increased training facilities for staff from a disadvantaged background. The
complaint from black journalists remain that these efforts are too slow. As a way of speeding
up the process of integration in the newsrooms and to facilitate a speedier transformation, it
seems reasonable that employment hiring guidelines for the national press be posted.
National newspapers must reflect the diversity of the new democracy from within
before they can start to do the job properly. That is not to say that because newspapers in
South Africa are staffed mainly by the former ruling class, that every white person working
on a newspaper is racist or antagonistic towards the new black government. Editorial change
will not be brought about by simply changing the racial balance of editorial staff. Research in
the United States has shown that while newsroom diversity is necessary, it will not be
sufficient to bring about changes in the way blacks are represented in the news.
It goes beyond structural change. It needs to embrace changes in attitudes and
professional culture. Primarily, the dominant news values operate, and journalists (whether
they are black or white) tend to define news according to this framework. In time, journalists
will recognise/appreciate their functions in post-apartheid South Africa, that they have a
significant role in moving the country through the transition where blacks, whites, and
coloureds are treated equally in the eyes of the law.
However, a more racially balanced newspaper is an important pre-requisite for
meaningful change. A more racially mixed newspaper in South Africa will be better prepared
to reflect the life experiences and diversity of the society that they will serve. It must be
remembered that during the apartheid years, racial groups were kept firmly apart and it will be
a learning experience for all concerned as well as bringing a wider perspective to the debate.
As matters now stand, the media still remains under the control and direction of
whites who have little knowledge of the diverse new target audience. In South Africa, with a
population of around 40 million people and fewer than four million whites, it is obvious
where the new target audience will be and it makes not only economic sense, it is also shrewd
political judgment for the media to move in a different direction, considering growing
criticism from the government that the media appears chained to the ways of the past. The
government is eager to see transformation at every level of society. The national press stands
accused of stalling efforts to change. This accusation by the government remains a serious
threat to the press and whether the perception of bias is fair or not, it is expedient for the press
to move quickly to redress the situation.
A more racially balanced newsroom will go some way to correcting claims of bias.
Otherwise the implications for curbs on freedom of the press loom ominously large. The
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argument from the government remains that the national press has, by default, threatened the
freedom of the press and so has compromised its right to it; the press did not subscribe to the
constitutional provisions because the press is not free to all sectors of the nation.
Limitations of analysis and further research
In an environment clouded by extreme differences of opinion and accusations of racism, it is
imperative to state where you are aligned because it could be seen to influence your
objectivity. Black journalists have a decidedly different view to white journalists on the role
of the press during the apartheid years.
Significantly, the status quo remains. Both sides remain distrustful of each other.
Black journalists are still struggling to gain a place in the national mainstream press other
than at the lowest levels. As a black journalist working in South Africa in the mid 1970s at the
height of the apartheid era, the future was ominous for black and coloured journalists. It was a
hazardous profession offering few prospects. I fit into this category and share many of the
views held by black South African journalists. In 1980, I left South Africa to pursue a
journalism career in Australia because of the constant harassment, racism and lack of career
opportunities. In this thesis, I have at all times tried to be objective and fair in my analysis.
This thesis has taken an historical perspective of the development of the South
African press. The methodology is largely descriptive and empirical. It relies on interviews
with working journalists. While it does not delve into a theoretical analysis of what could
comprise a new media system in South Africa, it highlights the complex problems within the
press that needs to be resolved to reflect the social and cultural diversity of South Africa. This
is a challenge that not only faces the South African media but in many other countries and
forms a major platform of the International Federation of Journalists’ Bilbao Declaration at
the IFJ World Conference in 1997.
My thesis has built on previous examinations of the South African press and provides
a framework for further research into a new media order for South Africa, the career
development prospects and educational opportunities for black journalists, the impact of staff
poaching by related industries and the low esteem in which journalism is held as a career
option in South Africa.
This study has also gained from my experiences as a coloured journalist at the height of
the apartheid era, a first-hand account of harassment and discrimination at the hands of overzealous police and timid publishers.
This study incorporated the work of leading media scholars and academics who set the
agenda with calls for media transformation. However, debate has been dominated by white
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academics. Academic input by blacks and coloureds is lacking. This is a legacy of apartheid,
Bantu education, and the lack of journalism education opportunities for blacks and coloureds.

Towards a new era
Ten years after the collapse of apartheid in South Africa, the political transformation has gone
full circle. Major social transformation has occurred but transformation in the national press
remains elusive. Much has been done to integrate the national press but expectations remain
that so much more needs to be done by the media to reflect the society which it serves and in
which it operates.
Many of the criticisms of the media’s racist inclinations in 1994 and shortly thereafter
have been resolved. For instance, there is a determined approach by the major media
corporations towards a more racially balanced staff although the lack of senior black
journalists

remains a hindrance. Some news organisations have moved towards correcting

the imbalance by offering opportunities to new graduates to train as sub-editors in the field of
economics journalism. For instance, Johnnic Publishing whose operations include the
Financial Mail, Business Day, Sunday Times, Eastern Province Herald, and the Daily
Dispatch, launched the Johnnic Pearson Graduate Training Program in February 2003, which
lasted six months. Independent Newspapers launched a similar training program for subeditors.
Press ombudsman Ed Linington has been appointed to monitor complaints in the
media. Justice Mervyn King was appointed chairman of the Ombudsman Appeal Board.
Two-way communication between the government and the press has been improved
with the revamp of the old South African Communications Service (SACS) and the formation
of the Government Communication and Information Service (GCIS) with Joel Netshitenzhe
as chief executive officer and chief information officer. The objective of the GCIS is to
promote access to information. GCIS describes its objectives as: ensuring that the voice of
government is heard; fostering a more positive communications environment; having a clear
understanding of the public information needs and government’s information needs; and
setting a high standard for government communication.1
The development and prosperity of the national press in South Africa is hindered by
distrust and hostility at many levels. The press is suspicious of the government harbouring
plans that could regulate the media and curb its investigative role. The government remains
deeply mistrustful of sections of the national media and accuses it of undermining
government initiatives and pursuing a hidden agenda. Some senior black journalists are also
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accused of being manipulated by their editors and encouraged to pursue a malicious
confrontation with the government.
The general public appears split between concerns for the future of the national press,
mistrustful of its role in a non-racial society, while others sympathise with a press regarded as
being under siege from government threats. This potentially damaging state of affairs was
influenced by two main factors:
Firstly, the legacy of apartheid and authoritarian controls imposed on the press to help
prop up the political system and a willingness on the part of many newspapers to comply.
Against a background of authoritarian government controls and extremely hazardous
conditions for journalists during the apartheid era, it was always a difficult task for the South
African print media to operate effectively as the ruling National Party continually assaulted
the free flow of information from 1949 until the Party’s stagnation and fall in 1993.
The national press can take some comfort and deserves commendation for its role,
especially the English-language press, for taking on the mantle of de facto opposition against
the apartheid policies of the National Party. But it would be an exaggeration to suggest that
the press played a major role in the eventual downfall of apartheid. This was always a white
owned and controlled press aimed at whites. They were the supporters of the controversial
rebel sports tours, campaigns against the “terrorists”, and in their own way, practised a form
of jobs reservation, and petty discrimination. It was a press hostile to black and coloured
people, benefiting from the spoils of apartheid and reluctant to give up those benefits.
Pippa Green [1998] states that during apartheid, black journalists at many mainstream
newspapers felt humiliated and saw themselves as being at the mercy of white editors, many
of whom unwittingly collaborated with the regime. She recalls an insight into the workings of
the Argus news desk:
As a labour reporter in 1982 on a Cape Town English-language daily, the
Argus, my first story made the front page. It was about striking milk
delivery workers, African migrants in the then hostile Western Cape. The
next story about a steel strike was placed inside, heavily edited. “Ah,”
explained the news editor, “when white readers don’t get their milk
delivered, that’s a big story, but they aren’t interested in other strikes.”
This brought home to me the realisation that the reference point for most
English newspapers was how whites were affected by what we were
reporting; black reporters understood this too, but for them, it was an even
more bitter reality to endure.2
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In the new dispensation, it is this same national press – both English and Afrikaans
language newspapers – that find themselves the target of community and government
backlash. The people that they ignored are now in a position to dictate terms. With the press
being reluctant to change, the government is growing restless and accusing the media of
working towards its demise. The signs are clear. If the media refuse to move in keeping with
the national post-apartheid transformation process, there is every chance that the government
will step in to redefine the role and responsibility of the press.
As my thesis argues, there are signs to suggest that it is the view of some influential
elements within the government that this white-controlled press needs to be brought into line
as calls grow for a socially responsible press. But what is meant by a socially responsible
press? Indeed, the South African press is a highly developed Western libertarian model. It is
driven by libertarian ideals and friction between government and press in this case is not
unusual.
Terje Skjerdal [2001] suggests the government is more likely than the press to favour a
social responsibility model but warns that the government views social responsibility more as
a euphemism for a nationalistic model that censures critical reporting. His study indicates that
the distinction between “critical” reporting and “negative” reporting is blurred.3
However, there is no suggestion that the press should move from being a public
watchdog to a government lapdog. Provisions in the Constitution guarantee freedom of the
press. From the government there are calls to implement a new media order to level the
playing field and to foster a newspaper industry that is more in keeping with the politicoeconomic imperatives of a developing nation. It stems from a long history of oppression and
persecution by the mainstream white press exemplified in Arrie De Beer’s statements to the
Truth Commission during its special hearings on the media − “our history was not only one of
pain, but also of ignorance” and what Green [1998] recalls:
Generally, the rule during the state of emergency imposed by the
government in the 1980s and internalised by many newspapers was that “if
the police didn’t confirm it, it didn’t really happen.” In part, this rule
worked because enforcers of it had embedded themselves in various media
outlets.4
Black and coloured journalists still recall how their news stories that were critical of the
government were heavily censored, cut or simply ignored. I can recall how Security Police
would visit the Argus building and were handed photographs taken by white staff
photographers during the race riots in the late 1970s. In this way, the police could identify
community leaders from the newspaper photographs and then arrest these people. In
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exchange, white reporters and photographers from both the Argus group and the Afrikaans
press were allowed to travel with the military and police into areas of unrest and photograph
the activities without risk. On one occasion in 1977, as a reporter on The Cape Herald
newspaper, I was arrested by police while covering a riot in the coloured suburb of Athlone
where several people had been killed and many injured. As I was led into the back of this
military van, among the heavily armed troops were several white photographers
photographing me unaware that I was a fellow journalist − including two who worked for the
same organisation where I was employed. It was in incidents like these, where the distrust
between black and white journalists originated. It has not faded with time and it is against this
background of treachery and mistrust that the government complains it does not and cannot
receive fair treatment from a national press that remains basically white. The complaints
extend beyond the expected parameters of friction when a Western libertarian press working
outside of governmental controls strives to keep governments accountable. This prompts calls
for a media that more broadly reflects the complex South African society in which it operates.
Ryland Fisher [2000] takes issue with the increasing demands for transformation of the
press. As one of a few high-profile coloured editors of a mainstream English-language
newspaper, Fisher struggled to lead The Cape Times from being the white liberal Cape Town
morning daily and during his brief tenure at the helm tried to increase the number of senior
black journalists on staff. He says of his efforts:
I believe that we have all become so concerned about getting the
demographics right that we have overlooked the need for real
transformation in the media industry. And that need is reflected in the way
our newspapers continue to report from mainly a white, privileged
paradigm. Most South African newspapers, even those with black editors,
continue to perpetuate this white paradigm of the news and news values.5
Simply restructuring or changing the make-up of national newsrooms is hardly a
guarantee of a more equitable distribution of news resources nor does it guarantee that the
government would receive favoured or sympathetic treatment from sycophantic black
journalists. It would be demeaning to suggest that black journalists would be uncritical of
government excess. So what would a transformation of the national press ultimately mean
other than achieving some semblance of social balance, equal work opportunities and the
results of an affirmative action program? Fisher favours a “a mindset change that involves a
new approach to journalism, a new approach to covering our very diverse society”.6
I do not think that transformation simply means the replacement of white
staff with black staff. However, it is important for newspapers to roughly
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represent the demographics of the province or the country that they serve.
This is important for the Western Cape, for instance, where the majority of
the population can be classified coloureds. In this province, would it be
advisable to have the majority of a newspaper’s staff being [black]
African? 7
This rather simplistic approach fails to recognise that South African newspapers, as
newspapers anywhere in the world, are driven by economic constraints and newspapers are in
the business of being profitable. This further complicates the road to transformation. The
Western Cape may well have a larger coloured population, but this does not necessarily
translate into newspaper sales. However, transformation is a major component of change. It
will never be the panacea to fix the hurdles faced by the South African press but it will lay the
foundations of equity in the media that will ultimately lead to major newspapers reflecting the
diversity of the communities in which they operate. Broad acceptance of the need for
transformation signals an important commitment to reshaping the media.
The South African press profited under the apartheid system which it tacitly supported
for a long period. It was a colonial type of media rather than the libertarian press that it
pretended to be. While operating under free market principles of a Western libertarian press, it
failed by omission in that it was always a segmented press that served the interests of the
ruling classes ie. the Afrikaners and the English-speaking whites. At times it was more of a
disobedient child, at all times it was part of the family. Legislation kept the wayward
newspapers in check while others knew their place in the apartheid machinery.
The threat to freedom of the press in the new South Africa now comes from the press
itself, from the way it has evolved in the post-apartheid era and the reluctance of its major
players to embrace change. The new black government maintains that the national press has
yet to shake off the shackles of the apartheid era, and, under the guise of freedom of the press,
was working against the national interest. There is a growing rift, not in the traditional way
that the Western press and government has an uneasy and often troubled relationship, but in a
way which leads to suggestions that the national press, which remains dominated mainly by
white conservatives, cannot accept that a black government can be competent.
On the other hand, the press maintains that the new government is intolerant of
criticism and unable to make the transition from leaders of the liberation to leaders of the
government. After a cosy period of induction, it is the government that has to come to terms
with the role of a vibrant and critical press.
There are government fears that the very fabric of society in the emerging democracy in
South Africa is being threatened by a combination of extreme social, economic and political
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problems. There are fears that the socio-economic problems facing the Government of
National Unity could ultimately undermine the fragile democracy as the ruling African
National Congress fails to deliver on its promises of a better life for the millions of its
supporters. There are also fears expressed by Nelson Mandela, who established a commission
of inquiry in March, 1998, to investigate media leaks that the African National Congress-led
government faces possible revolt and that unnamed sources are plotting to destabilise and
eventually overthrow the government. This, however, was later proved to be untrue.
Apart from the lack of proper housing around the country, millions of people living in
squalid squatter camps without any electricity and sanitation services, in extreme poverty and
with poor health facilities, a very high national unemployment rate that is suggested to be
around 40 per cent and impossible to determine because of the influx of illegal citizens from
other African countries, and a variety of basic problems such as illiteracy and a growing
impatience with the Reconstruction and Development Program, it further complicates the
transition to a country that offers a better future for all its citizens. Above all else, the national
crime rate is a major problem. It is a problem that threatens the future of democracy in South
Africa. And it impacts directly on the role of the media.8
There are serious fears that the socio-economic problems that grip South Africa are
exacerbated by the way in which the national press reports on these events, and in a more
sinister way, there are suggestions that the national press is embarking on a campaign to
actively undermine the work of the government by its constant negative and harmful focus,
ultimately giving the impression of a government unable to cope and in disarray.
At a news conference in Johannesburg in July, 1997, Mbeki said it was “quite clear
that if corruption in the police, the judicial system, the prisons services, and the Department of
Home Affairs is not stopped, you could have a collapse of the entire democratic system”.9 He
warned that crime was halting investor confidence and damaging the economy. Arrests that
take place within the police service were indicative of the extent of corruption within the
criminal justice system and he suggests it is not a problem that arises from mere greed but
from a lack of commitment to a democratic South Africa and that major crime syndicates
included security force members from the apartheid era.
Mbeki paints a chilling picture of a struggling democracy in crisis and almost on its
knees. This is a major problem not only for the Government, but it also has serious
ramifications for the role of the national media in a time of crisis. The media is independently
owned, guards its independence jealously and pursues a vigorous watch on government. For
the new black government, it is an approach that is too vigorous. Under normal
circumstances, there would be nothing wrong with this approach. Indeed, it is the traditional
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approach of the Western media in developed democracies, but in the prevailing circumstances
it certainly can be argued that it may not be the correct approach in the short term. In major
democracies such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and a number of
European countries with a healthy tradition and history of freedom of the press, it works well.
These countries are a long way down the road of democracy, social-economic problems
are not on the scale and intensity as is the case in the developing South Africa, and the bonds
of society are not threatened by complicated problems that will take many years to resolve.
Barriers to change
The South African Government accused the national media of pursuing a hidden agenda and
conducting a campaign which aims at undermining the new government. President Mandela
accused the media of being run by conservative whites living in the past and who are not
prepared to embrace the far-reaching transformation that is occurring across South Africa
since the National Party conceded apartheid was a failure. The plea is obviously for some sort
of developmental media system but without the onerous burden of censorship or government
restraint, perhaps something along the lines of the Indonesian pancasila press of President
Suharto that was expected to pursue an agenda that upholds the national interests.
But it is not hard to find fault with the Indonesian model that has now completely
fallen from favour. Under the pancasila philosophy and the notion of a new order, guided
democracy, political and economic turmoil continued unabated. Cronyism and corruption
flourished, government indiscretions and excesses went unreported because it was deemed
harmful to the national interests and racism flourished. The predominantly Muslim country
overwhelmed its Christian minority in the provinces in much the same way that Indonesia’s
ethnic Chinese business people were the victims of vicious racial assaults by indigenous
Indonesians, especially in Java. There were many important issues that the Indonesian press
was either reluctant or unable to pursue with vigour because of the developmental media
policy and the restrictions imposed by the terms of the Press Act of Indonesia. [See Appendix
E for an ASEAN model of the press.]
In the end, the developmental media became more of an uncritical extension of
government than the watchdog it ought to be. In short, there are as many problems with
adopting a developmental media framework that aims to work towards some loosely defined
national interest as there is pursuing a vigorous Western libertarian media approach.
There is also another subtle yet sinister hurdle that erodes the functionality of the
national press. It stems from hypocritical, influential members of the ANC government who
pay lip service to press freedom and do not desire the close scrutiny of the press for fear of
what might be uncovered. The war against apartheid is marked with atrocities by both whites
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and blacks. These crimes against humanity included acts of terrorism, kidnappings, poisoning,
torture and even murder. Innocent people were caught in the crossfire as the South African
army battled the “terrorists” and it is not an unrealistic suggestion that there are senior
government officials concealing misdeeds from a gruesome past. The black liberation fighters
of Umkonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) the armed wing of the ANC, have been well
rewarded for their efforts and now occupy senior roles in public office. Some of these office
bearers publicly declare a commitment to press freedom, but privately they have no
enthusiasm for the close scrutiny brought on by a vigorous, investigative free press.
The controversial ANC Women's League president, Winnie Madikizela-Mandela, is
one example of a freedom fighter with a chequered history. To millions of the poor black
masses from Soweto, Madikizela-Mandela remains a respected leader of the fight against
apartheid. To these mostly semi-literate blacks she remains the Mother of the Nation. There
are others who simply see her as a villain tainted by scandal, corruption, township violence
and linked to the murder of Stompie Sepei.10
Madikizela-Mandela accuses the South African print press of needing “urgent
introspection and a radical surgical transformation" to enhance democracy. She has endured a
mauling at the hands of the press for her excesses but espouses the same tired complaints that
the old media order must change, yielding place to new. However, Madikizela-Mandela does
not really want a vigorous press because she resents the close scrutiny that her affairs have
attracted. In much the same way, there are others who are now senior public office holders
and in government who also have much to hide from their days as freedom fighters. To them,
media criticism of the government is regarded as an attack on the black government, and
criticism of the government by black journalists is viewed as a betrayal of the sacrifices made
in the cause of the liberation struggle.
Addressing the Johannesburg Press Club in Braamfontein, Madikizela-Mandela
accused the media of being wedded to the old order of “Western racist supremacy, and out of
kilter with the new social order”.11 And she argued that the dilemma was to strike a balance
between two major cultures: a “dying fossilised European conservative liberalism and an
assertive emerging African renaissance”.
They [the media] use the conventions and values of a small section of our
society to define what constitutes a standard free press. They use their
freedom to push an agenda that is totally out of touch with African
society.12
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Madikizela-Mandela said politicians were being accused of wanting to manipulate the
press when they complained of sensational and partisan reporting, yet they were merely
asking for a free, fair and responsible press that understood the sensitivities of the majority.
By remaining wedded to Eurocentricism, the media has become a major
obstacle to the inception of our African renaissance.13
The media, according to Madikizela-Mandela, would continue to be perceived to be
loaded with the agenda of “racism and white superiority as long as editors remain loyal to
parties' political ideologies and are controlled by a business sector that is aligned to (those
parties') paradigms”.
Madikizela-Mandela has an unlikely ally in Gwen Ansell, the executive director of
the Institute for the Advancement of Journalism based in Johannesburg. Ansell laments the
deplorable standards of journalism in South Africa.
Writing propaganda infected all the parties to struggle. Its legacy is still
with us. Alongside this was Eurocentrism, which took not only the style
but also, quite uncritically, the news values of the West as the news values
of South Africa. The opportunity to develop an appropriate voice and set
of values for a developing, culturally rich African nation was ignored.14
Madikizela-Mandela’s reputation was forever sullied in the nine days that she
attended the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings in Johannesburg in December
1997. The deputy chairperson of the TRC Alex Boraine [2000] was scathing in his criticism
of Madikizela-Mandela who denied involvement in all of her alleged crimes despite the
evidence and blaming it on lies and exaggeration by the media. Boraine states:
For me, as someone who sat through the entire hearing, who read carefully
the account of the in-camera hearing, and who has now read over 3,000
pages of the transcript of the hearing, I can only conclude that anyone who
participated in that hearing, who listened to the many witnesses and
Madikizela-Mandela’s responses, would have to be naïve or blindly
committed to the point of worship if they believed that she (MadikizelaMandela) had not been aware of what was going on in her own home and
had not been party to what took place.15
In its final report tabled in 1998, the TRC was particularly harsh on MadikizelaMandela and the Mandela United Football Club, a group of gangsters who spread their reign
of terror in suburbs of Soweto at the command of Madikizela-Mandela. The Commission said
she was “central to the establishment and formation of the gang which later developed into a
private vigilante unit” that operated from her homes in Diepkloof and Orlando West.16

239

The Commission also found that the football club was involved in a number of
criminal activities including killings, torture, assaults and arson. It states further:

The Commission finds that those who opposed Ms Madikizela-Mandela
and the Mandela United Football Club, or dissented from them, were
branded as informers and killed … The Commission finds that Ms
Madikizela-Mandela failed to account to community and political
structures. Further, she is accountable, politically and morally, for the
gross human rights violations of the Mandela United Football Club. The
Commission finds further that Ms Madikizela-Mandela herself was
responsible for committing such gross violations of human rights.17
On that same day, The Star’s internet edition also reported Deputy President Thabo
Mbeki raised similar complaints. Although Mbeki has a decidedly different agenda to that of
Madikizela-Mandela, the basic principle remains to be domination and control of the
message.18 Addressing a meeting in Johannesburg of the International Advisory Board of
Independent Newspapers, Mbeki said the South African media was doing a bad job of
covering the positive aspects of South Africa's changing society. As an example, he said one
of the stories the media had until recently not reported was the fact that crime had been
dropping steadily since 1994.
Mbeki said the reason this development was ignored for so long was that there was a
“pessimistic mindset” that said crime was out of control. He added that this same mindset
contributed to a belief that good doctors came only out of places like the University of the
Witwatersrand and not the University of Transkei. He said positive aspects such as the fact
that the amount of steel sold in the first half of 1997 had equalled two-thirds of the steel sold
in the whole of 1996 was not fully understood or reported by the South African media. And
he pointed out that coverage of President Mandela's speech at the ANC's Mafikeng
conference in December, 1997 had demonstrated the deficiencies in South African
journalism.
He said 83 per cent of the information in Mandela's speech was not passed on to
readers. “How do we change the society if we don't even know about it?” he asked and he
also called for more transformation of the press so that different types of voices could be
heard.
Former Cape Herald news editor and Argus company employee for more than 16
years, Warren Ludski suggests the reluctance of the South African media to embrace change
is largely to maintain the status quo for as long as possible and to maintain the profitability of
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the newspapers for as long as possible.19 Ludski, a “coloured” journalist now working in
Australia, says change in the service provided by the media is inevitable but that change could
see a sharp fall in advertising revenue as the market changes and as the newspapers have to
adapt and make themselves accessible to a wider audience, indeed a poorer audience, a less
sophisticated audience, an audience that is less attractive to advertisers.
The results may be that editorial standards will shift and could even decline as the
focus of the news would shift to accommodate this changing readership which is both
financially and educationally disadvantaged and which is unlikely to share the political
dimensions and aspirations of the conservative white owners and operators. This shift, in turn,
will have a dramatic effect on advertisers and in turn this will have a deteriorating effect on
the profitability of the media.
Ultimately, newspaper editors are responsible to both the publishers and the
shareholders and profitability is crucial to the survival of the business. Ludski suggests that
for this reason, Independent Newspapers and the majority of the South African media are
reluctant to introduce sweeping changes to shift the policy of their newspapers to
accommodate a wider audience that better reflects the multiracially diverse South African
society and why they are slow to reshape the composition of editorial staffing which remains
conservatively white.
The editor at The Argus, in Cape Town, Moegsien Williams rejects the assumption
that his newspaper was reluctant to embrace widespread changes both at editorial policy level
and in staffing because it feared alienation or a backlash from advertisers. Williams points out
that The Argus has shifted to accommodate the variety of news, especially the rising crime on
the Cape Flats, while the group’s morning paper, The Cape Times, has shifted to become
more analytical.
In this way, the two Independent Newspapers publications can share the load and so
dominate the English-language newspaper market in the Western Cape. Williams also rejects
the calls from both Mbeki and Madikizela-Mandela that the media should be more compliant
or more supportive, preferring instead a vigorous exchange between the media and the
Government as a way of keeping both the government honest and fulfilling his obligations to
his readers by keeping them informed.20
The confrontation between government and the press in South Africa is not an
unusual situation. Newspapers the world over are always facing government pressure. In
practice, the national press is accused of hijacking the guarantees of free speech and
exercising the guarantees to freedom of the press to undermine government inadequacies and
failures. There is a conflict which has ominous implications with the Government suggesting
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it is the victim of some collaborative plot from a delinquent media bent on its demise. It is a
charge fiercely denied on all sides by the national media. On both sides of the argument there
is urgent need for rationalisation to find some middle ground.
It is a volatile combination of clashing ideologies in which there can be no winners
and little space to move between the extremity of authoritarian controls on the one hand and
leaving matters as they stand and wait, as Milton would have, for the matter to resolve itself
in the free marketplace of ideas. Whether a defiant government will wait for this long-term
transition or pursue the food-before-freedom argument remains to be seen. Whether the
government decides to change course and follow what is now the familiar and much despised
interventionist model typical in African countries where authoritarian governments control the
press is a more frightening although remote prospect.
For the South African government to move down this interventionist path will be
detrimental. To artificially correct this perceived imbalance or bias in media coverage by the
national press will be to resort no less to government interference and censorship. That is the
basic issue − whether to intervene or not. In many ways, the argument represents a microcosm
of the difficulties faced by developing Third World nations.
In the case of South Africa, the need to level the playing field to represent the
diversity of the new society in the national media could be used as a poor excuse to impose
some temporary restraint on the press. But it is fraught with danger. What will be the time
span of such an intrusive system? Who will decide and what will be the sanctions for the
transgressors? There are too many obstacles in such a retrogressive move. And there is an
immediate paradox within the provisions of the Bill of Rights and the constitutional
guarantees of a free press.
Perhaps what is needed is an appeal to the conscience. Just as the South African
Constitution guarantees freedom of the press under a Bill of Rights and just as the
government commits itself strenuously to a guarantee of freedom of information and a desire
for a vigorous and independent press, so too it needs a socially responsible press that will not
sink the ship during a stormy period.
The predominantly white-controlled media is perceived to be conservative and
historically biased against black majority rule and at the very least, to be unsupportive of the
new Government. There are constant calls from diverse quarters that the face of the media
should change to reflect the diversity of South African society. It is easier said than done for a
variety of reasons, the main one being economic.
Just as strong as the temptation by sections of the government to tamper with the
guarantees of Freedom of the Press should be resisted, there is a corresponding need for
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Western societies to realise that expectations of a true libertarian press, a Western model of
the press, at the present stage of South Africa’s national development would be premature.
On the one hand, authoritarian controls on the exchange and free flow of information,
or the method of press control so familiar in Africa, the developmental media theory so
popular with military and authoritarian governments, both have serious limitations.
Authoritarian media policies, and by extension developmental journalism, brings with it the
problems of self-censorship and inefficient government hiding behind a cloak of
developmental media secrecy – it is not in the national interest to criticise government failings
and excesses.
The future of the media’s role in post-apartheid South Africa represents a challenge to
liberal conscience. A delicate balance of freedom and control that will guarantee that the press
is free to criticise the government and to maintain the important social role of keeping society
suitably informed about the work of government is required. At the same time there is need
for a socially responsible media that will not threaten nor harm the national good. That is not
to suggest a media that is subservient and weak, dictated to by government policy and driven
by government ideology or controlled by some Minister in a far off office. The media needs
to take up the challenge of keeping the government honest and it needs to participate in the
transition from apartheid to democracy.
The national media cannot be expected to be a mouthpiece for government
propaganda and it is not the expectation of government that it should be so. At the heart of the
problem is whether a vigorous and independently owned national press can be an adversarial
press and simultaneously a developmental press working towards what is commonly
determined as being in the national interest.
In the final analysis, freedom of the press is a political decision. The type of press
which will develop in post-apartheid South Africa depends as much on political directive as
well as how the national press meets its challenge and its obligations to reflect the needs of
society. There is no denying the need for a socially responsible press but the issue at stake is
who is to determine this responsibility: Will it be self-determined, socially-determined or
politically determined?
While newspapers stand with one foot in the till, they have another important function
and that is to grease the wheels of democracy. Newspapers are not disinterested observers
offering comment, advice and reports on the political spectrum. They are active participants,
role players and shapers or destroyers of government policy while simultaneously acting as
the public watchdog and maintaining the free flow of information and ideas.
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We cannot seek a purely developmental model for the South African media for what
is already a technologically advanced and libertarian functioning media. That will mean
turning back the clock. The difficulty facing the Government is that it does not control nor
own its own newspaper as is the case in many developing countries. The South African media
is independently owned, spans a narrow base of concentrated ownership and generates a
confrontational approach between the government and the press.
This is no different to the way the media operates for example in the United States,
the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand or many developed nations of Europe where
there is a strong history of democracy. Any tampering with the freedom of the press would be
a devastating blow to a country that already is in the process of dismantling authoritarian
controls and a free press is the lifeblood of a free society. But if freedom of the press means
freedom from supervision and freedom from controls, then there is also a corresponding
obligation of social responsibility on the part of the press.
If it is then the case that newspapers should not only keep their readers informed but
also reflect the views of its readers, then it would be logical to ask who are these readers
whose views are reflected in an agenda that apparently seeks to undermine the efforts of the
government or at the very least appear negative towards the efforts of nation building and
reconstruction. The ruling African National Congress holds 62 per cent of the national vote
and a merger with the Inkatha Freedom Party will lift the total to nearly 75 per cent of the
national vote. In these very broad terms, it would appear that on this assumption, it is curious
that the newspapers are claiming to be reflecting the views of its readers.
However, under the authoritarian controls of the Nationalists during the apartheid era,
the South African press has suffered so much oppression and harassment and it would be
wrong to replace one sort of oppression with a different version no matter how noble the aims
or intentions. Albie Sachs [1990] sees the problem as one that provides to reconcile the need
for openness and the right to speak one’s mind with the necessity for healing the wounds
created by racism. Conceding that huge obstacles exist to temper the free flow of information
in South Africa, Sachs says:
We must remember that the objective is to open doors that are at present
closed, not to create more blockages to the free circulation of ideas and
information. We would have gained little if we were to replace the present
media controls with new ones that simply switch the propaganda and
biases around if one realm of banality takes over from another. Truth has
always favoured the democratic cause, and our people are tired of forever
being protected in the name of what others think is good for them.21
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In the emerging democracy, there are enormous expectations on the government to
deliver on a variety of matters that restricted the lives of oppressed people, not least among
them the need for improved access to the media. Addressing the issue before the adoption of
the new Constitution, Sachs says there are many questions which bear indirectly but
significantly on the question of free speech and in turn a free press.
At present, the press in South Africa is anything but open and anything but
non-racial. The Rand Daily Mail, the most informative and widely
respected daily newspaper of the 1960s and 70s, was closed not on
journalistic grounds, but because its circulation was too high among blacks
who had no money and too low among whites who had money. In absolute
market terms, nothing should be free, not even speech. English-language
and Afrikaans-language monopolies control virtually the whole of the
commercial press, and not only the press itself but most of printing and
distribution. Similarly, broadcasting is almost entirely in the hands of the
state. What the commercial and state monopolies have in common is that
they are completely white-dominated, locked into the apartheid structures.
This affects not only the appointment of journalists, but the very
determination of what is front-page news.22
As an equitable resolution, Sachs offers two possible options: firstly the new
government can either shut people up and decide on their behalf what to do with the limited
resources, or else involve people themselves in making informed choices.
Clearly the latter requires the maximum circulation of information and
ideas. Freedom of expression and accountability thus become inseparable
... We look to our articulate, technically experienced, and battle-scarred
media people to lead the way in proposing solutions.23
To facilitate change in the South African press, it is my view that it would be prudent
as well as pragmatic at this stage of national development for the government to implement an
uncomplicated policy to foster a new media order that can clearly spell out obligations and
expectations for all parties concerned, the levels of freedom of the press within the legislative
boundaries and a media mission statement.
The role and aim for the media must be clearly spelled out and the limitations or
direction of the national press must be clearly signposted. It is not a desirable situation but it
is a simple way of levelling the playing field and speeding up the changes that are sought of
the press. This basic philosophy of the relationship between media and government must be
simply described to include what is expected and what is determined by the national and the
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public interest. It must be a statement that can be readily understood by the bulk of the
population and if newspapers contravene it, it must be clear to the bulk of the population that
there was a determined breach of the policy. There must be sanctions in place to dissuade the
offenders and to ensure that the policy is workable. Not by the traditional methods of the
National Party such as banning orders or closures, harassment, or a variety of complicated
laws, but by imposing punitive measures on the offending newspapers. The offenders could
be fined an amount that will indicate the seriousness of the transgression. Newspapers must
always be free to publish, but that freedom will then come at a price, with the risk of a fine.
However, the option for imposing a fine must be imposed by an independent party such as a
press tribunal.
Options for the implementation of the new media order can include an instalment
plan which can be reviewed and amended after a set number of years. The framework of the
new media order must remain within the provisions of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
It can operate much in the way that South African law still restricts detailed reporting of
divorce cases in court.24
Reshaping the landscape to facilitate a New Media Order
The route of authoritarian controls holds little promise because it will reflect the methods of
the past. It will be more pragmatic to seek these changes with the cooperation of the press
rather than to charge ahead in a confrontational way and force changes upon a reluctant target.
If ever there was a window of opportunity to initiate a new media system, then it would
have been in 1993 or the months earlier when the Constitutional talks were underway. It was
a period of immense optimism in South Africa. There is no chance of a systematic change in
the way that the media operates in South Africa.
What is urgently needed is an attitudinal change that will speed up the process of
integration in the national newsrooms. Instead of looking to artificial mechanisms, the South
African press must refocus its efforts and concentrate on improving the quality of journalism.
There is ample opportunity to improve newspaper standards. Some of the areas that need
attention include top-quality investigative journalism, gender issues, health and social
welfare, the effects of AIDS-related deaths, poverty and the effects of high unemployment.
Finance journalism is also neglected in most of the major newspapers and there is a need to
boost the standard of analytical reporting in business and finance.
Elements of a developmental media model with aspects of the public journalism
concept also hold promise. Implementation of a uniquely South African media system needs
further research.
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Berger [1995] says that in developing a national communications policy, there is no
need to reinvent the wheel because suitable proven models exist internationally and can be
adapted to suit the particular needs of the South African situation.25 Jackson [1993] also
signals the need for change and considers a liberal democratic model although he concedes
that it might be an ideal that is unattainable and out of favour with many Afrikaans or
alternative journalists.
Yet, even if this were so, the press ought to set its sights on no less a target
because of the protection that a liberal democratic view of the press
provides… Although the benefits of liberal democracy will not soon be
realized, if ever, in South Africa its journalists ought to demand nothing
less than the generous protections that such an approach assures them. Nor
should the press settle for less than offering its society the high quality of
journalism needed for liberal democratic societies to function optimally.26
The development of the South African press has moved on steadily since 1993 and
while Jackson’s suggestion is but one of several that has validity and merit, some additional
options could include:
1.

The development of a national media charter and time-frame development plan to
assist the speedy transformation of the national press. As outlined above, this option
will only flow from a positive decision by the national press to reorganise towards a
type of media more in keeping with the transformation that has occurred since the
demise of the apartheid system.
This will be an undeniably difficult adjustment for the media to make because there is
already in place the press of a developed nation. However, the reason why this is so is
because it catered almost exclusively to the white middle-class markets and was driven
by white middle-class advertising, political agendas aside. The emerging market is
decidedly different and less attractive, and whether the decision to meet the
transformation demands is political or not, the economics of the situation make it an
unattractive proposition.
So, it seems logical then, that to push for the changes that are so desperately required of
the press to have a hand in nation building, there will have to be either some incentive
or some directive from the government. Gavin Stewart [1990] also raises the options
for a national press charter within the framework of a Bill of Rights, a Freedom of
Information Act and “above all a sincere conviction in the hearts of our citizens that
open government and free speech are the lifeblood of democracy this will be the most
difficult condition to put in place”.27
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At the same conference, Alison Gillwald warned that a vibrant and dynamic press run
by ethical journalists will not simply rise out of the embers of apartheid, nor through a
media framework imposed from above whoever is above.
One of the major sources of media power in free societies is normative. It
is the norms and values of society that determine the acceptance or
rejection of media practices and content far more than state legislation or
media councils. The media in South Africa are particularly vulnerable
because they cannot find refuge in the public’s indignation or rage when
their freedom is curbed.28
2.

Incentives such as subsidies to protect struggling newspapers and to provide a wider
cross-section of views to the community is one option but in a country where money
is better directed towards alleviating poverty and sickness, it would seem clear that
some sort of limited directive could be feasible. Instead of the subsidised
newspapers being confrontational, it could be skewed to focus more on matters of
national interest and development. It is to be anticipated that this suggestion would
find extreme distaste among libertarians and it is expected that the press will put up
obstinate protests and fight against any suggestion that they be told in which way to
act.
But were one to focus more specifically on how most newsrooms operate then it will
become clear that individual journalists on just about any newspaper, while
delivering whatever reports they do, have very limited input into the news selection
process, the direction and agenda of the newspaper, even the placement of
individual reports. Newspapers operate on a pyramid structure and the vast number
of journalists that combine to produce the product are by and large unaware most
times of what others are doing unless it impacts upon their tasks. It is inevitably left
to the editors and their trusted assistants to select copy, formulate policy and
direction − to set the agenda that is ultimately the cause for so much concern by the
government. The power is concentrated in the hands of a trusted few faceless media
executives.
The suggestion of subsidies is not unique, and media commentators Eric Louw and
Gavin Stewart amongst many have supported the subsidy plan. It is a concept that in
South Africa, no less than anywhere else, has serious organisational disadvantages
as well as being susceptible to abuse and mismanagement.

3.

Options for a vernacular media pose some challenges for the national media. With
such large numbers of semi-literate and illiterate people in South Africa who are
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deprived of any aspect of the media to keep them informed, or those people in many
parts of the country who speak a vernacular language, usually poorly educated
people who speak a mixture of English and Afrikaans, there is a need to provide
some basic form of news medium in keeping with the reconstruction and
development plan. However, it is a task that could be too expensive for the media
groups to consider, and with very little prospect of any sort of returns.
This could be an option for some statutory bodies such as local councils to step in to
produce some form of basic information sheets that will keep the poor equally
informed on matters of importance and perhaps even include government plans such
as community health schemes, sewerage improvements in the squatter camps, plans
for electricity supplies or even extra taps, and so on.
If these sorts of publications are taken on by local councils or even community
groups, it is an area where perhaps the government could offset the costs by
providing printing and other associated facilities and subsidising these sorts of basic
information sheets on a small scale rather than moving into the costly business of
newspaper subsidies.
4.

Increased commitment to journalism training and education. There is a strong need
to educate the public in the role and their expectations of the media in an effort to
prevent the type of harassment of journalists that leads to censorship through fear.
High school pupils should be introduced to media studies from the first year of high
school − as is the case in Australia and many other countries, with major strands
offered in the final two years of high school. In the same way, there is a serious need
to improve training facilities for South African journalists. Some media
organisations have already developed strategies for staff improvement but much
more needs to be done to improve both content and quality of the press. A skills
audit by the South African Newspaper Editors’ Forum in 2000 found major
shortfalls among journalists including: poor reporting skills, a lack of concern with
accuracy, poor writing skills, a lack of life skills, low levels of commitment, weak
interviewing skills, weak legal knowledge, lack of sensitivity, weak knowledge of
ethics, poor historical and contextual knowledge of journalism and a low level of
training.29
Steven Wrottesley [2002] the editorial chief of staff at Independent Newspapers
Cape, traces this basic lack of journalism skills to around 1977, a high point of the
apartheid era when many senior journalists either quit the profession or left the
country to work elsewhere and again in the late 1980s when many editorial
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production journalists were lured away to join overseas corporations introducing the
new computerised printing systems. South African newsrooms were the pioneers of
“cold type” digital setting with most metro newspapers adopting the Atex computer
editing and reporting system in the 1970s and trained computer production
journalists were snapped up by news organisations in Australia, Canada and the UK
as they came online.
Eight years after the first democratic election in South Africa, journalism
is no longer seen as “sexy”. Many who would have gone into the media
now seek the greater rewards of other professions or in top government
jobs. It is accepted that these reasons, and probably a plethora of other
ones, have led to serious skills shortages for South African journalism.30
5.

Pay, conditions and lack of career options need to be improved dramatically,
especially in the case of black and coloured journalists who work at the lower levels
of the profession. By raising the standards and conditions for younger journalists,
the profession will be much better positioned to keep their staff. And by lifting the
rewards and conditions, incrementally they will hopefully also raise the profile of
journalism as a desirable and worthy vocation.

6.

Changing the gatekeepers of information: more black and coloured sub-editors must
be trained as an urgent measure. Some news corporations have fast tracked this
initiative but much more needs to be done. Already, the South African Newspaper
Editors’ Forum and media executives have committed themselves to increased
training facilities at the major media publishers, more cooperation between
publishers on the provision of journalism training, and increased interaction with
journalism training institutions such as universities and technikons.
Among the plans agreed to by editors, senior journalists and educators were:
a.

To have trained coaches in newsrooms to work with reporters. Training
institutions will develop and run courses to train coaches.

b.

To put punitive measures in place in news rooms and training institutions to
combat inaccuracies in reporting.

c.

To train journalism experts in media houses as content assessors and to ensure
media houses take part in the consultation process on journalism unit standards
(part of South Africa’s outcomes-based education). Both measures would establish
the levels of expertise expected of journalists.
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d.

To develop a closer relationship between tertiary and other training institutions
and the media throughout the country by holding regional and national meetings to
establish the highest standards of journalism.

e.

The group will also put in place methods to improve historical, contextual and
legal knowledge of journalists and to promote a reading culture.31
In the final analysis, even if nothing is done to facilitate structural change in the South

African media, and the preferred option is to await a metamorphosis, the press can swiftly
benefit by:
•

Improving the credibility of newspapers by improving the quality of the product
and lifting the image of journalism as a worthy profession and desirable career
option;

•

Improving career structures and staff training options for reporters, sub-editors and
managers;

•

Improving conditions and pay structures for journalists, particularly at the lower
levels where promising talent is being lured away by the public service as well as
the private sector.
This thesis has considered the inherent difficulties associated with the transformation

of the South African press and identified options for change in the emerging democracy.
Further research can build on this body of work by considering the effects of racial bias in the
newsroom, media bias and discrimination in the post-apartheid press. There is also
opportunity for further research into the merits of a uniquely South African media model that
incorporates aspects of public journalism, the developmental model, and the Western
libertarian model to achieve that delicate balance between the role of the press and what the
government expects of the national press in terms of the national interest.
The bulk of the research for this thesis is limited to the 1990s when Nelson Mandela
was still president. There are signs that the rift between the government and the press is no
longer an unbridged chasm and indications are that a metamorphosis is underway that will
lead to even greater transformation of the press.
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Notes for Chapter Eight

1.

Government Communication and Information System manual in terms of section 14 of
the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000 (Act No 2 of 2000),
www.gcis.gov.za/docs/publications/manual.htm/

2.

Green, Pippa, Struggling for Memory Against Forgetting: the English-language
newspapers may have been too timid, even collaborated, Nieman Reports, The Nieman
Foundation for Journalism, Harvard University, Volume 52, No 4 Winter 1998, page 3.

3.

Skjerdal, Terje Steinulfsson, Responsible Watchdogs? Normative Theories of the press
in Post-Apartheid South Africa. A discourse analysis of 102 newspaper articles, 199699, Masters dissertation, Graduate Program in Cultural and Media Studies, Natal
University, February, 2001, chapter 6.

4.

Green, Pippa, Struggling for Memory Against Forgetting: the English-language
newspapers may have been too timid, even collaborated, Nieman Reports, The Nieman
Foundation for Journalism, Harvard University, Volume 52, No 4 Winter 1998, page 3.

5.

Fisher, Ryland, Changing the paradigm of South African media, The Cape Times
editorial comment, August 2000.

6.

Ibid, Fisher.

7.

Ibid, Fisher.

8.

South African crime statistics and related research data collected from the Institute of
Security Studies, Pretoria, http://www.iss.co.za/index.html

9.

Mbeki, Thabo, Crime Threatens South Africa’s democracy, Associated Press

wire

service, July 14, 1997.
10. Stompie Sepei was a 14-year-old Soweto activist who was abducted by members of the
Mandela United soccer club linked to Winnie Madikizela-Mandela. Sepei was later
murdered by the gangsters and gang leader Jerry Richardson was jailed for life.
11. The Star internet edition, February 18, 1998, Press needs radical change, says Winnie.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
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14. Ansell, Gwen, (2001) Getting Down And Dirty: What needs fixing in SA journalism?
Interviewed by Marisa Rodrigues, www.iaj.org.za
15. Boraine, Alex, A Country Unmasked: Inside South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, Oxford University Press, 2000, page 253.
16. Ibid, page 254.
17. Ibid, page 254.
18. Ibid, Mbeki tells SA press to be more positive, Star internet edition, Feb 18, 1998.
19. Ludski, Warren, news editor of the defunct Argus publication The Cape Herald,
personal interview. The Cape Herald was one of the Argus newspapers aimed at the
“Coloured” market in Cape Town and Port Elizabeth.
20. Williams, Moegsien, editor of The Argus, in Cape Town, personal interview, March 8,
1998.
21. Sachs, Albie, Protecting human rights in a new South Africa, Oxford University Press,
Cape Town, 1990, pages 51-52.
22. Ibid, Chapter 4, Free Speech -unlimited or qualified.
23. Ibid, p. 52.
24. A case in point here is the injunction that was taken out by Earl Spencer to gag the press
from reporting proceedings in his divorce hearing in the Cape Town Supreme Court.
Lawyers for Earl Spencer sought and received a gagging order from the court that
restricted South African newspapers from reporting details about his divorce
proceedings − especially the two Cape Town metropolitan newspapers The Argus and
The Cape Times who were ordered not to publish further details of the proceedings.
Judge Siraj Desai found for the earl but the newspapers’ lawyer, Milton Seligson,
argued that the case was about fundamental rights as it relates to the function of the
press and it should be seen as a clear breach of the provisions of free speech. The earl’s
lawyers argued that the case should be seen as a clear breach of the current law as it
relates to reporting divorce proceedings, no matter what the Constitution says. The
newspapers readily admit they acted illegally but within the parameters of the
guarantees of freedom of the press. In this instance the laws as it affects reporting of
divorce proceedings were upheld despite the constitutional provisions. In this way the
new media order must also operate within the parameters of the Constitution. See
Associated Press, wire service reports, November 22-27, 1997, Diana’s brother seeks to
gag media in divorce case, also The Argus and Cape Times same dates.
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25. Berger, Guy, International Experience: Government Communication and Media Policy,
paper delivered at Conference of Communicators, Arniston, August 25-27, 1995.
26. Jackson, Gordon S., Breaking Story

the South African Press, Westview Press,

Colorado, 1993. pp 223, 233.
27. Stewart, Gavin, Traditions of Control: Can our media escape its past, paper delivered at
the conference The Shape and Role of the Media in a New South Africa, hosted jointly
by Idasa and the campaign for an Open Media, Johannesburg, November 23-25.
28. Gillwald, Alison, Media Morality: More than codes of Ethics, , paper delivered at the
conference The Shape and Role of the Media in a New South Africa, hosted jointly by
Idasa and the campaign for an Open Media, Johannesburg, November 23-25.
29. South African National Editors’ Forum (Sanef) survey 2002, www.sanef.org.za
30. Wrottesley, Steven, South African news struggles to emerge from apartheid,
International Press Institute, Global Journalist, Fourth Quarter, 2002, pp 15-17.
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Appendix A
Main Newspapers of South Africa: their approximate circulations and base cities
National
Sunday Times

weekly

505 500

Rapport

weekly

390 500

City Press

weekly

267 500

daily

208 250

daily

27 750

Argus

daily

89 000

Cape Times

daily

55 000

Die Burger

daily

95 000

weekly

120 000

Daily News

daily

81 000

Natal Mercury

daily

50 000

Sunday Tribune

weekly

115 000

daily

37 750

Sowetan
Bloemfontein
Volksblad

Cape Town

Weekend Argus

Durban

East London
Daily Despatch
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Indaba

weekly

37 000

Imvo

weekly

19 350

Star

daily

182 000

Citizen

daily

145 000

Beeld

daily

116 500

Business Day

daily

35 000

EP Herald

daily

31 250

Evening Post

daily

17 500

Die Burger

daily

15 500

weekly

36 250

daily

27 500

daily

24 000

Johannesburg

Port Elizabeth

Weekend Post

Pietermaritzburg
Natal Witness

Pretoria
Pretoria News

(Note: Figures from AMPS and SARAD, as at December 1997.

274

Appendix B

South African National Editors’ Forum, Mission statement declaration of intent,
organisation and program of action. October 18-20, 1996, Cape Town.
A. Preamble.
We, South Africa’s most senior print and broadcast editors and journalism educators
and trainers, gathered at the Breakwater Lodge in Cape Town for the history unity conference
of the Black Editors’ Forum and the Conference of Editors from October 18 to 20, 1996, to
launch the South African National Editors’ Forum.
Recognising past injustices in the media, we commit ourselves to a program of action
to overcome these injustices and to defend and promote media freedom and independence.
Belief. It is our belief and understanding that:
1.

Public and media scrutiny of the exercise of political and economic power is
essential;

2.

The law related to the operation of media should be consistent with South
Africa’s Bill of Rights in its protection of freedom of expression;

3.

Journalists and media owners have a duty to work to the highest professional
standards and ethics;

4.

Journalists and journalism teachers should embrace a learning culture by
committing themselves to on-going education and training.

Declaration of Intent:
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1.

To nurture and deepen media freedom as a democratic value in all our
communities and at all levels of our society;

2.

To foster solidarity among journalists and to promote co-operation in all matters
of common concern;

3.

To address and redress inappropriate racial and gender imbalances prevalent in
journalism and news organisations and encourage corrective action and a
transformation of culture within the industry;

4.

To promote media diversity in the interests of fostering maximum expression of
opinion;

5.

To promote the process of media education and to help aspirant and practising
journalists acquire or develop skills;

6.

To promote professional freedom and independence in broadcast media and all
media funded by public authorities;

7.

To encourage government to ensure transparency and openness in administration
and to pass laws ensuring maximum freedom of information;

8.

To use all available institutions to defend media freedom.

Organisation: To give effect to the above intent, we commit ourselves to establishing an
organisation with the following structure:
1.

Structure

1.1

The organisation is called the South African National Editors’ Forum.

1.2

The executive body is called the Editors’ Council. It is made up of 20 members.
The interim agreement for one year is that the 20 members consist of five BEF,
five COE, five broadcast editors and five representatives of magazines, interest
groups and journalism educators. After the interim period, the Council would be
elected from the general membership. The Editors’ Council shall have a
chairperson and a
deputy chairperson. They shall be voted into position by the Editors’
Council. This Council should endeavour to meet at least four times a year.

Programme of Action
This conference instructs the Editors’ Council to:
1.

Draft a constitution so as to accurately reflect the spirit and intent of this
founding conference.
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2.

Prepare an annual report on corrective action in the industry and actively lobby
media employers for the implementation thereof.

3.

Draft a charter to protect editorial independence and seek the endorsement of
stakeholders including Government, political parties and media owners. Such
charter will include a code of journalistic ethics and conduct.

4.

Promote and defend media freedom by: establishing channels of communication
with Government, judiciary and relevant statutory bodies using all available
institutions to defend media freedom including the Constitutional Court,
parliamentary bodies and the Public Protector. This should include the repeal of
all restrictive legislation, promoting a culture of a freedom of expression in the
community by means of a public education programme.

5.

Together with other bodies such as the Print Media Association, Independent
Media Diversity Trust and major media owners investigate means of promoting
media diversity to further the free flow of information and give support to news
organisations owned and controlled by people from disadvantaged communities.

6.

Together with other relevant training bodies, investigate the promotion of media
education and training.

October 20, 1996, Cape Town
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Appendix C
[Additional aspects of the Independent Newspapers submission the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission.]

Spies in the newsrooms
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, investigating abuses of the apartheid era, invited
all the major news organisations to participate in a week-long special hearing into the role of
the media during the apartheid era. It started September 17, 1997.
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Independent Newspapers and the Times Media group accepted the invitation to appear
at the hearings but the Afrikaner press proprietors refused to attend. Nationale Pers rejected
outright the efforts of the TRC to investigate the actions of the Press and the Afrikaans
newspaper Beeld threatened its editorial staff with dismissal if they chose to give submissions
to the TRC. Truth commissioner Dumisa Ntsebeza told the hearing that if the threats were
correct, then it was a great pity.
Arri de Beer, a former Afrikaner journalist and now media lecturer and researcher at
Potchefstroom University, testified in his personal capacity. He said few things had made
such a dramatic impact on his life and consciousness as testimony to the Truth Commission
about atrocities at Vlakplaas, headquarters of the security police “death squads” and he had
been sickened and horrified by revelations of human-rights abuses by Vlakplaas operatives,
which had made clear the evils of apartheid. Professor De Beer told the Truth Commission
that in his work as a journalist he had at times kept quiet when he should have spoken out
volubly. He said the absence of the Afrikaans media from the hearings would be seen as a
violation of history.
Afrikaans media and their intellectuals had operated inside a “mielie driehoek” (maize
triangle) mentality which was only found between Potchefstroom, Bloemfontein and Pretoria,
and the Afrikaans media had played an important part in building and maintaining the evil
which was apartheid. He did not believe it was possible for former National Party cabinet
ministers to claim they did not know about human-rights abuses. Now the chance was being
offered via the commission to heal past transgressions, but it was not being taken up by
Afrikaners. “If you look at this particular commission and its work, and one has to write about
it in years to come, one of the main issues which will come to the fore is that Afrikaans
people like myself did not know.” This was one of the main failings of the Afrikaans media
that it did not properly inform its readers about the evils being perpetrated in the country.
At the hearings, the South African newspaper industry also came under fierce criticism
from black journalists who accused the national press of largely colluding with the apartheid
government and for practising petty apartheid in newsrooms. The journalists also accused the
mainstream newspaper companies of denying them the same training and promotional
opportunities as their white counterparts, and some charged that discriminatory practices were
continuing in spite of recent changes in newspaper ownership. Members of the Forum of
Black Journalists, a media pressure group with the main aim of enhancing training and
professional advancement for black journalists, said in its official submission, by Mondli
Makhanya and Abbey Makoe, that the forum accused the English and Afrikaans press, and
the South African Broadcasting Corporation of colluding with successive National Party
governments to perpetuate apartheid.
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This they did by actively enforcing discriminatory laws in their own institutions, using
terminology and language that was ideologically in keeping with the National Party
governments, and in conflict with the forces fighting for the eradication of apartheid. “They
failed to inform the populace about the evil that was going on around them and victimised
those in their employ who were actively opposing apartheid,” the Forum delegates told the
TRC.
Sowetan night editor Mike Tissong, who started work in newspapers in the 80s,
outlined the cost of ignoring the voice of black journalists at that time. He started his career as
a cadet reporter at the Star, in Johannesburg. Tissong described how a young white journalist
who was given the opportunity to sit on the newsdesk to check copy “acted as she felt against
staff who were not white”. Tissong said although his stories were used as he had written them,
his byline was removed. “And there was no recourse for the black staffer who was subjected
to this offensive treatment,” Tissong said. He said there was also a tendency among senior
white journalists to disbelieve stories filed by black staff. He cited as an example the incident
in Duduza, on the East Rand, when a number of young activists blew themselves up after
trying to use hand-grenades that were booby-trapped. “Rich Mkhondo (a reporter on the Star)
and I received calls one morning that several youngsters in Duduza township had died in
explosions. Rich set off for the township while I stayed in the office to pull the story together.
Our contacts were adamant that a security policeman had infiltrated the group and given them
grenades which were set to explode as soon as the pins were pulled. He convinced the group
that he was a trained Umkhonto we Sizwe [the ANC’s armed wing] guerrilla who needed them
to carry out a mission.”
Tissong said some of the youths were killed and others maimed when they tried to
attack homes of councillors. Tissong told the Truth Commission that when he filed the story
for The Star, he was met with disbelief at the angle he had taken, and a white reporter was
asked to get the official police version of what had happened. “The whole story was made
into a watered down version of what happened that night,” he said. Despite this, Tissong said,
police laid charges over the report. “I went to court alone to face charges in terms of an Act in
which it was an offence to tell lies about the police. After several trips to court, my attorney
and I were informed that the police were dropping the case.” About 10 years later Vlakplaas
police operative Joe Mamasela boasted on television that he had set up the operation to have
youngsters killed and maimed.
In separate hearings, Jon Qwelane, who is now editor-in-chief of Mafube Publishing,
and Thami Mazwai, a director at the same company, said the mainstream media in the country
were well placed to challenge the injustices of apartheid. Instead they chose to do otherwise.
They accused the country’s main newspapers, including the Star, the Sunday Times and the
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now-defunct Rand Daily Mail, of using apartheid legislation against black journalists who
fought the system. Qwelane lambasted the editors for concluding a pact with former state
president P. W. Botha in agreeing that the country was in danger of a total communist
onslaught in the 1980s. Shortly afterwards P.W. Botha declared a state of emergency which
resulted in gross violations of human rights. Qwelane told the TRC:
I want to charge all the mainstream newspapers English and Afrikaans with collusion
with apartheid and having a hand, directly or indirectly, in the subsequent murder of tens of
thousands of black people by the apartheid army and police. I’m not off my rocker.
He told the commission that by deciding not to publish stories that highlighted the
political problem and black people’s struggle against apartheid, the mainstream newspapers
denied the public a basic human right, the right to be informed.
Qwelane said the editors “often waxed eloquent in stinging editorials, condemning the
apartheid system” but failed to match their words with action. The newspapers, he said, also
practised apartheid in the workplace. “Black journalists were not given any training at all.
Indeed everything that I know about journalism has been learned by trial and error,” Qwelane
said. “In very many cases the lack of training was often used as a convenient excuse to deny
black journalists promotion on the newspapers on which they worked. It often depended on
the goodwill of the particular editor to correct what was evidently wrong in denying blacks
promotion.” Qwelane said black journalists were also paid less than their white counterparts.
Both Qwelane and Thami Mazwai cited cases in which editors hid behind the state
apparatus to punish black journalists for defying apartheid. Mazwai said that while working at
the Rand Daily Mail, he was once made to forfeit his leave for the two days he had spent in
police detention after taking part in a march in 1978. Qwelane said the Star refused to pay
him for three months after he had refused to register at the pass office, as required of black
workers. The collusion with apartheid went even further because facilities at these
newspapers were also separated along racial lines, Qwelane said. Blacks could not share
canteens and toilets with their white colleagues. Black facilities left much to be desired,
Qwelane said. “Were these not human-rights violations?” he asked. He acknowledged,
however, that there were “periodic flashes of courage and brilliance [by mainstream
newspapers] by exposing the gross injustices under which we lived, to the rest of the world”.
Qwelane related another incident to the Commission which he said still remained with
him. On a Friday on the beat, he remembered, a black man had committed suicide, leaving
seven children destitute. On the same day, a truck with sheep had overturned on the highway.
The sheep made it on to the first page of the Sunday Star. The seven children and a destitute
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mother just squeezed on to the news pages of the Africa edition, the edition that was directed
at black readers.
John Horak, journalist and spy
A former journalist at the Rand Daily Mail, John Horak described his life as a professional
police agent caught between the murderous intentions of his handlers and the media
establishment. He told the Truth Commission hearings that his former handlers tried to
assassinate him after he was finally forced out in 1985. His life was also threatened several
times by his handlers while he was working for them. This had forced him to flee the country
with the assistance of the ANC after he was driven out of the security forces. He was
subsequently instrumental in drawing up guidelines for the new South Africa’s intelligence
community.
Horak said journalists who acted as informers under apartheid were “two-a-penny” in
those days. He said half the newspapers’ newsrooms were made up of journalists who were
sympathetic to the apartheid state and others who were lumped together as communists. He
claimed many senior editors knew of his work, but they did not take any action against him at
the time. He singled out the former Sunday Times editor Tertius Myburgh as one of the
editors who had knowingly co-operated with him. He said former Sunday Express editor Ken
Owen had also allowed police spy Craig Williamson to write a column under an assumed
name in his newspaper. Horak said he was also often approached by journalists seeking
favours from him because they knew he was a police spy. Many, including an assistant
Sunday Times editor, whom he did not name, had approached him, seeking his assistance in
getting into contact with the security forces so that they could work for them.
He said informers were divided into three main categories: agents who were
professional policemen doing a job; informers who gave information freely or for money on a
regular basis; and “sleepers”, who would give information when it suited them. He expressed
sympathy for journalists who believed in what they were doing because the small pool of
newspapers in South Africa meant there were few alternative employment opportunities.
Horak’s testimony contained many gaps because TRC regulations prevented him from
naming individuals who were still alive and working in the media, but he revealed that he had
spent more than 30 hours being “debriefed” by the commission.
Don Mattera, victim of a spy campaign
Don Mattera worked as a journalist for many years at the Star’s Johannesburg offices and he
was also a member of the Forum of Black Journalists. Mattera told the Truth Commission’s
inquiry into the media that he, too, accused white South Africans of thriving under apartheid
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and he said the state of journalism cannot be divorced from the rotten state of South Africa as
it pertained.
Mattera, who was banned and subjected to repeated raids on his home by security
police, was particularly scathing about his former news room colleague John Horak, who
testified about his role as a police spy on newspapers. Accusing Horak of “whispering
campaigns” against several journalists, including himself, Mr Mattera said that had it not been
for President Mandela and his campaign for reconciliation, “John Horak would have been
dead by my hand”. There had to be a “total catharsis and purge” of South African society and
the media had to be “reformed” until it represented the country’s demography, he said.
Independent Newspapers and the TRC
Independent Newspapers chief executive officer, Ivan Fallon, conceded at the TRC that there
were shortcomings in the activities of the former Argus company from the 1960s until the
early 1990s and that it was “deeply regretted”.
“We make no bones about these ... We regret them deeply,” he said. “But the company
has changed dramatically, and I reject very strongly [the claim] that an apartheid mindset
exists in this company today.” Rory Wilson, the managing-director of Independent
Newspapers Cape, said the Argus had been “a rather staid, cautious and slow-moving
newspaper company”. It had been so strongly driven by commercial motives that it “often
blunted its cutting edge in exposing the wrongs of apartheid and human rights violations”.
Also, it had made insufficient effort to overcome obstacles to the free access of news,
imposed by apartheid laws. However, the Argus had also operated in a hostile legal and
political context, he said. “Journalists were constantly harassed, threatened, abused and
intimidated for doing their duty as they sought simultaneously to serve the interests of a
largely white readership and a repressed, restless black majority.”

Wilson told the Truth Commission that the new leadership of Independent Newspapers
had devoted much time and effort to ensuring that the imbalances of the past were redressed
and that the shortcomings of the old Argus company did not persist and that a great deal was
being done at all levels in terms of training, education and upgrading of staff from
disadvantaged backgrounds. Ivan Fallon rejected a statement made earlier during the hearing
by Thami Mazwai, head of Mafube Publishing and a former Argus employee, that the
“apartheid mindset” lived on at Independent Newspapers. “Whatever has been said about the
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old Argus Newspapers, Dr Tony O’Reilly and Independent Newspapers [which bought the
company in 1993] have been from the outset significant friends of the new South Africa,”
Fallon told the Truth Commission.
Wilson detailed the company’s shortcomings and said although many editors and
journalists had taken a courageous stance in opposing apartheid, more should have been done.
“Our company made insufficient efforts to overcome the obstacles of apartheid. Our staffs
were generally too white, and blacks were only introduced on any major scale during the
1970s. We made insufficient attempts to generate news from disadvantaged communities, and
this led to a distortion. The alternative press showed up our company for having lost touch
with the oppressed masses.”
Times Media Group and the TRC
Cyril Ramaphosa, chief executive at Times Media Limited, told the Truth Commission that
the TML group was committed to transforming itself. Mr Ramaphosa, who led TML’s
submission to the TRC hearing on the role of the media during apartheid, said the English
newspapers in South Africa had played “in the main” a courageous role in unearthing the
evils of apartheid, but more had to be done.
He said criticisms of the way TML’s newspapers had produced news were true,
particularly coverage of news relating to black people. This, and people’s mindsets, had to
change. He gave the assurance that issues raised in the hearings had not “gone in one ear and
out the other”. His editors were attending the hearings and were paying particular attention to
the criticisms and were “internalising” them, he said. Ramaphosa also gave the assurance that
black empowerment at boardroom level would be accompanied by empowerment in the
company’s newsrooms. “It’s early days yet, but major steps are going to be taken to transform
institutions and fortunately we have taken it up as a strategic objective to ensure we have a
fair, true representation of the country’s demographics in the make-up of our company.”
TML chief operating officer Lawrence Clarke denied that the 1985 closure of the Rand
Daily Mail had been politically motivated. Although he was not party to the decision, he said
he had spoken to directors who were involved and they were adamant the decision was a
commercial one because not enough advertising revenue was coming in. But a former editor,
Raymond Louw, later said he believed the closure was politically motivated. He said the
Mail’s advertising executives had made only perfunctory attempts to get advertising this was
told to him by a senior advertising source.
Clarke said Times Media’s predecessor, South African Associated Newspapers, had
been in dire financial straits in 1985 and he was convinced that the group would have
collapsed if the Mail had not been closed. He said SAAN and TML had hired and fired more
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editors than any other group, but they had always been replaced by editors who believed in
the same ideals as their predecessors. He was unable to explain how a person like John Horak,
who was widely suspected of being a police spy, and who admitted such to the Truth
Commission, could have been promoted to a position where he was able to easily monitor, via
the company’s computers, the output of any journalist. Clarke acknowledged the concept was
“horrifying”.
Horak had earlier told the hearing that he had been a police spy and he claimed many
senior editors knew of his work but did not take any action against him during the apartheid
era. He singled out former Sunday Times editor Tertius Myburgh as one of the editors who
had knowingly co-operated with him as an informer. But, Raymond Louw said he had been
suspicious of Horak but without evidence he could not do anything. Louw said the Mail had
been concerned about bugging, especially after a 1965 expose of inhumane treatment in South
African prisons, and he had often resorted to having important conversations in passage-ways
or writing notes to his staff. His successor Allister Sparks, who heads the SA Broadcasting
Corporation’s television news department, had discovered after the Muldergate scandal that
his secretary was a police spy.
Louw said he had not attempted a spy-hunt in the news room as it would have
demoralised his staff. Instead he only discussed sensitive stories with a few trusted staff.
Lawrence Clarke also claimed a proud record for the former SAAN group in opposing
apartheid and for encouraging dialogue.
Both the Independent Newspapers group and the Times Media group

said they had

not interfered in the work of their editors but that their editors had always been mindful of
“their fiduciary duties to their shareholders” which meant they did not risk pushing the
borders of press freedom that the alternative newspapers later showed off to great effect.
Security Police spies
A former security policeman, Vic McPherson, told the commission’s special hearing on the
media that there had been more than 40 informers working for the old intelligence services in
the newsrooms of South African newspapers in the late 1980s. He said their role had been to
spy, to manipulate news and to ensure positive coverage of the police and military.
The state president at the time, Mr F. W. de Klerk had been fully briefed about these
clandestine “strategic communications”, Mr McPherson told the commission. McPherson was
in charge of the security police’s Stratcom unit in 1989 and 1990. He said he had personally
established a network of about 40 “contacts” in the media, including undercover police
officers, paid informers, well-disposed journalists and unwitting sources. The media had been
a target for infiltration because the state saw them as a tool for propaganda and counter-
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revolutionary strategies. One of the undercover police officers had been Craig Kotze, a police
captain who worked at the Star for six years. He later became a spokesman for Law and Order
Minister Adriaan Vlok, and subsequently communications adviser to Commissioner George
Fivaz. Another had been John Horak, who worked at several newspapers and the SABC for
27 years. McPherson said his own network had also included eight paid informers and about
30 other “contacts”. These agents had been based at more than a dozen news organisations
including the Sunday Times, The Pretoria News, the Star, Rapport, the SABC, Beeld, the
Citizen, South African Press Association, Reuters, the magazines Huisgenoot, Insig,
Republikeinse Pers, Rooi Rose and the BBC’s South African office.
The aim of media infiltration had been to wage “psychological warfare” against
liberation movements. All Stratcom projects had been approved by the Minister of Police and,
in principle, by the president. Many of the projects had been intended to discredit leaders of
the Mass Democratic Movement through the publication of prominent reports embarrassing
them. The budget for media-related Stratcom projects had been R50 000, out of a total
Stratcom budget of R4.5 million, McPherson said. The money had been used to pay
informants, for travel expenses and to entertain journalists. McPherson said he had personally
“run” six projects in various newspapers during 1989 and 1990.
Craig Kotze, news room spy
National Police Commissioner George Fivaz’s communications adviser Craig Kotze chose the
TRC hearings to come clean and “reveal” one of South Africa’s worst-kept secrets: that he
had been a security branch agent while he worked at The Star. From his testimony to the
Truth Commission, he came across as neither an able spy nor a capable journalist.
I was expected to operate like any other journalist and I was in fact often scooped by
opposition media on some big stories [like] the Winnie Mandela, Stompie Seipei and Olivia
Forsyth stories among them.

APPENDIX D

[Full text of Guy Berger comment piece published in the Mail & Guardian March 7,
1997.]
Nearly nobody noticed when F.W. de Klerk told the Truth Commission in 1996 that
government disinformation “could have created a climate” allowing for gross human rights
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violations to occur. This surprise admission stands in contrast to the way the press is
analysing its role during apartheid.
There has been some focus on those worst-case journalists who spied and lied on behalf
of the system. The dirt is coming out on how weak or pro-apartheid editors in the “liberal”
press spiked and censored stories that should have been published. There has been criticism
that conservatives in the “mainstream” media under PW Botha agreed to “keep their house in
order”, leaving it to the alternative weeklies to go it alone in exposing the worst abuses.
But there has been very little assessment of how even the liberal press performed dayto-day legitimation of racial domination − even if some papers criticised the corruption and
crimes that flowed so logically from this system. The Sunday Times recently recanted some of
its most brazen records, such as when it celebrated a murderous South African Defence Force
raid on Botswana with the headline: “The Guns of Gaborone”.
Then [the] Independent Newspapers drew up a dossier setting out historical
“shortcomings” in the way its papers − under the Argus Company − had accepted press
restrictions. In hot response, four retired editors of Independent papers have now defended
their personal records as campaigners against apartheid’s gross violations of human rights.
Harvey Tyson, former editor of the Star, declared he would never apologise for what he
had done as a journalist. Evidently, he has forgotten the regret expressed in his book Editors
Under Fire. In it, he admits to having fallen for security police manipulation in publicising
allegations that “KGB colonel” Joe Slovo had blown up his wife, Ruth First. Missing in this
entire flurry, however, is any scrutiny of how everyday, routine reporting reflected − and
contributed to a climate where black lives were cheap and human rights went unrecognised.
Unlike government supporters like the late former Sunday Times editor, Tertius
Myburgh, Harvey Tyson was a liberal editor. Yet like most whites, Tyson probably believed
the Slovo story to be plausible at the time. He viewed his role as a watchdog—but failed to
see any difference between the legitimate property owners and the real thieves. The liberal
press was, of course, not the same as the SABC which never seriously claimed to be anything
other than propaganda for apartheid.
But it was not as different as people like Tyson would like to think. It reflected
establishment assumptions where white newsmakers and white audiences counted. Blacks did
not. Only a few brave, white English-speaking journalists saw the role of black resistance
beyond their papers’ liberal − and limited − opposition.
Attacks by Nationalists added to the illusion harboured by many white liberal
journalists that the key actors were themselves and the government. Not black South Africans.
It is an understandable thing for people to assume that they are a leading force for freedom
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when victimised by a bullying government, and enduring court cases and ever tighter
legislative controls.
Liberal journalists may be forgiven for evaluating their role in relation to such
pressures. But this logic does fail to locate them in the broader sweep of things. The liberal
press operated in, and took its cues from, the prevailing white landscape.
A handful of white editors rose above the conventional wisdom of the day. They
“opened an account” and they paid a price: exile for Donald Woods, loss of their jobs in the
cases of Raymond Louw, Allister Sparks and Tony Heard.
White journalists like these, who tried to lead the white readership market, rather than
follow its prejudices and its interests, also ran into falling circulations. The decline was not
compensated for by black readers who failed to attract advertising revenue.
If it wasn’t such context that constrained the role of the liberal press, it was the
confined outlook of most white journalists. Many of these journalists did campaign against
“petty” apartheid. But macro-apartheid − especially after Bantustan independence − got less
critical attention. Coverage sometimes pilloried the pass laws; it routinely neglected the
wages paid to migrant workers. The problem with the liberal press is not only that its
opposition did not go far enough. Nor even that its champions like Tyson did not realise that
there was a lot further to go. What was worse was the day-to-day reflection of what South
Africa was about. Black people were invisible in most newspapers.
If you were Desmond Tutu, you got coverage − usually negative − in The Star. If you
were a golf caddie featured in a Daily Dispatch picture, you’d be lucky to have even been
photographed in the rain standing next to white men enjoying the shelter of an umbrella, with
your name captioned as “Jackson”.
The record of black journalistic advancement is similarly pitiful. In 30 years, no white
editor matched the record of Drum editor, Anthony Sampson, who empowered an historic
generation of top quality black reporters, writers and investigators.
To understand all this context is not to justify the role of the liberal press. It is to
explain it. The press today is unlikely to repeat its general complicity with the day-to-day,
humdrum mechanics of racial domination. But liberal journalists − of whatever colour − may
continue to overlook their role in legitimating other kinds of domination. This is the way that
the media represents how men dominate women, adults abuse children, urban people scorn
the rural, and the voices of the able drown out those of the disabled.
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F. W. De Klerk has acknowledged that the way that realities are reflected can
contribute to climate where human rights are violated. Journalists need to do likewise.
[The Mail&Guardian]

Appendix E
Final report of the Consultation on Press Systems in ASEAN Jakarta, Indonesia, 23-26
August, 1968.
Preamble:
ASEAN is a relatively young region, both in terms of independent history as well as the
level of development. But with relative stability and wealth of natural resources, it promises
to be the most dynamic region in the Pacific Basin.
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ASEAN is geographically, ethnically, culturally, historically, and economically diverse.
The extent of diversity has given rise to the development of unique national press.
The national press systems in ASEAN countries are, in turn, influenced by this
diversity. The wealth of publications in so many languages in the ASEAN countries is a
reflection of this unique situation.
It is clear that the ASEAN national press systems will continue to be influenced by the
domestic situation in each ASEAN country although the region itself is becoming more open
to outside influences.
The promotion and preservation of political stability, rapid economic growth, social
justice and greater regional cohesion should and will be the main priority of the ASEAN
press.
The degree of freedom among ASEAN national press varies according to the peculiar
geographical, racial, cultural, political and economic circumstances of each country.
Philosophical and legal bases of ASEAN press systems
The philosophy of ASEAN national press systems is based on a common understanding
of the nature of man:
of holistic man, both rational and emotional, and
of man in his cultural context, rooted in his understanding of community, authority, and
religion or spiritual belief.
This philosophy:
includes universal human values, as defined and filtered through each society’s cultural
and historical experience, and
influence the thrust of each society, and determines the direction and process of its
search for fulfilment.
This philosophy integrates the thinking of those components of society concerned with
the press system, including government, media, and the public, in their efforts to realise the
national aspirations.
The philosophy of ASEAN national press systems is operationalised through:
the Constitution, the laws, and administrative measures;
the electoral process and other mechanisms of participatory democracy; and
the media’s articulation of the philosophy as well as the actions arising from it.
In the light of the above, it is recommended:
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1.

That efforts be made to eliminate possible dissonance arising from differences in
perception between the participating elements in the ASEAN press systems: the
government, the media, and the public.

2.

That the media be actively involved in defining their character and role in each
society through mechanisms existing in the respective ASEAN nations.

3.

That the press be considered a partner in development, with the responsibility of:
(a)

professionalising its ethics and practice; and

(b) helping society progress in development and nation-building.
4.

That both press and government always recognise the cultural context within
which ASEAN societies develop, with a view to utilising the culture both as
background for understanding, and as base for change.

5.

That ASEAN nations consider each other’s range of experience as basis for
learning in such matters as: press ownership, press councils, embodying the
relationship of press and government in legislation, and other aspects of press
systems.

The above recommendations would contribute to the translation of philosophy to
practice in the ASEAN press systems.
Role and responsibility of the ASEAN press
Principles and recommendations, premised on the importance of working in an
atmosphere of freedom
1.

The primary functions of the ASEAN press are:
(a) to support efforts at nation-building and to be a partner in national
development;
(b) to promote and enhance relations between ASEAN member countries;
(c) to help mould a national identity;
(d) to promote social harmony;
(e) to help explain public issues and policies to facilitate their implementation;
(f)

to inform and educate;

(g) to exercise self-restraint and good sense so as not to cause misunderstanding
or tension between different ethnic, racial and religious groups.
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2.

To discharge these functions effectively and fully, it is vital that the media be
given adequate access to information, which is essential to the development
process.

3.

In promoting relations between ASEAN member states, the media have to be
mindful about certain reporting which could adversely affect, or even harm,
relations. Good sense and sound editorial judgement must at all times prevail.

4.

To promote ASEAN understanding, it is important that journalists of all ASEAN
member countries cultivate each other and maintain close links. This could
facilitate the verification of certain kinds of reports which may appear inaccurate
or slanted.

Freedom and responsibility of the ASEAN press
Objectives
1.

Since the ASEAN press is generally free in its day-to-day business, its objectives
should be to use that freedom in the most productive manner, taking into account
the many interest groups the ASEAN news media must serve.

2.

The press in the ASEAN region has a vital role in national development. Hence
development journalism should be encouraged.

3.

The press should make fair comments on all institutions that combine to make up
society as part of its freedom and responsibility.

4.

The national press of ASEAN countries carry heavy responsibility in exercising
freedom as they have to consider the element of loyalty to their countries as well.

5.

The national press in each ASEAN country should endeavour to look at problems
and issues in each member state from the ASEAN perspective.

Recommendations
1.

ASEAN journalists, journalistic institutions, publishers and those concerned with
press freedom in the ASEAN region should endeavour to encourage the adoption
of the objectives mentioned above.

2.

ASEAN governments should help promote a free, responsible and credible
national press with adequate access to information for the national press.
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